

**ADVOCACY PARTNERS FOR PEACE?
THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF PRIVATE SECTOR BUSINESS
AND SERVICE PROVIDERS
AS ACTORS FOR PEACE IN NIGERIA**

FOUR CASE STUDIES BY NSRP

JANUARY 2013



CONTENTS

Acronyms

1.0 Overview of the Study and Main Recommendations

2.0 Case Studies on the impacts of violent conflict

Study 1 On access to health services and facilities in Yobe state

Study 2 On the grains business in Kano state

Study 3 On the hotel industry in Jos, Plateau state

Study 4 On artisanal fishing communities in the Niger delta

Bibliography

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Acronyms

DFID	(UK) Department for International Development
ETS	Emergency Transport Services
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEMS	Growth and Investment in States (DFID supported programme)
HAPSSSA	Hotel and Personal Services Senior Staff Associations
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IA	International Alert
ICG	International Crisis Group
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
JAS	Jama'atu Ahli Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (known as Boko Haram)
JTF	Joint Task Force
KACCIMA	Kano Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Manufacturing and Agriculture
LGA	Local Government Area
MCHI	Maternal Newborn and Child Health Initiative
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MMR	Maternal Mortality Ratio
MNCH	Mother, Neonatal and Child Health
MSS	Midwife Service Scheme
NBS	National Bureau for Statistics
NDHS	National Demographic and Health Survey
NSRP	Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme
NUHPSW	National Union of Hotels and Personal Services Workers
NURTW	National Union of Road Transport Workers
PAYE	Pay as You Earn
PDP	People's Democratic Party
PHC	Primary Health Care
PRRINN	Partnership for Reviving Routine Immunization in Northern Nigeria
PSS	Private Sector Strategy
SME	Small and Medium Scale Enterprise
UMTH	University of Maiduguri Teaching Hospital
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAT	Value Added Tax

1.0 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY AND MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

Background: why is NSRP interested in business and services?

In Nigeria as elsewhere, violent conflict is generally bad for business and for services. A single attack can affect a regional economy, while ongoing violence can have impacts that are national in scope.¹ Some businesses do well out of conflict – the private security sector, legal and illegal arms sales and the drugs business tend to thrive. However, most legitimate domestic business suffers, as do essential services – particularly health and education. If employees of health clinics and schools migrate to escape the violence, these services can experience a long-term decline.

Local populations and livelihoods are affected not only by the primary acts of violence, but also the security measures put in place to stem these and apprehend protagonists. Security measures can be burdensome for business and services. For example, if borders are closed, international trade is restricted or ceases; if road blocks are numerous, the costs and time taken to transport goods will rise; if security checks involve paying bribes, this will add further to transportation costs and, in turn, prices at point of sale. Road-blocks and security checks can also make visits to health facilities impossible, prevent drugs for vaccinations getting through, and cause the closure of schools. When security forces take the law into their own hands (for example, if they loot or burn homes or make extra-judicial arrests) this can lead to further internal displacement and tension. In such cases the security forces become part of the problem.

These impacts suggest questions. First, given that business and services are negatively affected by violent conflict, do business owners and service providers (public or private) constitute a potential ‘advocacy’ group that do already, or could in future play a significant role in building and maintaining peace at a state or local level? Could business people be part of reconciliation efforts following violent conflict? Second, if business people and service providers are able and willing to play this role, what part might NSRP play in facilitating this? Further, is NSRP aware of the negative impacts of conflict on business and the impact that this has on livelihoods? Could it do more to help businesses, and therefore their employees – local women and men - to recover after major acts of violence?


This study was an opportunity to begin to answer these questions. It draws on International Alert’s (IA) work on the role of business in peacebuilding, particularly the findings from work with business in Uganda and Pakistan.²

¹ Potiskum in Yobe State used to have one of the largest livestock markets in Nigeria. A gun and grenade attack on 3rd May 2012 had devastating consequences. It halved market business overall, reduced the livestock market by 50 or 60% and reduced cattle prices by a third. Wider security measures compounded the effects – the closure of the border with Niger, Chad and Cameroon to stop the import of guns and fighters all but stopped international trade in the north. See: IRIN 2012.

² See for example International Alert (2006). In Pakistan skills training for vulnerable young men is the major way in which the business community is currently engaging with government, civil society and donors on action to prevent boys being drawn into groups that use violence. (Interview with IA staff working with the private sector business community in Pakistan, December 2012.)

International Alert (IA) has developed a spectrum of domestic private sector responses to violent conflict. The spectrum shows business as having a negative, conflict sustaining effect at one end and a positive, conflict reducing effect on the other. In the middle of the spectrum business is merely about coping/survival. Although the diagram below was developed to relate to business we would contend that services - education and health services for example - also have a similar range of responses to violent conflict.

Figure 1 - Spectrum of local business responses to conflict (can also apply to service providers)



Source: Banfield, Guinduz and Killick (2006:2)

International Alert's work with domestic private sector business in conflict environments indicates the kinds of roles that businesses can play in recovery processes. Drawing on different country examples IA notes that business can:

- i) Provide skills training and jobs for youth who are vulnerable to being drawn into violence by specifically targeting areas where there is violent conflict;
- ii) Participate actively in recovery processes. For example, in northern Uganda IA supported the formation and operation of the Northern Uganda Business Forum for Peace, a group of representatives from the district chambers of commerce, farmers' associations, market vendors and fishmongers associations. The Forum enabled local Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs) to have a voice in the recovery process, including in elections. In 2011 the membership chose to focus on addressing youth unemployment as a key peacebuilding goal for the economic recovery of the region (IA 2011:9).
- iii) Influence government security policy and/or dialogue processes that aim to reduce tensions/bring about peace.

Can Nigerian business - and services such as health and education - have similar roles in NSRP's focal states? This is a critical question for NSRP as it decides on whether there are peacebuilding opportunities for working closely with selected business and services.

Why this particular study now?

During its year long design and inception period, NSRP undertook a series of mapping studies to understand the role of different conflict actors and identify ways to support those with the potential to reduce violence and bring peace. However, NSRP made few contacts with either business leaders or individual SMEs at that time. NSRP realised this gap towards the end of the inception period. Consequently, in August 2012 NSRP's four Regional Co-ordinators were asked to undertake a study on businesses or services that they knew had been significantly affected by violence in their respective regions.

These case studies also had an internal capacity building element and functioned as an initial 'introduction' to the business environment for NSRP staff. As a programme, NSRP was aware that if it is to engage businesses and services in dialogue it needed to see the world from their perspective.

The aims of the four studies were undertaken to enable NSRP to:

- better understand the *impacts* of violent conflict on selected businesses and service providers in NSRP target states;
- ascertain the *coping, mitigation and recovery strategies* adopted by business people and service providers after incidents or periods of violence – with a view to (possibly) identifying means of supporting indigenous strategies (rather than imposing solutions from the outside);
- identify pathways whereby businesses and services might become *more effective advocates* for conflict prevention and peacebuilding – and to identify ways in which NSRP might support this.

There is an enormous range and scale of private business activity in Nigeria, particularly if the informal business sector is included. The case studies should therefore be seen as illustrative not representative. The studies focused on:

- Mother, Neonatal and Child Health (MNCH) services (Yobe State)
- Grain markets (Kano State)
- Hotel industry in Jos (Plateau State)
- Artisanal fishing in the Niger Delta (Bayelsa and Delta states)

In addition to answering questions for NSRP it was envisaged that study findings may also be relevant for other DFID funded programmes – particularly those directly involved with private sector business (e.g. the GEMS programmes) or health or education services.³ Indeed one of the case studies (on MNCH services in Yobe State) was undertaken at the behest of one programme - the Partnership for Reviving Routine Immunization in Northern Nigeria, Maternal Newborn and Child Health (PRRINN-MNCH). It was therefore anticipated at the outset that this initial

³ For example the DFID supported Growth and Employment in States programme (GEMS) and the various programmes supporting health and education services, including Partnership for Reviving Routine Immunization in Northern Nigeria, Maternal Newborn and Child Health Initiative (PRRINN-MCHI).

NSRP study on business and services would be a way of further opening dialogue with other DFID funded programmes.

Why focus on domestic business and not the oil and gas sector?

From the outset it was decided that the study would focus on the domestic private sector and not the transnational oil and gas companies operating in the Niger Delta. This is because the impact of violent conflict on the oil and gas sector has been a major research concern for at least two decades;⁴ in contrast domestic business has received little (if any) attention. This is understandable given the centrality of oil and gas to the Nigerian economy and the extent of production losses due to armed conflict and illegal bunkering. As Oyefusi notes (2007:1), oil business has been found to have the highest risk of civil conflict of all natural resources because of the large rents it offers and the shocks to which the government and the national economy are exposed. Moreover, the predominant focus on oil business is understandable given the scale of operations of the oil and gas majors, the institutionalised nature of their community development programmes (designed to give them licence to operate with local communities) and the degree of leverage they have with government on conflict and security issues. Clearly, oil business operates at a different scale to that of small business operators and service providers in Nigeria.

NSRP therefore decided to focus this initial study on domestic private sector business as an area that has so far received little attention. In future NSRP may decide to study the role of the oil and gas sector on conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

2.0 The case studies

The case studies were chosen on the basis of their importance to state economies and livelihoods but also for practical and security considerations. We needed business where a single individual (NSRP's regional coordinators) could undertake field research over the period of just six weeks (August-September 2012) and in states that were experiencing – or had experienced – very significant violence. The case studies chosen are as follows:

- Study 1 investigated the impacts of violence on **Mother, Neonatal and Child Health (MNCH) services in Yobe state**, particularly with regard to ante- and post natal services. This study was undertaken in conjunction with PRRINN-MNCH who had identified that many health workers, as non-indigenes, were leaving the state due to the violence and threats to their safety. From a DFID perspective it was anticipated that study findings would help 'rethink' models of support to health services in Yobe State.
- Study 2 investigated the impacts of the violence on the grain **markets (pricing and distribution) in Kano State**. There was a particular focus on the impacts of the high number of security check-points between Sabuwar-

⁴ For a summary of the literature relating to conflict in the Niger Delta region see World Bank (2008)

Kaura (the important grain market in the Kano-south senatorial district, some 180kms away from Kano) and Kano metropolis.

- Study 3 investigated the impacts of violence on the **hotel industry in Jos**. The focus was on the impacts for 10 hotels in Jos metropolis. The hotel industry has many downstream impacts (e.g. employment in support sectors – for example, hotel services and food stuffs), some of which were also investigated. The significance of the study is underscored by the fact that Jos was Nigeria’s tourist haven before the onset of violence.
- Study 4 investigated the impacts of violent conflict on two **artisanal fishing communities in the delta region**. The livelihoods of both communities chosen for study had been devastated by significant violence in the past and one question was how well they had been able to recover. This case study was also to address NSRP’s focus on addressing violence and impact of violence against women and girls. Women undertake fishing and fish marketing in both communities.

It is worth emphasising that this was NSRP’s first engagement with business and service providers. The initial focus for these studies was therefore on understanding violent conflict from a business and services perspective. The larger question – whether businesses could contribute to peacebuilding more generally - was not directly addressed during interviews. However, the findings of the case studies indicate NSRP’s potential role in this regard.

3.0 Main findings

This section presents two main findings from the case studies. The case studies themselves contain more detailed analyses of sector and location-based findings.

There are two overall findings. Each of these requires some explanation.

a) Local businesses and services studied are focusing on ‘coping/survival’; they are not currently playing a pro-active public role in conflict early warning, community reconciliation or wider business recovery.

In all four case studies the focus of business people and service providers interviewed was on the ‘coping/survival’ aspect of the spectrum detailed earlier. There was no indication that any of the businesses studied had played a proactive role in conflict prevention, in reconciliation or in peacebuilding more generally. The case studies indicate some of the reasons for this ‘coping-only’ emphasis.

First, with the exception of the Niger Delta study, violent conflict was ongoing. There was no peace agreement and settlement; violence was (and is) continuing. The fragmented, episodic nature of the conflict environment in the study areas (and Nigeria as a whole) means there is no single peace process. The uncertainty this creates makes business and services focus on maintaining their assets in a way that

means they can 'open for normal business' again when the local security situation improves. This is different to studies in post conflict settings where space has opened up for business people to come together and identify a peacebuilding role – as it did in Northern Ireland (Nelson 2000), South Africa, Sri Lanka (Killick et al 2005) or Uganda (Banfield et al, 2010).

A second reason why business and services are focusing on their own survival is the lack of any external help (financial or humanitarian) that would have eased the immediate burden of the violent conflict and 'freed them up' to play a more public role. When violence devastated the hotel industry in Jos, destroyed fishing businesses in the Niger Delta, made the transport of grains impossible in Kano State or massively reduced MNCH services in Yobe State those involved had no-one to turn to for help. In other words business and services remained on their own and they naturally focused on their own survival; they did not look to take on a wider 'public' peacebuilding or recovery role.

Third, the absence of a peacebuilding function might be attributed to the apparent lack of impetus (or institutional infrastructure) to meet collectively to discuss their joint recovery needs and demand that violence should be stopped and peace maintained. The issue here is not a lack of collective bodies – there are active associations in the areas studied, and indeed all over Nigeria in the form of business and professional associations, chambers of commerce, trade unions and community-based associations. However, it appears that at least in the sectors studied these associations did not see themselves as having a prevention/early warning or reconciliation role.

The same is true of services. In Yobe State, those who stayed in their jobs in order to respond to the needs of women and children made a strong effort to keep MCNH services open. This was despite the fact that most services had lost between a third and three quarters of all their staff. However, apart from the sharing of staff among facilities (and even between states – the University of Maiduguri Teaching Hospital (UMTH) sent doctors to Yobe State) there was no evidence that public health bodies had ever discussed what to do in case of violent conflict, how they might best respond when it broke out or what their role might be in preventing it.

This finding - of a lack of a joint response to violent conflict by umbrella bodies – may indicate a role for NSRP. There are examples in other countries of such associations bringing together business actors *before* violence breaks out, *during* violent conflict to help with reconciliation, and *after* violent conflict to aid recovery. There are examples of this occurring even when there are serious institutional barriers involved (e.g. ethnic and/or religious factionalism). **Engaging with such umbrella bodies is therefore a potential next step.** It would seem they could have a much more proactive role in both prevention and recovery than at present, particularly if organised to do this with external help.

b) Systematic recovery strategies need to be put in place as soon as there is sufficient 'peace'. Otherwise, many businesses will fail and services may never recover to pre-violence levels.

In two of the sectors studied – in Yobe State and Niger Delta - the violence led to large-scale migration. In Yobe State, a high health proportion of health service staff were Christian and non-indigene. In fleeing the violence many also left the state. Recovery in this case therefore means finding innovative ways to either facilitate the return of existing staff or to recruit new staff in a state with few training facilities for medical personnel. In the Niger Delta the fisher-folk from one community spent three months living in the bush or with relatives after the violence. When they returned they found that their assets (canoes, nets, etc.) had either been destroyed in the violence or stolen. Those that were determined to begin life again as fisher-folk (and many were) began from a low base; they had to borrow from moneylenders at high interest rates and then hire boats. Many could not do this and had to look for other work; for this they migrated again.

Although the circumstances and impacts of the violence were very different in Yobe State and the Niger Delta they had one similarity: the impacted businesses and services needed immediate help to get going again.

In the Niger Delta case study early action could have made a lot of difference to artisanal fishing businesses. There needed to be better information (about when it was safe to return home), better security to prevent looting and theft, credit facilities that would have allowed for fisher-folk to buy boats rather than rent them, and social counselling to mitigate the social problems that ensued, including increased alcoholism and drug abuse. None of these things were available and it is unlikely that that artisanal fishing will now recover to pre-violence levels in the affected communities.

As a programme NSRP has so far mainly focused on identifying how to help prevent violence from breaking out and ensuring that when it does there is an immediate and appropriate response from local, state and federal security providers. However, these studies raise the issue of **the longer-term economic consequences of violent conflict on ordinary people's lives – whether they are business owners, employees, clients or service users**. How might NSRP – or other bodies – respond to this? This issue is important, not least because the lack of help with recovery can induce a sense of hopelessness and increase a sense of grievance, neither of which is conducive to a long term peace.

4.0 Implications for NSRP

There are several implications for NSRP. First NSRP could begin to engage with major business organisations in its eight focal states, including but not only chambers of commerce. This is with a view to **bringing business 'in' to discussions of conflict prevention and peacebuilding**. There has already been a good precedent set for this. NSRP initiated discussions in Kano State which the President of Kano Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Manufacturing and Agriculture (KACCIMA), the security leadership and representatives of the Emir of Kano attended and discussed how to bring about a more sustained peace. This needs to happen at district and local level; it is part of NSRP's Output 1 activities.

Second, NSRP needs to be aware of the importance of **moving into an area fast**, as soon as the security situation permits, to help with recovery and reconciliation. It might do this through NSRP's **proposed grant mechanism or through identifying other funding sources** better able to respond to the needs identified. Thus, for example, the need for affordable credit is vital in the early days after violence has destroyed small businesses. Moreover, after particularly vicious violence that has killed many people the need for psychological counselling is also apparent. This is not an NSRP specific role but it could play a part in linking communities with agencies and organizations providing these services.

Third, there is an **advisory and co-ordination role** to play at all levels following violence. What do communities need immediately; what is available; what can be done to reconcile communities that have attacked each other; how can offers of help be experienced as non-partisan (and therefore not conflict-promoting)? What help might umbrella bodies like chambers of commerce or business associations give that is beyond their own members? NSRP already offers a technical advisory service to other DFID funded programmes about how to be 'conflict sensitive'. This is critical immediately following a period of violence as anyone seen to be benefitting unduly (e.g. through favouritism in government sponsored employment schemes) can be seen as favouring one side or the other, and thereby furthering a sense of grievance rather than mitigating it. NSRP has the expertise and the mandate to respond to government and donor requests for advice in these circumstances.

Finally NSRP needs to help businesses in its focal states **move from the 'coping /survival' emphasis that they currently have to the 'conflict reduction/peacebuilding' role that they could potentially play**. Businesses – and business associations – have a potential role to play as advocates on wider peace issues: ways to address local grievances that underlie conflict, early warning systems, an appropriate security response. The issue of response is particularly important – all the business and services in this study suffered additional losses as a result of the ferocity of the security force response or decisions to close borders and set up hundreds of additional roadblocks along trade routes. Advocacy for proportionate and disciplined security responses to violent conflict may therefore be a good entry point for those businesses willing to become involved in wider conflict reduction and peacebuilding dialogue and action.

STUDY 1. IMPACT OF VIOLENT CONFLICT ON ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN YOBE STATE

1.0 BACKGROUND

Yobe is a mostly rural state with a large land mass of sparsely populated communities and settlements located at long distances. The North East and North West zones have the worst health indices in the country. Yobe State could arguably be described as being worse off than other states in the North East zone; it has an infant mortality rate of 100 per 100,000 live births and an under five mortality rate of 217 per 100,000 (2003 National Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS) estimation MDG4). While the MDG5 indicator puts the national Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) at 800 per 100,000 live births, that of the North East was 1,547 per 100,000 (NDHS 2006). A recent estimate of the MMR, using the indirect sisterhood method⁵ in a rural LGA in Yobe revealed an alarming MMR of 3,200 per 100,000 live births and a lifetime risk of dying from pregnancy related complication of 1 in 6. (Goni, 2005)⁶

The health sector is under resourced and understaffed, with one Primary Health Care (PHC) facility per 5000 population. The 17 Local Government Authorities (LGAs) put together have a total of 460 health facilities, with only 40 nurses and midwives. The entire state has only 61 doctors. The mortality rates reflect the dire lack of service provision. The study began on the assumption – which turned out to be correct – that the current wave of violent conflicts has significantly worsened this situation.

This study was undertaken in August and September 2012. It looked at the impacts of violent conflict on health care facilities and staff since November 2011. The study compares changes in access to health care over a nine month period, from November 2011, the baseline date, to August/September 2012.

Study objectives

This study was slightly different to the other three case studies undertaken as part of this research. This is because it was undertaken at the request of a DFID programme – the Partnership for Reviving Routine Immunization in Northern Nigeria, Maternal Newborn and Child Health (PRRINN-MNCH) and undertaken by NSRP as part of the service it provides to other DFID funded programmes operating in conflict-affected environments. This study is also different from the other studies insofar as it focused on a service – health care – rather than a commercial business.

The aim of the study from the PRRINN perspective was to determine the degree of attrition of staff in the health sector as a result of the violent conflict in Yobe State. For NSRP, the study served as a proxy for assessing the impact of violent conflict on

⁵ This is a research method using a living sister to find out the cause of death of a deceased sister/relative who died in pregnancy related complications. A survey is carried out among reproductive age mothers, asking them whether they had ever lost a sister or a relation in this manner. It was discovered that in 100 women, at least 10 or more women had this experience.

⁶ All figures are as quoted in the 'Proceedings of Yobe Economic Summit 2008' – an official document published in 2008.

the health sector as a key service sector. It also allowed for an investigation into coping and recovery mechanisms on the part of health facilities affected by violence.

Specific objectives were:

- To ascertain the impact of violent conflicts on access to health services and facilities by women and children in three selected communities in three LGAs of Yobe State
- To understand the experiences of post/ante natal women in terms of access to immunisation and other quality health care services
- To determine the perception of health workers on levels of threat and what can be done
- To find out the number of health staff (including midwives on the MSS scheme) who have left due to violence or the threat of violence
- To find out if staff has been replaced, and how the health facilities are coping with, and or managing, including who is filling the gaps.
- To understand the impact of violent conflicts and security road blocks and check points on vaccines/cold chains – from the perspectives of health workers and mothers
- To also draw from the experiences of Emergency Transport Scheme members of the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW).

Methodology

The study was undertaken in two health centres covering one urban area (the State Specialist Hospital, Gujba Road, Damaturu) and one rural area (Family Support Maternity and Child Welfare Center), both in Damaturu LGA. In addition, Dapchi, the headquarters of Bursari LGA (about 108km from Damaturu) was chosen in order to get the views of the members of the Emergency Transport Services (ETS). It was originally proposed that two urban and two rural centres be studied in order to compare the impact of violence on inhabitants of the two settings. However due to the ongoing violence it was not possible to focus on four centres and two were chosen.

All information was collected through individual interviews. These were with health facility staff, women patients visiting the facilities, and emergency transport workers.

The study began with an initial visit to introduce the study to stakeholders - administrators of health facilities, Chief Medical Directors (CMDs) and PRRINN staff. The PRRINN consultant Dr Ashiru Garba was also interviewed in his office at the University of Maiduguri Teaching Hospital (UMTH). He provided some valuable suggestions on how to go about the study. This facilitated the collection of information on clinic days for ante/post natal at the health centres, where all categories of patients could easily be accessed.

Security challenges encountered

There were several challenges with the field research. Initially this had been planned as a joint endeavour with PRRINN staff. In the event no PRRINN staff or their field workers were available in Damaturu and their office (as any other public office then)

was closed due to the violence. Hence all interviewing had to be undertaken by the NSRP Regional Coordinator on her own. Original plans for interviewing were therefore revised; for example, the initial number of expectant and nursing mothers to be interviewed was 100 but due to security constraints and the lack of any PRRINN partner the number of these respondents was reduced to 50.

The study was not completed as planned due to the escalation of violence in and around Damaturu during the field research period. This included the burning down of a number of telecommunication mast installations so that all communication within and from Yobe became impossible for two weeks. At one point, a 24 hour curfew was imposed for three days in Damaturu and Potiskum. Due to these various security incidents field research had to be telescoped into just 10 days as it was not safe enough to stay for longer.

A total of 89 interviews were conducted, as follows:

1. Expectant and nursing mothers	50
2. Doctors	4
3. Nurses & midwives	10
4. Administrators	3
5. Members of Midwife Service Scheme	Nil
6. Cold chain staff	1
7. Emergency Transport Services	21

2.0 FINDINGS: IMPACTS ON STAFF, PATIENTS AND FACILITIES

The study showed that in the nine month period (from November 2011 to August 2012) violent conflicts have impacted negatively on all categories of stakeholders as well as on all services and facilities. The sections below detail the impacts on four groups and institutions: health workers, end users, health centres and emergency transport workers. Table 1A provides a summary of some of the findings.

Table 1A: Impact of violence on selected stakeholders

	Category	Left the job and the state	Threat-ened	Killed	Delivered at home	Returned home without vaccine at least once
1	Expectants and Nursing Mothers				16	19
2	Doctors	6	6			
3	Nurses/Midwives	8	6	1		
4	Others	6				

Source: NSRP field survey

(i) Impacts on Health Workers

There has been a significant attrition of health workers. A proportion of all categories of health workers have left their posts and not returned. The percentages of those leaving since November 2011 due to the violence are as follows:⁷

⁷ These figures were given by the Director, Primary Health Care Service, Damaturu, August 2012

Table 1B: Percentage loss of health workers by relocation

Category	Extent of relocation (%)
Medical doctors	33
Midwife Service Scheme staff	75
Nurses and Midwives	24
Other medical personnel	13

Source: NSRP field survey

In addition, some health workers have been physically attacked (by police); one died as a result of the general violence. Due to the shortage of staff all staff now have had to work four extra hours per shift (facilities now have two 12 hour shifts rather than three 8 hour shifts).

(ii) Impacts on End Users – mothers and children

As a result of the violence the access of expectant and nursing mothers to health care staff and facilities had significantly declined. In summary:

- Access of mothers and children to health services has declined – mothers cannot get to health services, especially at night due to state imposed curfews and whenever there are violent incidences during the day. Consequently more mothers have delivered at home, particularly at night
- Children have had much reduced access to immunisation. Vaccines have not always been available, and sometimes mothers have had to return home without their children being immunised
- Increased vulnerability for mothers who fled the city to rural areas and farm houses (increased reporting of both skin diseases and malaria).

(iii) Impact on Health Centres

- Health centres remained open despite the curfew, but some had very few health staff. 38% of patients interviewed said they were sent back home at least once
- Attendance at health centres declined. Below is the attendance pattern for one centre – figures for August 2012 shows a 60% drop in attendance at the centre compared to November 2011.

Table 1C: Monthly attendance at health centres

November 2011	450
December 2011	447
January 2012	439
February 2012	449
March 2012	421
April 2012	395
May 2012	391
June 2012	389
July 2012	260
August 2012	271

Source: NSRP field survey

- Vaccine delivery had completely stopped to the Family Support Maternity Hospital, Damaturu at the time of the interview. There had been no vaccine delivery for 3 weeks. This centre had served an average of 408 women/children a month prior to June 2012
- The cold chain was not being maintained. This was partly due to the fact that the store is located down town, in a Jama'atu Ahli Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (JAS) stronghold area, where everybody was afraid to travel to.

(iv) Impact on Rural Emergency Transport Workers

- Community voluntary workers had completely stopped taking women to the urban health centres (the urban health centres are the only place for quality care, yet the 21 volunteers could not reach the urban centre due to the violence)
- The community volunteer drivers - most of who did not own vehicles, but took them on loan - had to continue paying the vehicle owners even though the violence prevented them from making sufficient money to make these returns.⁸ They had no help from anyone.

3.0 RESPONSE MEASURES TAKEN BY HEALTH ESTABLISHMENTS

Health establishments have tried to adjust to the impacts of the violence and to maintain services where they can. However this has not been easy and has shifted the burden of work to remaining staff. Response measures by health establishments include:

- Adjusting shifts to longer working hours from three 8 hours shifts to two 12 hour shifts per 24 hour period
- Using ambulances to convey staff to and from their homes since public transport was not easily available
- Consultant Doctors from University of Maiduguri Teaching hospital providing cover for short periods in Yobe on contract
- Drafting in student nurses/midwives to fill the gaps in the times of dire need
- Housing many of the staff in vacant buildings within the hospital premises.

4.0 CONCLUSIONS - AND LESSONS FOR PRRINN AND NSRP

Health services for women in Yobe, like the businesses studied, have been seriously impacted by violence. Overall attrition rates may be as high as 50%; this inevitably has negative implications for women and children's health. The first response of health facilities – like that of businesses – has been to try to 'cope', albeit with reduced staff and resources. The two facilities visited were trying to stay open and provide a service as best they could. Individuals were working longer hours, some

⁸ Private vehicle owners hire drivers who make money by carrying passengers who pay. However the drivers who have signed up to the rural emergency transport scheme voluntarily carry emergency cases for free – although only when emergencies arise. These drivers still have to fuel the buses they use as well as remit takings to the owners of the bus. Incidents of violence, especially when combined with an increase in women asking for transport to hospital, means they are negatively impacted as more of their work is done for free but they must still remit returns.

were earning less, and some were being drafted in for short periods, including from Borno State.

A major question going forward is whether those health staff that left their jobs and fled the area – most of them women - will return to work when the violence subsides. We do not know the answer, as the study did not interview anyone that had left. However, their return seems unlikely given that most of the women are health care workers on contract from states in southern Nigeria. They are mainly Christians and non-indigenes. These three factors – the fact they are women, Christians and non-indigenes – may make them afraid to return, conscious that violence could again flare up and they might be trapped or even targeted. Also, being non-indigenes from the south makes it likely that they have homes to go to. Moreover, as health workers there are likely to be places where they can work that are safer than Yobe at the present time.

If this supposition is correct – and more research is needed to confirm it – then there are implications for the long-term delivery of health care in Yobe State. If health staff do not return then immediate emergency planning is required, given that Yobe is already an underdeveloped state, underserved by health services even when there is no violence, with - currently - insufficient numbers of trained health workers to replace those that have left.

From a PRRINN (and Yobe State Government) perspective one longer-term question is 'How are health staff to be replaced?' And in the shorter term, 'How are women and children's health care needs going to be met whilst services lack capacity?'

From an NSRP perspective one conclusion is that a study on the impact of violence on health services (even more than on business) makes a good advocacy tool for stimulating action from government and other relevant development partners. Health services are about people's basic survival, literally life and death. The deaths of women in childbirth and the lack of vaccinations for children (two key goals of the MDGs) are reasons for the government and all involved parties to heed calls to take action on bringing violence to an end. Research of this sort can be used to make a powerful case to end violence whilst also reflecting the need for emergency action to help the most vulnerable endure periods of conflict and then recover from it.

As a programme that offers a 'conflict service' to other DFID programmes NSRP also learnt an important lesson. This was that effective provision of such a 'help' service can only occur if there is a true partnership with the other programme. This requires sufficient joint planning at the outset. On this occasion there was insufficient dialogue with our PRRINN partners so that the study had to be conducted by NSRP staff alone. The result was that it remains incomplete and reliant on less data than was originally envisaged. In the future NSRP will ensure there is much more time made for a joint agreement on field research plans and respective responsibilities and roles. On the positive side, there is a good indication from both DFID and PRRINN that this is just the beginning of the relationship and further joint action is desired and planned.

STUDY 2. IMPACTS OF VIOLENT CONFLICT ON THE GRAINS BUSINESS IN KANO STATE

1.0 BACKGROUND

Kano State is one of the key strategic states of Northern Nigeria, with a population of over 9 million people. It is the most populous state of the Federal Republic of Nigeria with many pressures on its social and economic structures. The prevailing violent conflict and insecurity has led to the stagnation of the growth of businesses, impeded the free flow of goods and services and affected the distribution of food items.

The main reason for carrying out this study was to assess the impact of violence on one important economic sector: the grains business. Specifically the aim was to identify the extent to which the people involved in two major grain markets in Kano State (Sabuwar Kaura and Dawanau) have been affected by the violence and the coping and recovery strategies they have adopted.

Objectives of the study

More pointedly, the study aimed to:

- Understand the impact of violent conflict on grains business as one of the major labour employers in Kano
- Assess the economic contribution of the grains business to the various controlling authorities prior to, during and after a period of violent conflict
- Assess the capacity of those dependent on grains business to mitigate, adapt or recover from the impact of problems associated with violent conflict, i.e. to understand indigenous coping and recovery strategies
- Identify how NSRP and others can help to increase their recovery capability
- Increase NSRP familiarity with business and services stakeholders in Kano state, for future partnership work on reducing violent conflicts.

Methodology

This research covers two major markets of the grains business in Kano: Sabuwar Kaura and Dawanau grains markets. The methodology for this study included in-depth interviews, observations and a review of existing data. Interviews were conducted with the following groups in August 2012:

- *Grain sellers* - the different sellers associations and their hierarchy were first identified; 13 different grain sellers were interviewed from Sabuwar Kaura market and 24 grain sellers from Dawanau Market
- *Grain transporters* – in order to understand the contribution made in the chain of grains between the two markets, representatives of eight different grains transporters were interviewed in Sabuwar Kaura market and 14 drivers were observed and interviewed in Dawanau market
- *Market users*: a group of users who patronize the Sabuwar Kaura market from neighbouring villages and communities were interviewed
- *Grain carriers* (Yan Dakon Hatsi). These are the people whose main job is to carry loads of grains and upload these onto trucks or download them whenever there is an exchange between the buyers and sellers. Three different categories

of such men were interviewed in Sabuwar Kaura market and six carriers in Dawanau market.

More interviews were carried out in Dawanau market as it is the largest grains market in Kano State and there was a greater availability of all categories of respondent (grain sellers, their associations, carriers and buyers).

Sabuwar Kaura and Dawanau Grains Markets

Sabuwar Kaura market is located in Doguwa Local Government Area. It is a grains market stationed to receive agricultural products from farmers in Zaria and Saminaka LGAs in Kaduna State and some other neighbouring villages. It is from there that most grains and other agricultural product are transported to Dawanau Market in Kano State. It is therefore a link for buyers and sellers.

Dawanau grains market is one of the biggest grains market in West Africa, and is a major link for almost all West Africans grains businessmen according to the chairman of grains sellers. It is situated in Ungogo LGA in Kano State, and is visited by people coming to buy food items from all parts of Nigeria as well as neighbouring countries.⁹

2.0 FINDINGS

This section looks at the impacts and coping strategies adopted at both Dawanau and Sabuwar Kaura grains markets; it also looks at how anticipated risks were managed or addressed. Sometimes quotations from respondents are used to support a point.

Responses from the people interviewed at both Dawanau and Sabuwar Kaura grains market show that the recent spate of bombings in Kano (from January 2012) and the continuing insecurity had impacted negatively on all aspects of the grains business. This was clear from the significantly reduced number of marketers who come to both of the markets for business before and after the recent violent incidents.

The respondents were asked how the conflict and bombings affects their business. Their responses varied, but are summarized as follows:

(i) Reduced volume of grains transported

The first question asked was whether the violent conflict experience in Kano in and after January 2011, had affected the grains business in the two markets. According to the sellers, drivers and carriers, it has affected their business and their income because the volume of the grains transported has reduced by about 75%. According to Isma'ila Nayaya, a carrier at Dawanau Market: 'Prior to the occurrence of the

⁹ Dawanau Grains market is governed by an association of grains sellers, with a leadership structure and hierarchy. The chairman of the grains sellers at the time of the field study was Alhaji Muhammadu Abdullahi Koya; there is also a treasurer, vice chairman and other executive members of the association. They control all the affairs of the market. It is through the structure of this association that the researchers were able to conduct the interviews for this study.

bombings in Kano, every week we would upload and download up to 200 trucks, but after the violent incidents hardly could we load up to 50 trucks in a week’.

The above quotation is also in line with one of the assertion by the Chairman of Dawanau Grains Sellers Association, who said that: ‘More than 200 trucks were sold every week before the January 2011 incident, while between February and April they managed to sell 34 to 67 in a week, but from April up to the present time (August) only 73 trucks could be sold in Dawanau market’. Sabuwar Kaura market is not as big as Dawanau, but it links with local farmers who usually come to sell their farm produce there; it is then transported to Dawanau Market. One of the marketers, Sallau Haruna, said that ‘Because most of what is taken to Dawanau now is not usually sold, it affects Sabuwar Kaura market as well’.

(ii) Increased transportation costs

The cost of transporting grains before and after the bombings and conflict in Kano needs to take account of the season, the types of trucks used for transportation, the destination and the quantity.

The overall finding is that the cost of transportation more or less doubled between January and August 2012. This was due to the 35 additional check points set up by security personnel between the two markets and the fact that all loaded vehicles had to stop at these checkpoints and pay to get through. (There are already 117 check points within the Falgore Game Reserve on the major road between Sabuwar Kaura and Dawanau, a distance of 290 kms.) This added an extra two hours to the journey time (the journey took an average of seven hours rather than five); it also significantly increased costs as drivers had to pay the security forces at each of these check points in order to be allowed through. If they did not pay the security forces would ask them to unload all their grains and then to load them again. According to the Chairman:

The cost of transporting grains from one market to another has almost doubled now. This is because security check points are more visible than they were before, and at each check point the drivers must pay a certain amount of money to avoid unloading the grains and loading them back again.

In other words the security personnel manning the check points ask for money and the drivers pay this in order to stop being asked to download all their cargo and then reload it. This, according to Samaila Ya’u, a truck driver, is now part of the normal routine for security personnel at check points. They ask the drivers for ‘Kudin pure water’, meaning a bribe, and if they don’t pay unnecessary delays follow. Another respondent was of the view that the number of security points has significantly affected the number of people coming from other state and other neighbouring countries, like Niger, Cameroun, and Senegal and as far as Mali.

(iii) Impact on incomes of buyers, sellers and carriers of grains

The major grains sellers have lost a great many of their customers because of the bombings. This includes many customers who come from neighbouring states, communities and countries like Niger, Mali, Cameroun, etc. This loss of customers

could be long term. Most of the grains sellers interviewed were afraid that they would lose their long term customers as a result of the security situation. Some individuals have gone out of business because they could not stand the pressure of the impact. If the volume of grains and the number of sales decline then their earnings plummet. This was especially the case with those who relied on the customers that come from other states and countries within the African region.

The majority of carriers in both markets stayed without income during and immediately after the crises. As carrying grains was their main means of livelihood it negatively impacted on their family, including their food intake as their feeding depended on their daily work at the grains markets.

(iv) Impact on end users/consumers

In general, the bombings and other conflict violence experienced in the state, has reduced the number of customers who come to both Sabuwar Kaura and Dawanau markets to buy grains. This is directly because of the violence but also because of the security intensification, which hitherto had not hindered the movement of grains from either Sabuwar Kaura to Dawanau or from Dawanau to other places within and outside the state.

For the end-users interviewed, the bombings and the conflict has drastically reduced the volume of grains they buy and thus the food they eat. This was because of increased prices of grains and because 'our income is no longer what it used to be' implying that their daily income had decreased since the bombings.

(v) Recovery and mitigation strategies: what could be done to help

The respondents were asked what would have helped them recover from these impacts on their business. The majority said that if the security operatives on the road had not mounted road blocks, or extorted money from the drivers, the customers would have continued coming to patronize them and in essence the chain would have been sustained and the impact would have been minimized to a large extent.

The Dawanau Grains Sellers Association has taken some mitigating action since the crisis. According to the Chairman, the association has contacted customers within and outside Nigeria and, through the drivers association, agreed to send grains to them; on receiving the grains the customers will send the money they owe. This arrangement has reportedly helped members of the Dawanau Grains Sellers Association maintain some of their important customers, especially those coming from other countries - including Niger, Cameroun, and even Mali (although it means the grain sellers must wait for payment).

The Chairman of Dawanau Grains Sellers Association also reports that the association has also now formed a relationship with the security operatives so as to ease some of the difficulties affecting the grains business, especially the transport chain, which is vital to the entire grains business in Nigeria.

3.0 CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NSRP

Kano in general, and all Kano businesses, are drastically affected by the impact of the bombings and violent conflict within the state. The grains business, like other business has suffered a major setback. This is according to all the respondents in this study, who were involved in marketing, transporting, loading and unloading from both markets investigated.

The problem of insecurity has been compounded by the way and manner the security operatives are conducting the affairs of managing the security in the state, which has seriously affected most business.

The main association of grains sellers is helping to manage the impacts of the conflict on its members, whilst at the same time cooperating with the state in order to ensure that some of the hurdles to transportation are removed.

The action taken by the Dawanau Grains Sellers Association indicates the importance of having a representative business organization that is prepared to take action on behalf of its members when violent conflict occurs. By organizing to send the grains to international buyers it has helped prevent the loss of important long-term customers. The organization also appears to have had some influence on the behaviour of the state security forces, which were directly contributing to customer and grain business losses.

Lessons for NSRP

The first lesson is that NSRP **should not expect small businesses to automatically become 'peacemakers' more generally.** Businesses will concentrate on 'coping-survival' (the middle of the spectrum presented in the introduction) as their primary goal during periods of violent conflict. That said the Grains Sellers Association did take action to help its members maintain their international trade partners. This indicates that higher profile, encompassing business bodies like this (e.g. trade associations, chambers of commerce) might be persuaded to play more public longer-term peacebuilding roles if individual member businesses would benefit, and if there was sufficient incentive (e.g. technical help) to encourage them to do this.

The second lesson follows from the first. It is that **business associations (rather than individual businesses) are likely to be the best potential collaborators and interlocutors for NSRP.** They might be expected to be willing partners on initiatives that enabled their members to maintain their livelihoods during periods of violent conflict, to speed their recovery afterwards and prevent the re-occurrence of violence in future.

Recommendations

It is **recommended that NSRP investigate and identify the major business associations in each state** – and their overall bodies, chambers of commerce and equivalents - with a view to **including their representatives in discussions about how to end violent conflict and bring about a sustainable local peace.**

Thousands of people are dependent on these business associations and subscribe to them. All of them need peace to make a living, and a profit.

It is also recommended that **NSRP work closely with other DFID programmes** (e.g. GEMS 1-3), to better understand and build on their relationships with business associations. Some of these association, unbeknown to NSRP at present but already DFID partners, may be willing to engage with NSRP on a peace-building agenda.

STUDY 3. IMPACT OF VIOLENT CONFLICT ON HOTEL BUSINESSES IN JOS, PLATEAU STATE

1.0 BACKGROUND

The hotel business is a key sub-sector of the tourism industry in Plateau State. Increasing tourism is one of the main industrial targets of the Plateau State Government's economic growth strategy. The drive to nurture its tourism sector to world class standards stems from the natural advantage of the climatic conditions the state enjoys from its temperate weather and the beautiful rock formations.

The sector is a growing employer of labour through its direct business operations, the value chains it creates for other business to thrive and its contribution to internally generated revenue. It contributes about 8% to employment generation.¹⁰ The performance of the sector as an environmental mood reflector is however largely dependent on the existence of a peaceful environment, security, and high economic and social activities for it to thrive. However, the protracted violent conflicts in the State that started in September 2001 to July 2012 have slowed down economic activities and reduced the influx of tourists to the state.¹¹

A substantial literature now exists on the conflicts in Jos (ICG, 2012, Higazi, 2012, 2011, 2007; Krause 2011; Ostien 2009; HRW, 2001). However the study of its impact on hotel business is yet to gain as much attention from scholars. One of the recent studies on conflict and businesses is the Plateau State Private Sector Strategy Development by HND Plateau PSS Report, 2012. This study investigated ten agricultural and non-agricultural businesses in Plateau State. Tourism was one of the three non-agricultural sectors studied and included an examination of the importance of hotel businesses to the tourism industry. However, a study on the private sector in Plateau state (Chessa et al 2012) noted that Jos has the next largest number of hotels after Lagos, Port Harcourt and Kano and that in 2006, 23% of the State's GDP came from crop production and 62% from hotels and restaurants. This indicates the importance of hotel businesses to the economy of Jos.

This study examined the impact of two major periods of violent conflict in Jos i.e. the violence that started in November 2008 and the violence that began in January 2010. The aim was to look at the 'before and after' impacts on the hotel industry of both periods of violence.

2. CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY

Context

Jos is the capital of Plateau State and was established around 1910 with the mining of tin by the colonial regime. It is a miniature Nigeria as it is comprised of the various

¹⁰ National Bureau for Statistics (2006) as cited in Chessa et al (2012b).

¹¹ Chessa et al (2012b) p. 73 'Local and foreign tourists no longer visit Plateau state because of the conflict situation and the negative perception accorded the state in terms of security. There has been a drastic fall in tourist inflow from 115,754 visitors in 2000 to 16,857 in 2011'.

ethnic groups that can be found in the various parts of Nigeria. As a cosmopolitan city with its usual pluralistic characteristics, the city has always been renowned for its temperate climate and the hospitality of people in the state. The city gained from immigration in terms of economic growth. However the social diversity thus created has become one of the factors underlying the protracted violence since 2001.

The violent conflict time line indicates that Jos was not immune from violent conflict before 2001. In 1994, shortly before the 1999 civilian regime there was mass protest against the appointment of Aminu Mato as the Chairman of Jos North LGA. The outbreak of violence in Jos in September 2001 quickly spread to escalate the conflicts already going on in the southern part of the state. The major violence of May 2002, around the People's Democratic Party (PDP) primaries in Jos North LGA, was followed six years later by major violence in November 2008 around the Jos North Local Government election. This was then followed by the January 2010 violence. The pattern of conflict in Jos has changed over time; violence now often involves terror attacks that cause large-scale destruction of lives and property.

Methodology

The sources of data for the study included questionnaire, interviews and observation. The study sampled nine hotels and questionnaires were distributed to the sampled hotels. The questionnaire was completed by hotel staff members. The researcher interviewed hotel managers in order to clarify issues arising from the questionnaires. Staff selected for interview included those who were working at the time of the study and those who had been retrenched due to a fall in business. Others interviewed included staff of the Plateau State Board of Internal Revenue, the Plateau State Tourism Board and the National Union of Hotels and Personal Services Workers (NUHPSW). Members of Hotel and Personal Services Senior Staff Associations (HAPSSSA) were also interviewed in the one hotel where there are members (the Hill Station Hotel in Jos). The related businesses that operate within the hotels studied were also identified and monitored.

3. FINDINGS

The following sections summarise the main findings from the analysis of data collected through the questionnaires, interviews and field observations. These findings are presented in terms of impacts on the four main concerns of the study: impacts on the hotels as a business, on hotel staff, on other businesses and on the government.

(i) Impact of violence on the hotels

The study found there were multiple impacts of the violence on the hotels. These are described below:

- **Loss of patronage/revenue to hotels.** As a result of the impact of the 2008 and 2010 violence, hotels in the state experienced a sharp drop in the sales of rooms and conference facilities. The average rate of room usage in Jos before November 2008 was about 40%, after the November 2008 violence the average room usage ranged

fell to 25%; in the following twelve months after the January 2010 violence the occupancy dropped to an average of 18%. There were weeks when occupancy was down to four rooms or none at all in some hotels, except for the armed security men occupying hotel rooms for free. From the interviews, respondents attributed the poor patronage to the protracted nature of the conflicts and the media reportage that scared off potential visitors to the state. This had resulted in a very significant loss of revenue.

The drop and fluctuation in the sales on conference facilities in the hotels were attributed to the impact of the violent conflicts immediately after the occurrence of violence in 2008. From mid 2009 we cannot entirely attribute the loss of business for the use of conference halls to the violence as the use of privately run gardens, halls and catering service outfits started gaining ground in Jos around that date. Most of the affluent elites now prefer to host their weddings and other social gatherings in these more aesthetically styled halls.

- **Increased costs of operation.** The costs of operating hotel business increased as a direct result of engaging armed security personnel during and after the occurrence of violent conflict. One of the hotels studied incurs a cost of about ₦5m annually as a result of the facilities provided for armed security men hosted within the hotel.

The cost of getting supplies to the hotels had also increased due to curfews imposed in the early days of the violence and the initial fear of reprisal attacks and silent killings that usually follow such incidents. The curfews meant there were fewer suppliers to the hotels due to the severe restrictions on the movement of goods.

- **Non-payment of cash obligations.** The hotels are not able to meet their maturing liabilities. As a result of the market situation occasioned by the violent conflicts most hotels experienced serious cash flow problems that made it impossible for them to meet their cash obligations. These included the payment of utility bills, suppliers, salaries, and leave grants. Many hotels were also unable to deduct and remit taxes to the appropriate authorities.

Most of the hotels could not carry out renovations because of the hard times. One of the sampled hotels for instance had 40 rooms gutted by fire in 2004 but to date the hotel has not been able to renovate the affected building. Another hotel planned to expand the present hotel after buying the nearest properties from their owners. However this was before the 2008 crisis; the hotel is now unable to build the planned annex due to its poor financial position.

- **Loss of personnel/ staff due to retrenchment and voluntary resignation.** All the hotels studied reported that they have lost both skilled and unskilled staff through retrenchment and voluntary withdrawals. The staff strength of the selected hotels before the crisis in 2008 was estimated to be about 700 staff. After the November 2008 crisis there was no significant loss in staff strength through resignation or lay offs despite the loss of sales volumes and irregular payments of salary to staff. However, after the 2010 crisis, staff numbers were reduced by about 30% - a total of 182 staff were laid off (from the total 700 work force) while 48 others

voluntarily resigned their appointments due to the inability of the hotels to pay their monthly entitlements for several months. Some legal actions were taken by aggrieved staff trying to recover their entitlements from the hotels.

It is also worth noting that the cost of recruitment, selection and training of skilled personnel can be enormous. The impact of the loss of old staff through retrenchment and voluntary resignation is that the quality of the services declined due to the inexperience of the new and poorly paid staff.

(ii) Impact of violence on hotel staff

There have been significant impacts for hotel staff, not all of which are likely to be reversed when peace returns. They include:

- **Casualisation of staff as against full time employment.** The rate of casualisation of staff has been on the increase since 2009 as a mitigating strategy for the loss of revenue from the impact of violence on the business. The hotels have since 2009 filled about 90% of vacancies resulting from retrenchment or resignation with casual workers. The ratio of casual staff to full time workers, which used to be about 40% to 60% on average in the hotels in Jos, has fallen significantly. Many hotels now have only 30% full time staff with 70% employed on casual terms. However, the conditions of work for full-time staff has also got worse so that even full time staff do not have much better conditions than casual workers.

From the findings of this study, the reasons for preferring the casuals to full time staff include employing cheap labour to reduce operational costs, avoidance of the payment of gratuity or pension on leaving the organisation, and the prevention of the formation of labour unions to fight for the rights of the workers.

- **Non-payment of staff salaries.** Most of the hotels covered in this study had a time during the conflict period when staff salaries were delayed for several months. Hotels that managed to continue to pay their staff did so by sourcing funds from other businesses that belonged to the hotel. This was because none of the hotels were generating enough funds to pay salaries.

Both small and large hotels are caught up in this trap of not being able to pay staff salaries. Over a third of the hoteliers interviewed still owed their workers between five and 15 months salary. This may account for the continued cases of voluntary resignations even when it was obvious to the workers leaving that they would not be able to take their retirement benefits.

- **Increased working hours.** Most of the hotel workers work longer hours for less pay as a result of the violence. One of the hotels in the study is known to have given employment to a former bank staff member on the condition that he worked 12 hours every day for just ₦12,000 per month (US\$76, i.e. about \$2.50 a day).

- **Difficulties of joining a trade union.** Few hotel workers now have an organisation to represent their interests. Hotel managements have increasingly refused to recognise the relevant trade unions, and some hotels have fired union members for

fear the unions will demand basic rights (e.g. for workers to be paid their salaries, termination packages etc.). As one senior trade union official remarked:

Most of them (the hotels) refuse their staff from joining the union. In AA hotel we have been trying to get them into the union for years. But once the management notices any staff that shows interest they fire them straight. So the rest are afraid. Staff of BB hotel was in the union but after one strike action following delayed salaries after one of the crises, the management insisted they leave the union. So they left. In CC hotel the staff had already filled the forms to join the union in early in 2008 but immediately after the crises most of them left the hotel so somehow the deal just broke down. (Names of hotels omitted)

(iii) Impact on government

Most of the hotels in Jos have been unable to pay any of these various mandatory taxes to the three tiers of government as and when due.

There are multiple taxes due to the three tiers of government:

- the local government normally collects the sanitary levy, the off liquor licence and sign post and mobile adverts rates from the hotels annually
- the state government through its internal revenue board collects the property rate, renewal of motor licence and PAYE while the annual renewal registration is paid to the Plateau State Tourism Corporation
- the federal government collects tax after profit and VAT and shares this with the state government. It also collects the Corporate Affairs Commission registration fee required of any formal business in Nigeria.

According to the Board of Internal Revenue less than 40% of the hotels in Jos deducted and remitted their staff 'Pay as You Earn' (PAYE) tax to the Board of Internal Revenue of the State from 2009 to 2011 following the violence in 2008 and 2010.

(iv) Impact on suppliers and food vendors

All businesses supplying the hotels directly or the guests have been negatively affected. The study identified the following impacts although there are many others.

- **Loss of investment for food vendors, car hire and others.** Within the studied conflict periods, demand for supplies and services reduced significantly because most hotels did not have enough guests. This affected multiple businesses including bookstands, shoe sales shops, travel agencies, herbal medicine shops, photographers and others. Food vendors and poultry farmers whose primary buyers are the hotels suffered the same set back in terms of sales of their goods. Poultry farmers had to discard quantities of eggs due their limited life span. The payment for already supplied goods also dragged on for a long time leading to a loss of value in their trading capital.

Other businesses like car hire were also affected by the low patronage to the hotels. The car hire that normally operates within the hotels and stationed within the premises are now no longer stationed in most hotels. Instead, they make an

arrangement with the hotels to call them on the phone when guests need transport. Other services have also been negatively affected. As one interviewee remarked:

Before, we take even ten cars to the airport and we all see customers to bring into town but now even one car hardly gets customers. Because people coming in are mostly residents of the state so they call their drivers to pick them at the airport. People from outside the state are very few because they have already been told in their places that Jos is always in trouble so they don't want to come. And even when you carry people you hear them asking you if you are taking them to places that are safe. For instance Christians would want to know if you are taking them a Christian area, Muslims also prefer Muslim areas. Because you know the town is now divided in two, Christian on one side and Muslims on the other. Honestly, I wish we would all come to understand that this crisis is not helping us at all and stop it.

• **Non-settlement of bills to suppliers by the hotels.** The irregularity of cash inflow to the hotels has led to the delay in the settlement of payments to suppliers. Some of the respondents claim that their trading capital has been tied down for over six months due to non-payment for goods supplied. Over 50% of the suppliers to hotels claimed to have lost the value of their investments due to a delay in payments. As one woman shopkeeper, with a shop empty of provisions remarked:

Q: How long have you been doing business with this hotel?

R: e don tey o. Since when my brother (Sarki) dey work for kitchen na him introduce me to the F& B that time na him I start to supply them o. That time things still good.

(It has been long. At that time my brother was working in the kitchen. He was the one that introduced me to the foods and beverages manager, then I started supplying. Then things were good).

Q: What about now?

R: Ah you no see my shop? E don tey them no dey pay us again. But last time Chris tell us say them go begin dey pay us small, small. We come supply and true true them pay us. As we come supply again now, come today, come tomorrow till today nothing.

(Ah, can't you see my shop? It's been long since the last time they paid us. But the last time Chris (the finance manager) said they had plans to start paying us in batches. So we made supplies and truly got paid but from time we made the last supply its been a case of come today or come tomorrow yet nothing to date)

Q: How much do they owe you now?

R: My money for there almost 250,000.00 if them give me now I go buy kaya (provisions) put for my shop

(My money there is almost 250,000.00 (US\$1,591) if they can pay me now I will quickly stock up my shop).

Summary of impacts

In summary, the two periods of violence investigated here (the violence that started in November 2008 and January 2010 respectively) had immediate and longer term impacts on hotels and on other businesses in the value chain. The immediate effects included the stoppage of business during the period of the violence and increased costs of providing additional security for the protection of the hotel and guests trapped in the hotel. Government imposed curfews stopped new business as a result of restrictions on people's movement and this in turn led to a reduction in the working hours of staff and multiple downstream effects on supplier businesses.

The longer-term effects of protracted violence are the loss of corporate patronage from clients outside the state. The loss of corporate clients is very serious as they

have been critical to revenue generation for the hotel industry in Jos through hiring of conference halls and refreshments, room hire and other related businesses including car hire.

The economic impact of the violence on the hotels in the long run as a result of loss of revenue is the inability of the hotels to meet their maturing liabilities. Non-payment of staff salaries and other emoluments - as one of the maturing liabilities - over time has led to the retrenchment of staff by hotels as well as voluntary retirement by those not retrenched. All levels of government have been affected due to reductions in the payment of taxes due.

4. MITIGATION STRATEGIES

Faced with a downturn in their businesses hotel owners have responded with a variety of coping strategies in an attempt to stay in business. Four particular strategies appear to be common.

(i) Co-hosting social activities on a profit sharing basis. Most hotels in the state now enter into collaborative deals with either individuals or organizations to host functions on a profit sharing basis. For example, local artists are encouraged to organise concerts in partnership with the hotels with a view to sharing the proceeds.

(ii) Huge discounts to attract patronage. Hotels now give huge discounts to guests just to keep existing customers as well as attract new ones. One hotel tariff sign, collected in the course of the study, was quite explicit about the reasons for the discount - it read: 'The downward review of the tariff is due to the present economic situation'. Besides these discounts, the hotels also give other incentives like free internet browsing and access to the swimming pool. Some hotels even give long staying customers free meals. Churches and social clubs are given sizeable discounts to encourage their continued patronage.

(iii) Rentals of hotel rooms as offices and residential apartments. Findings from the study show that a number of the hotels are now renting out some of their rooms as offices and residential apartments to generate revenue. The charges for such rentals are comparatively low compared to the aggregate sum of the daily rates for the room(s) for the same length of time.

(iv) Aggressive marketing/advertising. Most hotels have engaged in aggressive marketing and personal selling to attract patronage, and increase the use of hotel facilities to generate revenue. Some of the hotels that can either afford to advertise through the media, or can negotiate concessions, now do this to attract customers. However, due to inadequate funds not more than 20% of the hotels in Jos are reportedly able to use this marketing technique.

Personal selling through face-to-face contact is another marketing technique used by the hotels to increase custom. It is clear from study findings that some hotels encourage their staff to attract guests to the hotel with the promise of paying them a

percentage commission of the room sales. The same commission promise is also extended to the car hire drivers who are able to bring guests to the hotel.

5. IMPLICATIONS FOR NSRP

The findings of this study provide data for NSRP that the economic impacts of violent conflict on the hotel industry is an indicator of the wider impacts of violent in Jos, and Plateau State. NSRP will therefore use the economic arguments an evidence based advocacy an entry point with the Government. Some of the interviewees themselves emphasised this connection between the downturn in the economy (including hotels) and vulnerability to violence.¹²

NSRP will also use economic arguments to encourage the government to develop policies and activities to monitor and mitigate unemployment and loss of livelihood, both of which are key drivers of conflict and poverty in the society.

The business sector operators' are potential advocates for peace. NSRP could facilitate their playing a part in state level dialogue forums (as envisaged under output 1) because they lose so much from violent conflict.

6. RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that NSRP should **facilitate the process of having a platform for interaction between the government and the organized private sector**. The aim should be to strengthen the social contract between them, thereby facilitating opportunities to jointly initiate policy and action for peace and economic growth.

¹² As one respondent remarked: 'If people don't come to the state, hotels will not make any sales so the staff and their dependents will continue to suffer. The next thing is that the hotels will begin to think of laying them off there by putting more pressure on the labour market because the number of people there will swell which will also put more pressure on the economy and create situations where people react at the slightest provocation. It is another reason why the crisis has persisted.'

STUDY 4. IMPACTS OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS ON TWO ARTISANAL FISHING COMMUNITIES IN THE NIGER DELTA (OPOROZA AND IGBABELEU)

1.0 BACKGROUND

Artisanal Fisheries (Small-Scale Fisheries)

The fisheries sector is one of the most important sectors in Nigeria, both from an economic and a social standpoint. The Federal Department of Fisheries reports that the sector contributed approximately US\$1 billion to the country's GDP in 2009. Small-scale fish-farming and artisanal fisheries make up about 80% of the fisheries sector, supplying roughly 82% of the country's domestic fish production (Alagoa et al 2011). The fisheries industry further supports almost seven million people (directly or indirectly), and makes a major contribution to livelihoods, employment, and household food security, particularly for Nigeria's coastal communities (Alagoa et al 2011). In the Niger Delta, the fisheries sector is of utmost importance to small-scale or artisanal fish farmers.

Artisanal fisheries involves the use of traditional fishing methods - dugout canoes and nowadays motorized boats - in the shallow creeks and rivers to harvest fish either for consumption or for sale. This type of fishing is small in scale compared to deep-sea fishing, which is mostly undertaken by migrant Ghanaian fishermen who do commercial fishing and use fishing trawlers or Ghanaian type large plank built boats.¹³ The types and size of fish harvested by artisanal fisher-folk are different from those caught through these capital-intensive deep-sea fishing methods. In the study communities discussed below, the artisanal fisher-folk catch shrimps, mullet, crabs, etc, while the industrial or large-scale fisher-folk, fishing in the ocean, catch sharks, croakers, snappers, tuna, skipjacks, barracuda, dolphin and other big fish (Alagoa et al 2011).

Objectives of the study

The main reason for carrying out this study was to understand the impact of violence on two artisanal fishing communities that had experienced serious episodes of violent conflict over the last decade, and their own recovery strategies. Specifically the aim was to:

- Investigate the impacts of violent conflicts on artisanal fisheries and marketing
- Understand indigenous coping and recovery strategies
- Identify how NSRP and others can help to increase their recovery capability
- Increase NSRP's familiarity with businesses and services stakeholders in Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta states for future partnership work on reducing violent conflicts.

¹³ In most of the communities that inhabit the shorelines of the creeks and rivers systems of the Niger Delta large-scale commercial fishing is not allowed, because the gear used is destructive. The nets used sweep away all the fish, both small and large, and there is always a problem of by-catch. By-catch are fish caught which are not targeted. Traditional fishing communities in some parts of the Niger Delta forbid the use of the Ghanaian-type trawling nets described here as well as agro-chemicals and explosives, which are also sometimes used to catch fish.

The methodology employed involved observation (there were still visible indications of the scale of the destruction), focus group discussions with groups of fisher-folk and 49 individual interviews, a proportion of which were then transcribed verbatim. The research was conducted in two different communities at different locations in the Niger Delta.¹⁴ The communities were:

(i) Oporoza. This community belongs to the Ijaw ethnic group in the Niger Delta and is the traditional headquarters of the Gbaramatu Kingdom. Geographically, it is located in the Western Niger Delta, and administratively in the Warri South – West Local Government Area (LGA) of Delta State. The 1991 census puts the population of Oporoza at 2,443, while 2006 figures put it as 3,671. The area sits on the edge of the bank of the Escravos River. Apart from housing the traditional stool of the king of the Gbaramatu Kingdom, it has five fishing camps or settlements.¹⁵

(ii) Igbabeleu is a huge fishing settlement owned by the Beletiamia people. The eastern axis of Igbabeleu is Twon Brass, headquarters of the Brass LGA, to the west is Beleliama and to the north is Nembe. In the pre-crisis days, the Igbabeleu settlement was populated by fisher-folk from Ghana, Rivers, Delta, Ondo, etc. The population of Igbabeleu is reported to be over 7,000 inhabitants today.¹⁶

The two communities differ significantly in their conflict dynamics.

Oporoza communities witnessed the impacts of the bloody 1996-2003 Ijaw – Itsekiri war over the creation of the Warri South-West LGA. The community also suffered the spill over of the military bombardment of nearby Okerenkoko community. Major attacks took place in February 2006 over alleged oil theft activities by suspected Okerenkoko and Gbaramatu youths. The community was hit again in May 2009 when there were deadly clashes between soldiers of the Joint Task Force (JTF) and militant youths loyal to Chief Government Ekpemupolo (popularly called Tompolo). In revenge for their loss of men and materials the JTF soldiers launched attacks by air, land and water on the Oporoza community. The worst hit were the poor artisanal fisher-folk who lost their houses and all their fishing gear. They were forced to flee from their communities for over three months.

In contrast to Oporoza, the violence in **Igbabeleu** has been the result of long running communal conflicts. This had resulted in devastating the Igbabeleu community several times over the last 15 years. It reportedly began in 1997 when two women from the nearby Liama community (both traders in locally distilled gin) were attacked as they paddled in dug out canoes. One of them was killed, her co-traveller escaped

¹⁴ In Oporoza 31 individual interviews were conducted, 23 with women and eight with men. In Igbabeleu 18 interviewees were conducted, 12 with men and six with women. A proportion of these extended interviews were transcribed verbatim. In addition a number of focus groups discussions were held in both communities.

¹⁵ They are Opuedebubor, Tebujor, Ikpokpo, Sahara, Oburu and Olukperebu. Migrant fisher-folk from the Urhobo group (in Delta State), the Ibibio group (Akwa Ibom), the Ogoni group (in Rivers) and Ilaje group (in Ondo State) as well as Oporoza natives and others from other Gbaramatu communities populate Oporoza's fishing ports. The migrant fisher-folk in these ports that don't originally hail from Gbaramatu kingdom nonetheless pay annual royalties to the Oporoza council of chiefs.

¹⁶ Interview with one of the inhabitants, Itua Gbamote, Friday, 17th August, 2012.

with bullet wounds. The Beletiamia people, owners of the Igbabeleu fishing settlement, were accused of masterminding this attack. From then on tension built up and although some members of the communities tried to resolve the conflict amicably they were not successful. On 28th of June 1997, fighters from Liama and Egwema working together against Beletiamia and the Igbabeleu fishing settlements, with the help of mercenaries hired from other parts of Bayelsa and Delta states, dressed in their traditional war regalia and attacked Igbabeleu. Beletiamia was invaded later, and on same day. Several people were reportedly killed, and many houses set on fire or looted. Again, in 1999, as a fragile peace returned, Beleteima and Igbabeleu residents were returning to their destroyed or non-existent homes in the communities, when armed Liama and Egwema youths and mercenaries from the Gbarain area of Bayelsa reportedly attacked the returnees. The entire area was deserted again. Because no peace process had been instigated it took only a trigger event in 2006 (a fracas between two youths following a football match) for violence to break out again between the Beletiamia and Liama communities.

The two communities studied have therefore both experienced violent conflict on multiple occasions over the last 20 years. This has destroyed their homes and their main means of livelihood – artisanal fishing (in the case of Oporozo) and boat carving and fish trading (in the case of Igbabeleu). In both cases women were directly affected, both as direct victims of the violence and as principal earners from fishing. Personal testimonies collected during the field research give a good indication of the scale of the violence and its impacts. The following quotation from Oporoza describing events in 2009 is typical.

I was here when the plane came and started shooting. We ran into the bushes. I have a brother in Warri, but didn't want to inconvenience him and his wife. We spent three months in the bush. We were there until they asked us to come out. Some people came here after then, to distribute small garri, rice, etc to us. They looked like government people. We nearly died. I hate the bush because of hunger. We spent three months there see my legs (showed scars of deep injuries on her legs). I lost all my fishing nets and a wooden boat. I don't who removed them. Things were bad for us when we returned. We are recovering. I hire a canoe for N2,000 per month to go to fish and feed my family. Since that crisis nobody has given me a kobo. I am just struggling to survive. My plan now is to save money to buy my own canoe. With hard work and prayers I will succeed. But tell the government and their supporters that we want peace not war.¹⁷

Descriptions of the violence against women and children (including unborn children) in Igbabeleu are so vicious that the testimonies have not been reproduced as part of this report.

The research question, in both cases, was what had happened since the last major outbreak of violent conflict, and how were the communities recovering from the losses they had experienced?

2.0 FINDINGS

¹⁷ Interview with Mrs. Stella Toboufagha., 7th August, 2012, Oporoza Town, Warri South L.G.A. Delta.

The following is a summary of the impacts of the conflict and recovery strategies as described by the respondents interviewed in the two communities:

(i) Asset losses in the violence or stolen afterwards

The assets the fisher-folk lost during the conflicts included boats, nets and their houses. These asset losses were huge and seemingly irreplaceable for many families.

Many Oporoza residents reported staying up to three months in the bush, afraid to return to an area where there was war between the security services and the militant group led by Tompolo. Their slow return meant many materials were stolen even if not destroyed in the violence.¹⁸

(ii) Social problems – alcoholism and drugs, family break down

Some fisher-folk in the above communities who lost their key fishing materials and houses also suffered forms of trauma. Some took to heavy alcoholism, some to drugs like Indian hemp (igbo).¹⁹ This was observed particularly in the Igbabeleu community where the scale of destruction was even greater than in Oporoza.

In Igbabeleu especially, because one cannot provide for the needs of the family, some families broke up. There were also cases in Oporoza where those who got to the city after normalcy returned refused to return to join their families in the village.

(iii) Recovery strategies

Fisher families had three options after the violence: to return and try to rebuild the business, to migrate out of the area and find alternative work; to stay but change to another means of livelihood.

In Oporoza especially, after the crisis there was no help from government. Rather the poor fisher-folk formed co-operative societies or thrift societies where they make weekly monetary contributions to a pool after every week and revolve the refunded money contributed. This is a kind of saving system (thrift) rather than a soft loan arrangement.

Some residents borrowed money from local lenders with high interest rates and then could not pay off the loan at the stipulated time. Many community members have remained indebted for a long time, and this has worsened their frustration. This was the case with both communities (Oporoza and Igbabeleu). In Oporoza some loans were given by Tompolo, the militant leader – but apparently only to those related to him.

¹⁸ Individual testimonies from Oporoza and Igbabeleu are available. These detail the history of conflict in the communities, trigger events and the impacts of each new onset of violence.

¹⁹ I was first informed of the issue of alcoholism in Igbabeleu. I personally saw about 10 men who had become alcoholics, all between the ages of 40 and 60. Community people told me they used to be prosperous fishermen. They drank a highly intoxicating locally brewed gin called kiikii. This kiikii is often mixed with fresh Indian hemp leaves and seeds, a concoction that is popularly called 'Monkey Tail'. In Oporoza a lot of young men were also taking monkey tail including but not only frustrated fisher-folk.

In both Oporoza and Igbabeleu one recovery strategy was to migrate. Many who fled from their communities in its wake never returned. Some migrated to other places like Warri (Delta State), Port Harcourt (Rivers State) and Yenagoa (Bayelsa State), Benin (Edo State) and Lagos. There are social and demographic problems associated with this.

3. BEYOND THE OPOROZA AND IGBABELEU CONFLICTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR NSRP

This is the story of two communities that have been devastated by violent conflict. The study (as evident from verbatim transcripts of individual stories) shows:

- The long lasting effects of violent conflicts. Even now fisher-folk have not recovered to where they were – and may never do so for other reasons (due to the drop in catch; other competitors, etc.)
- The need for an early warning system. In one community – Igbabeleu – the cause of the violent conflict was widely known and action could have been taken to prevent the major acts of violence breaking out. Igbabeleu is a classic example of ignoring the warnings until it peaked. Early action may have at least prevented the ferocity of the security response – including the use of aircraft bombing.
- The need for a proportionate response by security forces that does not add to the toll of civilian deaths.
- The need for outside help immediately following the violence. Most of the fisher-folk interviewed had wanted to remain in fishing when they returned to their homes two or three months after being in the bush or with relatives. Many respondents had been in fishing for 20-40 years with all their family members. They wanted to stay in the community and build up their business again, bit by bit. But there was no help to do this and the lack of affordable credit was a major issue. The community revolving credit scheme was useful but did not give sufficient capital to get businesses on their feet again.
- The need for greater attempts at reconciliation. There is uncertainty as to whether the violence could break out again in Igbabeleu.
- The need to pay attention to social consequences. The number who died, the migration of many and the lack of affordable credit that allowed fisher-folk to purchase basic assets (boats, nets etc.) – together may have caused some of the social impacts that were attributed to the conflict, i.e. alcoholism, drug use, family breakdown.

Lessons for NSRP in working at community level

- The importance of paying attention to the need for **reconciliation** between communities

- The importance of **speedy help** to rebuild small scale businesses like artisanal fisheries; the immediate need for credit that allows for the repurchase of assets
- Psychological trauma and social impacts; the **need for services** to respond to these
- The importance of having an **early warning system**. NSRP has a mandate to work with government and its agencies to check when conflicts build up and nip in the bud before it results in violence
- The devastation (for artisanal fisher families) caused by the government response – the collateral damage that the bombing in Oporozo had on local businesswomen. The need for **engagement with the security forces** on these issues.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NSRP

Much NSRP work at community level will be carried out through an NSRP small grant mechanism. This scheme is being developed at the time of writing. This study indicates that this should be used not just in the prevention of violent conflict but for services needed by communities like Oporoza and Igbabeleu to **help communities recover, including economically**. Grants could be used by organisations able to help community members access credit, provide social and psychological counselling, advice on alternative livelihood options and so on.

In the absence of any real reconciliation there is always the danger that violence may break out again. There is a need for representative community members to be supported to keep a watchful eye on the study communities to check for resurgence of conflict indicators – in effect there is a need for **local early warning systems**. Also, there is the need to watch other communities to check for early warning signals.

Real efforts to **reconcile the communities** involved in the violence are still needed in Igbabeleu to remove the risk of violence reoccurring.

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