NRSP MAPPING CONFLICT PREVENTION ACTORS AND INITIATIVES IN SELECTED STATES

REPORT FOR BAYELSA AND RIVERS STATES

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Summary of conclusions

The mapping found that violent conflicts in the two states are mostly driven by struggle or competition for access to oil wealth. Most government and oil company responses have focussed on transfer of resources to aggrieved groups, especially groups that threaten or inflict violence. This has consequently encouraged internalization of a culture of violence. The mapping recommends that interventions should be aimed at ensuring that moderate voices are heard and non-violent actors benefit from existing and future empowerment programmes. In addition, NSRP should seek to promote greater collaboration between state, corporate organizations and civil society in peace building initiatives as a way of enhancing effectiveness and sustainability of programmes.

In the short term, NSRP should further explore possibilities for partnership with government of Rivers State while awaiting results of the upcoming elections in Bayelsa State. NSRP should however explore potentials for supporting election monitoring and election violence related initiatives in Bayelsa.

Specific recommendations for consideration in the medium and long terms are stated along outputs and include the following:

Output 1: More effective architecture for prevention, management and reconciliation of conflict at local, state and federal levels
1. Support initiatives that seek to strengthen state & LGA security committee through better coordination
2. Support initiatives seeking to provide human rights education and conflict sensitivity training to security agencies, government officials and media organizations

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Output 2: Reduced incidence and impact of social exclusion, environmental degradation and unemployment that drive cycles of violent conflict
1. Support initiatives for early reporting and response to oil spills
2. Support civic and peace education programmes for in-school and out of school youths
3. Support programmes for more effective and inclusive government and private sector women and youth empowerment and service delivery programmes
4. Support initiatives seeking to reduce drug use and cultism among youths
5. Support programmes providing therapy for persons affected by violence

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Output 3: More effective participation of women and girls in peace-building and reduce prevalence and impact of violence against women and girls
1. Deepen initiatives aimed at making women the fulcrum of peace-building
2. Support initiatives providing enlightenment and litigation service on violence against women as part of measures to create safe spaces for women in communities
3. Promote initiatives on women political participation including enhancing capacity of women to monitor the processes of governance.

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1. Study purpose

The Terms of Reference outlined the objectives of the mapping as follows:
   a) To better understand the local drivers of violence in (Bayelsa and Rivers) and the relevant actors
   b) To identify potential programme partners in the states
   c) To collect data on promising conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives
   d) To capture findings in a) meetings template and b) short analytical report for discussion with the core NSRP team in January 2012.

2. Methodology and approach

The main methods adopted for the mapping are key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs) in a workshop format with representatives of selected civil society organization (CSOs) and desk research.

Two workshops were organized in Port Harcourt and Yenagoa with 18 participants from CSOs in attendance in each workshop. A discussion guide was prepared for the workshops to keep participants focussed on the key output areas of the NSRP (see annex 2). Not all CSO representatives invited were able to attend due to the short notice of invitation. This is because the researchers waited for British Council to confirm reservation for venue of workshop before sending out invitation letters. Moreover, some invited CSO leaders that promised to participate in the workshop sent their representatives with adverse implications for the quality of contributions at the workshop.

Key informant interviews were more open ended and discussions were customized to reflect the specific areas of interest of the informant. In all, the team interviewed about 40 persons in the two states. However, since some informants pleaded anonymity, meeting notes were prepared only for 20 persons. Among those interviewed whose notes were recorded 8 were women and 12 men.

The major constraint of the mapping was the timing. The mapping started shortly after the NSRP core team meetings at the end of November and it was challenging to secure interview appointments with key informants in December when most people were already in holiday mood. It was particularly challenging to schedule appointments with government officials during the period. Access to Rivers State Government officials was hindered by the fact that the state government was organizing three major programmes throughout the month of December. These are the Port Harcourt International Trade Fair, the CANIRIV Festival and the 'Make Poor Man Follow Chop Christmas' programme. These programmes were scheduled consecutively from weeks one to three of December.

In Bayelsa State, the disqualification of the state governor from contesting the primaries of the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) made government officials, as one informant noted, to 'go underground'. The political uncertainty in the state made key political actors to refrain from granting interviews. The result of these constraints is that the researchers relied mostly on civil society actors and academics that were available on short notice for information. Information on relevant government initiatives were however sourced through desk research.

The researchers also decided to maximize time by dividing the assignment. While Patrick Naagbanton was to meet contacts in Rivers State at large, Ukoha Ukiwo was assigned to focus on informants in Bayelsa State and selected contacts in Port Harcourt. For the two workshops, Patrick Naagbanton handled invitations and logistics while Ukoha Ukiwo moderated and reported on the discussions. As a result of the time constraints it was not possible to visit communities where conflict resolution and peace-building programmes had been implemented. It is hoped that the proposed mapping of community level conflict management mechanisms (CCMM) would fill this gap.

3. Grievances that drive violent conflict

Perceptions of inequalities and injustices appear to be the underlying grievances that drive violent conflict in Bayelsa and Rivers States. The struggles for self-determination pioneered by the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) and reinforced and spread by the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) led to the popularization of grievance against the Nigerian state, the federal government, major ethnic groups and oil multinational corporations (MNCs). *Simply put, the discourse of grievance is framed around alleged domination of the state and oil companies by major ethnic groups and the resultant marginalization of minorities (Rivers and Bayelsa and other 'core' Niger Delta people) in benefits from oil wealth domiciled in the region.* It is argued that many youths believed the self-determination message of groups such as MOSOP and IYC when they visited the magnificent Abuja capital city for the first time in 1998. The stupefied youths had ironically travelled to Abuja participate in the one million person solidarity march for late Gen. Sani Abacha's civilianization gambit.

It is hardly surprising therefore, that most violent conflicts in the two states have been anti-state and anti-oil MNCs in nature manifesting as attacks on oil infrastructure, oil personnel and security agencies. In the past decade there has been a significant reduction in outbreak of intra-communal and inter-communal violent conflicts. Moreover, most of the past (and present) communal conflicts were (and are) attributed to so-called 'divide and rule' strategies of the state and oil companies as they involved (and still involve) conflicts over oil-bearing land and selection/election of community leaders/representatives to mediate relations with oil MNCs.

Amidst this general grievance narrative of 'resource control' are other emergent class, generational, gender and occupational perspectives. The youths generally blame poverty, unemployment, lack of opportunities and corruption among traditional and political elites for the violent conflicts. Interestingly, other social groups ranging from women, community elders, government officials, security operatives to CSO actors increasingly posit that the resource control narrative has become a ruse for indolent and self-seeking individuals posing as 'youths' to perpetrate violence on the rest of society.

Ethnic grievance also seems to be reducing in intensity in the two states since the creation of Bayelsa State. The old Rivers State was afflicted by the Upland (non-Ijaw) and Riverine (Ijaw) cleavage. Bayelsa State is virtually an all Ijaw state, though sub-Ijaw identities are salient and occasionally mobilized. In Rivers State, historical rivalry between Ikwerre and Okrika has been politically managed and has not led to violent conflict in the past decade. Ethnic grievance seems to most pronounce among the Ogoni who are still agonizing over the military brutality of the 1990s. This persistent grievance is partly expressed in the refusal of the Ogoni to allow resumption of oil exploration and exploitation activities in Ogoniland. The Ogoni are also aggrieved

about not having had the chance to produce a governor for Rivers State and are determined to agitate for creation of Bori State for the Ogoni people.

4. Events that trigger violent conflict (or could do)

In October 2010, one person was killed in a fight between some youths affiliated to two different cults. The youths had supported different teams in an English Premier League (EPL) football match. This incident triggered a protracted violent conflict between K-Dere and B-Dere communities in Gokana LGA of Rivers State. This is because youths from the community of the deceased mobilized to avenge his death by attacking the neighbouring community from which the alleged killers originated. *This example indicates how even mundane issues can trigger conflicts when there are tensions in relations between groups.* The two neighbouring communities had previously fought over access to opportunities during a road construction project. Some youths in the two communities aligned themselves to 2 cults (Deegbam and Dewell). Clashes between the cults, often sponsored by rival political aspirants, have led to cycles of violent inter-communal conflicts. The most recent incident of violent conflict claimed up to 26 lives in October 2011.

The triggers for violence are usually events associated with competition for access to resources. These are elections into political offices, elections into youth and community development associations, selection of traditional rulers, location of oil infrastructure in disputed marginal land or frontier areas, oil spillage and related environmental disasters, breakdown of negotiations or agreements between communities and oil MNCs and oil service companies, and payment or non-payment of royalty or compensation to communities by oil companies. Extra-judicial killings by security agencies have also triggered violent conflicts. The most notable cases are Odi in Bayelsa and Umuechem and Ogoni in Rivers State.

Loss of political power by political bigwigs also triggers violent conflicts as some groups, especially armed youths, seek to resist removal of their patrons. For instance, the removal of Chief DSP Alameiyeiseigha as governor of Bayelsa State was a trigger factor in the militant phase of the Niger Delta conflicts launched in December 2005. Similarly, several inter-cult clashes followed the removal of Chief Peremabowei Ebebi as Deputy Governor of Bayelsa State in 2008.

Finally, splintering or fission of cult groups especially when linked to influential political elites and traditional rulers have also triggered violent conflicts. Violent conflicts occur over struggle for territorial control because the breakaway cult seeks to assert its independence and demonstrate its strengths. For example, much of the violence in Rivers State between 2003 and 2004 was linked to the alleged shift of support by the state governor from Asari Dokubo's group to Ateke Tom's group. The state boiled again in 2007 when a new governor allegedly supported Soboma George who left Ateke Tom to form his own cult.

5. Who is keeping the peace now – and how?

A number of actors are responsible for conflict prevention and management in the two states. The actors involved often depend on the nature of conflict and the level of intensity. However, the governments at state and LGA levels and government agencies are the main actors responsible for and involved in conflict prevention and management, even though government policies and government officials contribute to the outbreak of violent conflicts.

The first strategy of government to conflict management is to deploy security agencies to ensure cessation of hostilities. Sources noted that although troops succeed as peacekeepers in some conflicts they also contribute to escalation of violence in others. This is especially when the troops were deployed at the instance of top government officials or oil MNCs with interests in the conflicts. For instance, the Ogbakiri conflicts in Rivers State escalated when the police deployed to maintain peace saw their mission as apprehending the youths that allegedly burnt the house of a government official from one of the communities. Moreover, troop deployment become problematic when extended over a period of time. Communities complain of soldiers and police engaging in counter-value activities, rape and extortion.

The second strategy of government is to empanel commissions of enquiry to investigate causes and recommend solutions to violent conflicts. The commissions of enquiry contribute to temporary peace as disputants usually honour ceasefire during the life of the enquiry. The most popular case of enquiry was the Rivers State Truth and Reconciliation Committee, which was established in 2008 and sat for almost a year. It had the assignment of unravelling the causes of and actors involved different violent conflicts that bedevilled the state since the beginning of the Fourth Republic. The government is often criticised for neither publishing nor implementing recommendations of commissions of enquiries. However, government's inaction is often influenced by a decision not to trigger renewed violence instigated by indicted persons. In some cases, indicted persons have secured court injunctions to stop government from implementing recommendations of such committees.

Generally, governments at all levels use both 'stick' and 'carrot' to maintain peace. Persons linked to violent conflict are warned to desist from instigating violence (such as threats to depose traditional rulers) and also compensated with appointments and or other sundry forms of resource transfers. The most obvious resource transfer is the on-going amnesty programme where the federal government is said to have essentially paid backers, leaders and foot-soldiers of militant groups in return for uninterrupted exploration and exploitation of oil and gas.

The oil companies have also transferred resources through a number of mechanisms, ranging from the highly celebrated community trust funds of the Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMOU) to the infamous surveillance contracts to militants. While resource transfers purchase temporary peace they contribute to the breeding of potential trouble makers as they lead to the evolution of culture of violence. The privileging of transfer of resources for conflict management increasingly portrays violent group mobilization as the surest route to economic and political empowerment.

Institutions such as councils of traditional rulers, councils of chiefs and committees of elders have also played mediatory roles in intra-communal and inter-communal conflicts as well as conflicts among factions of youth organizations and political elites. The capacity of these bodies to broker peace often depends on the respect, perceived impartially and sometimes influence they have over the disputants. However, mediation is challenging where disputants are very powerful or consider themselves to be powerful. This is because one or both of the parties feel powerful enough to determine outcomes of the conflict.

Cases of third party mediation by statesmen, jurists and religious leaders are also common in the two states. For instance, Gen. Yakubu Gowon, former head of state, and Rev. Father Hassan Matthew Kukah were invited by the World Council of Churches to mediate in the conflict between the Ogoni, the Federal Government and

Shell. Mediation has played a critical role in preparing the grounds for political settlement and transfer of resources. The mediation process creates safe spaces for antagonists to dialogue and begin the process of 'give and take' that is sometimes necessary for conflict resolution. For instance, several mediators were sent by the federal and states governments to the creeks of the Niger Delta to convince the militants to disarm and to accept the presidential amnesty. Faith based initiatives such as the intercession by the Niger Delta Bishops led by Bishop Friday Nwator and the Coventry Cathedral also contributed to preparing the grounds for the take-off of the amnesty programme. Under the initiative, Christian ministers were sent to the militant camps to preach peace and non-violence. Some of the repentant militants were invited to participate in weekly prayer sessions organized at the Rivers State Government House Chapel. *This admission of militants to the Government House eventually helped to build confidence about the sincerity of government toward the amnesty programme.*

CSOs including NGOs have also been known to act as peacemakers in the two states. CSO interventions have been most visible in the area of conflict prevention through peace education, conflict early warning and human rights advocacy. CSOs are particularly credited for preventing electoral violence through sensitization campaigns and election monitoring. Linkages between some of the NGOs with community based organizations (CBOs) have also enhanced capacity of such NGOs to play a role in conflict early warning. Some of the NGOs claimed they routinely transmit information of imminent conflicts to security agencies and government officials. The NGOs have also promoted peace through mobilizing women and youth from communities to 'pray', 'march,' and organize sporting activities for peace. Moreover, some NGOs have been involved in direct mediation between opposing groups. One of the NGOs that have recorded success in this area is the Academic Associates Peace Works (AAPW) that is credited for brokering the peace meeting between two warlords (Asari and Ateke) at the Presidential Villa during Obasanjo's administration. Sources attribute the success of the AAPW to the links its executive director had with high level government officials and key civil society actors.

The various stakeholders have also tried to maintain peace by addressing the underlying factors that predispose youths to be vulnerable to participating in violent conflicts. In Rivers State for instance, the government embarked upon a campaign against cults. Government officials were threatened with dismissal if found to be members of cults. The government also sponsored sensitization campaigns on cults in tertiary and secondary institutions. The state government is also implementing a youth empowerment programme through the Rivers State Sustainable Development Agency (RSSDA). RSSDA programme portfolio includes a skills acquisition component, a scholarship scheme and employment generation through agriculture and small and medium scale enterprises. The USAID funded Conflict Abatement through Local Mitigation (CALM) also supported selected skills acquisition programmes.

Assessing the effectiveness of the interventions remains a herculean task. Sources point to the major challenge of attribution in a context where different actors are implementing a coterie of programmes to promote peace in the same community/communities. Moreover, most of the programmes lack robust monitoring and evaluation plans. There are no baselines against which to measure progress. In many cases, project implementers mechanistically conclude that their interventions engendered peace because peace returned after they intervened. Some community sources however dispute such attributions. In the case of Ogbakiri, for instance, a source simply said peace returned because the displaced people of the warring

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communities were tired of living in exile after some years. Another source in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State opined that violence has reduced in the state because the same elites that paid youths to fight have decided to pay youths to refrain from violent activities.

6. Gaps in the conflict prevention architecture – and how the NSRP could help

A major gap in the conflict prevention architecture is the lack of synergy between government initiatives and civil society programmes. Government initiatives seldom engage civil society. For instance, civil society is not represented in the security committees at state and local government levels. There is no formalised relationship between government and civil society in security matters. Rather government officials prefer selective patronage of individuals within the civil society.

Secondly and relatedly is the non-inclusive nature of conflict prevention architecture at all levels. Interests of women, youth, non-indigenes and non-partisans are rarely represented. Many claim for instance that beneficiaries of skills acquisition programmes and scholarship schemes are not the most vulnerable persons in the community. Less privileged and indigent youths are often bypassed for wards and relatives of politicians and bureaucrats. A case in point is the amnesty programme where non-combatant relatives of top government officials and militant warlords were allegedly enlisted while some militants were excluded.

Consequently and thirdly, conflict prevention and management initiatives lack transparency. For instance, government is alleged to publish total number of persons trained or supported and the amount of money spent without publishing the names of beneficiaries. The criteria for selection of beneficiaries are rarely published. This leaves room for doubts and breeds resentment amongst groups that feel excluded- creating a discontent cluster that would take up arms in future. Corporate, donor and civil society interventions are also allegedly culpable in the area of transparency.

The fourth major gap in the conflict prevention and management as well as reconciliation architecture is the tendency to target militant and violent elements in society while ignoring moderate voices. There is palpable disillusionment among law abiding youths and women about the decision of governments and oil companies to transfer resources to unabashed 'trouble makers'. The impression has been created that the most effective way of attracting the attention of government and oil companies is to foment trouble. This is because governors appoint militant persons as advisers; state government gives sea pirates contract to keep the waterways safe; state governments make party thugs main beneficiaries of youth empowerment schemes; oil companies award contract for clean-up of oil spills to individuals that sabotaged facilities and give surveillance contracts to pipeline vandals. *The lesson is inescapable to all that violence pays. Thus, the conflict prevention and management strategy paradoxically provides incentives for violent group behaviour.* This is more so the case as no one is prosecuted for disrupting the peace.

Sources also point to the lack of conflict sensitivity in the state conflict prevention and management architecture. There is concern about the practice of security agencies deploying troops from a different region to maintain peace in another region. Without any proper briefing about the local context and empathy with local communities, the soldiers and police are alleged to have a 'kill and go' mind-set. Like 'an army of occupation' in a foreign land they embark on extrajudicial killings and other misdemeanour that aggravates grievances and social tensions.

Another aspect of conflict insensitivity is the hasty approach adopted. There is a delusion that peace can be instantly restored with the signing of peace agreements. There is no recognition that wounds take time to heal and that communities would need time to recover their losses. Thus, there is no plan for sustained engagement with communities. Some communities are peeved by the fact that the apparent incentive for brokering peace is the immediate return to the status quo ante- especially uninterrupted flow of oil.

Related to this is the materialistic approach of intervention. There is little investment in winning hearts and minds. Compensations are handed out to perpetrators and victims of violence alike. End of story! *There are few interventions that provide psycho-social therapy in the post-conflict context.* The result is a protracted recovery process from the experience of violence that is often interrupted by other bouts of violence. For instance, there are no drug recovery programmes for persons who perpetrated violence under the influence of drugs. There are no programmes that support therapies for victims of rape.

Another major gap in the conflict prevention and management architecture is the neglect of indigenous institutions. Few programmes interface with family heads that have the legitimacy to mediate conflicts. Neglect of indigenous institutions is most astounding in the case of African traditional religion. Most of the faith based initiatives focus on the Christian faith. Yet most of the persons involved in violent conflict only profess Christianity but still hold on to the faith of their ancestors. Sources in Bayelsa State believe that Egbesu priests who empowered the militants wield more influence on the militants and should also have been targeted in the amnesty process.

Finally, lack of sustainability is a major gap in the conflict prevention and management architecture. Conflict prevention, management and peacebuilding initiatives appear to be afflicted by short-termism. There is lack of continuation and sustainability plans in programmes whether initiated by government, oil companies, or donors and NGOs. NGO sources complained of being given funds to organize peace education and not having the opportunity to have sustained engagements with target groups- a factor isolated for the peculiar success story of PNI in Akassa, Bayelsa State. The result is that some NGO sources admitted merely scratching the surface. This is complicated by the fact that other donors are interested in supporting entirely novel initiatives- not building on what others had started. *It is against this background that the promise of NSRP to strengthen existing fruitful initiatives has inspired hope among potential partners.*

It is recognized that interventions should be cross-cutting given the complex inter- linkages among drivers of violent conflict. However, for programming purposes it is appropriate to make recommendations according to outputs. The recommendations are presented in a tabular for clarity. The table presents the title, description of suggested programme components as well as potential implementation partners.

Recommended activities for NSRP by Output

Output	Title	Description	Potential partners
1: More effective architecture for the prevention and management of conflict and reconciliation at local, state and federal levels	Strengthening effectiveness of state and LGA security committees	Support a civil society led but inclusive group to promote coordination among to security committees at state and LGA levels	AAPW, CEHRD, SDN, Peacemakers International, NOA, Ministry of Chieftaincy Affairs, Office of Adviser on Conflict Resolution
	Enhancing conflict sensitivity of media practitioners	Support NGO led initiative to train and monitor media organizations on conflict sensitivity	Search for Common Ground, SDN, CEHRD, Wazobia, NIPRODEV
	Human rights education/conflict studies for security services and key government agencies	Support NGO to build capacity of security agencies on human rights and conflict sensitivity	AAPW, IHRHL, CEHRD, CROTIN, NHRC, Houses of Assembly
2: Reduced incidence and impact of social exclusion, environmental degradation and unemployment that drive cycles of violent conflict	Promote inclusiveness and effectiveness of empowerment and service delivery programmes	Support NGO led initiative to strengthen women and youth associations to demand more effective and inclusive government/oil company empowerment and service delivery programmes	Good governance for grassroots, REEF,NIPRODEV, SDN, CRI, RSSDA, Ministry of Youth, oil coys, Ministry of Women Affairs, GADA, Kebetkache
	Early reporting and response to oil spills	Support NGO and coalitions with programmes for early reporting and response to oil spills	ERA, HOCON, NAGOND
	Conservation initiatives	Support NGOs to promote conservation through environmental education	ERA, Save the Earth, CEHRD, Ministry of Environment, Niger Delta Wetlands Centre
	Anti drugs and anti	Support NGO led	Niger Delta Peace

	cult campaigns and support services	initiatives to sensitize in-school and out of school youths on dangers of cultism and drug abuse	Committee, Ministry of Youths, Ministry of Health, Operation Rescue
3: More effective participation of women and girls in peacebuilding and reduced prevalence and impact of violent against women and girls	Action research on legislations/culture promoting discrimination against women and vulnerable groups	Support NGO led initiative to research and advocate for legislations protecting rights of women and excluded groups	CENTECS, CNDS, Quality Life Project, FIDA, GADA
	Tackling violence against women	Support NGO to educate public on legislations prohibiting violence against women and promoting litigation	GADA, Kabetkache, FIDA, Operation Rescue Mission,
	Political and human rights education for women	Support NGO to promote political participation and defence of rights of women	GADA, FIDA, Operation Rescue, Kabetkache
	Reintegration of female ex-militants and victims of militancy	Support NGO to provide holistic support to victims of militancy	Operation Rescue, Quality Life Project, GADA, Kebetkache

Appendix 1. List of people met

STATE: BAYELSA	
Name	**Description (title, place of meeting or organisation)**
Prof. Kimse Okoko	Former INC President
Sir Godwin Ebbeli	Executive Director, GGG
Mrs. Pat Marvis	Chairperson, FIDA Bayelsa
Princess Elizabeth Egbe	Operation Rescue Mission
Engr. Williams Flint	ED, REEF
CSP Nemi Iwo	DPO, NPF, Ekeki,Yenagoa
Hon Ogbolosingha	Chairman, Yenagoa LGA
Dr. Ibaba S. Ibaba	CNDS, NDU
Dr. Ambilly Etekpe	Dept. of Political Science, NDU
Mr. Phillip Slabor	Director, Development Initiators
Chief kalaite Jephthat	Niger Delta Peace Committee
Mrs. Ifeoma Olisakwe	Program Manager, NIPRODEV
Mr. Torki Dauseye	Family Welfare Association
Barr. David Alagoa	Peacemaker International

STATE: RIVERS	
Name	**Description (title, place of meeting or organisation)**
Prof. Mark Anikpo	Director, CENTECS
Mrs. Deborah Effiong	Programme Manager, GADA
Ms. Emem Okon	Executive Director, Kebetkache
Mrs. Chinedum Adebomi	Prog Officer, Quality Life Project
Mr. Chris Newsom	Advisor, SDN
Ms. Ibiba Don Pedro	Publisher, National Point
Chief Samson Agbaru	Ogbakor Ikwerre Convention
Prof. Ben Naanen	Emerald Institute for Petroleum Economics and Strategic Studies, UNIPORT
Chief Gbarabuleh	Paramount Ruler, Kpogor community, Tai LGA, Rivers
Mr. Tezzy	Wokoma Ama Youth Council
Mr. Celestine Akpobari	Khani 1 Community, Khana LGA