

ANNUAL PERCEPTION SURVEY

2013 Baseline Report

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Views captured in this work do not represent those of DFID.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

Since the early 1990s, Nigeria has witnessed growing incidences of violence which has resulted in an annual death toll of around 3,000 people since 2005.¹ Repeated cycles of violence have raised questions about the stability of Africa's most populous country as the violence affects all aspects of the nation's social and economic development.

The Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) seeks to support the efforts of Nigerian actors and institutions to better manage conflicts in order to reduce incidences of violence and the impact of such violence on the most vulnerable groups. The five-year DFID-funded programme will support initiatives at the federal level and in eight target states that have witnessed some of the worst incidences of violence in the country. The programme aims to: improve coordination and broader societal participation in conflict management mechanisms; reduce grievances over economic opportunities and the distribution of resources; increase the participation of women and girls in peace-building and reduce violence against women and girls; and improve conflict prevention and management policy and practice.

OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY OF THE SURVEY

The Annual Perception Survey (APS) is a central element of NSRP's monitoring and evaluation strategy and will be undertaken each year to measure progress by establishing a baseline and tracking the indicators of the changes that the programme is expected to bring about. The survey aims to track the incidence and impact of violence in NSRP areas, together with perceptions about the causes of violence, and the effectiveness of institutional responses.

The survey methodology was based on both quantitative and qualitative sources of data, and included a survey of 5,000 respondents randomly

selected from the programme's target LGAs, together with 10 key informant interviews (KII) and four focus group discussions in each state. The main challenge encountered during fieldwork was the security situation which affected logistics and, to a degree, the willingness of potential respondents to answer questions.

KEY FINDINGS OF THE SURVEY

Awareness of violence

Most respondents (81 percent) were aware of the outbreak of violence in their areas in the past five years, and somewhat fewer (62 percent) over the past 12 months. Awareness was greatest in Kano, Borno, Yobe and Rivers states.

At least a quarter of respondents claimed either themselves or members of their family had seen or experienced violence perpetrated by different actors in the past 12 months.

Most respondents were concerned that they or members of their families might become victims of violence (67 percent were 'very concerned' and a further 15 percent 'somewhat concerned'). This anxiety was highest in Borno State.

The incidence of violence shows how present it is in the lives of citizens: 14 percent. As many as 77 percent of respondents said that they, or a member of their household, had experienced some form of violence in the previous 12 months (96 percent in Bayelsa, 94 percent in Borno; Delta was lowest at 52 percent). The most common perpetrators were said to be: militant groups (27 percent); robbers (27 percent), gangs (26 percent), other ethnic or religious groups (23 percent) and security forces (21 percent).

The most common impact of violence on families of respondents were physical injury (28 percent), loss of income/livelihood (19 percent), loss of life (14 percent), loss of access to services (17 percent),

¹ See, Nigeria watch data- www.nigeriawatch.org

displacement (17 percent) and feelings of insecurity in the neighbourhood (17 percent). Most respondents had been affected by violence: only 47 percent said their families had not been directly impacted.

Nature and causes of violence

Twenty-four percent of respondents said violence arose from conflict over natural resources such as land, water or oil while a further 9 percent said the violence was only partially for these reasons. Such conflict was highest in the Niger Delta (68 percent in Rivers, 51 percent in Delta State, and 42 percent in Bayelsa) while the Middle Belt had the next highest rates (49 and 44 percent in Kaduna and Plateau, respectively).

Respondents were asked what they considered to be the main cause of violent conflicts and violence and the most widespread responses were: 'not enough jobs' (88 percent); poverty (89 percent); electoral malpractice (67 percent); politicians arming gangs for their own ends (65 percent), the non-resolution of previous conflicts (64 percent); and the availability of small arms (63 percent).

Management of conflicts

Only one out of four respondents felt the conflicts they experienced were 'effectively dealt with and resolved'. Most respondents (43 percent) said conflicts were not resolved while 18 percent said conflicts were only partially resolved. The degree of dissatisfaction was most pronounced in Borno and Yobe states where only three and 15 percent, respectively, considered that conflicts were effectively resolved.

When asked which individuals, groups or organizations played a role in keeping peace and managing conflict, those most frequently mentioned were: the army (51 percent); the police (45 percent); local religious leaders (25 percent); vigilante groups (21 percent); the federal government (including National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), Civil Defence and the Department of State Security (DSS) popularly called the SSS 20 percent); traditional rulers (19 percent); Security Task Force/Joint Task Force STF/JTF (19 percent); the state government, including State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) 17 percent); and youth groups (16 percent).

The most trusted institutions were faith-based and community-based organisations. In the north, Sharia courts and the Hizbah Board also scored highly. Other trusted institutions included leaders of religious umbrella organizations recording a mean score of 3.4, traditional rulers, Community Development Committee (CDCs), women's groups, vigilante groups; youth groups (all 3.3); the army (3.2); federal government and unions (all 3.1). At the low end were (in the Delta) oil companies with 2.3, scoring even less than secret societies (2.5).

Responses on the accessibility of institutions showed a similar pattern. When asked the extent to which they could easily meet each institution when they needed them, respondents said that they found faith-based and community-based actors and institutions to be more accessible.

Participation in conflict management institutions

Only 7 percent of respondents said that they participate in conflict management institutions, most commonly as members of community-based groups such as women's and youth groups.

Perceptions of public safety

The majority of respondents felt their security concerns were being met, with 65 percent answering 'fairly well' and 'completely well'. There was no significant gender difference in perceptions of public safety. However, average scores indicated that urban residents felt less secure than rural residents (5.5 vs. 6.1). The outlier state was Borno, where most respondents (70 percent) answered 'not at all well' and 'not very well'.

Asked what would most improve the security situation in their state, the most common response was that more jobs were needed (28 percent). Others spoke of improving the welfare of citizens, more effective communications and better security measures.

Respondents saw their own contribution to promoting peace in various ways: 24 percent spoke of 'praying for Nigeria', 23 percent advocated educating youth towards peace, 11 percent reported incidents to the police and 13 percent felt there was nothing to be

done. Respondents from the northeast were the least inclined to mention cooperating with the security agencies.

Sources of information on violence

The main sources of information on peace and security were personal networks on the one hand, and the media on the other. Personal networks such as friends (77 percent), family (64 percent), people in the neighbourhood (39 percent), other local opinion leaders or local neighbourhood elders (19 percent) and colleagues at work (18 percent) were clearly very important sources of information. Respondents also identified radio (83 percent) and television (60 percent) as also very significant. The results show that 25 percent got information from newspapers and magazines, and 16 percent from the internet. Only 8 percent mentioned government officials as a source of information on conflict. There was a tendency for women, rural residents, and lower-class respondents to rely more on local and family networks rather than the media for information.

Attitudes towards indigeneity

Policies and practices bearing on the respective rights of indigenes and residents have been seen as important drivers of conflict in some areas (see Human Rights Watch 2006; CLEEN 2009). However, about two-thirds of the respondents were content with the status quo, and most did not see them as a cause of conflict. There was no strong call for reform, unless this was to amend regulations so that non-indigenous residents and married women could access similar benefits to indigenes.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PROGRAMME

The survey provides a number of findings upon which some preliminary conclusions can be reached.

The study confirms the high incidence of violence in programme target states and the impact that citizens

feel it has on their lives. It also confirms the programme's supposition that the majority of people lack confidence in the capacity of conflict management institutions to manage conflicts non-violently. At the same time, most do not currently participate in conflict management processes. The responses to conflict by both state agencies and non-state groups have routinized the use of force, leaving little space for non-violent means. The study also shows that many conflicts are not considered to have been satisfactorily resolved thus becoming a cause of future cycles of violence.

Despite this reliance on force and allegations regarding widespread violations of human rights, most respondents expressed a fairly high level of trust in the propensity for security agencies to be fair to all parties even while being themselves perpetrators of violence. Local and faith-based institutions enjoy the trust of respondents and the vast majority of respondents, especially those from the lower and middle classes, rely on primary sources of information

The survey has generated baseline data for Indicator Outcome 1, Indicator 1 and Indicator 2.2. The baselines are presented in Annex 1.

The findings hold some implications for programme activities:

- The levels of public confidence in security agencies are an encouraging foundation for cooperation between the agencies and citizens in security governance and cooperative security provisioning.
- The current low levels of participation suggest a scope for wider public engagement in conflict management institutions.
- The concentration of incidents of conflict over land and water use in Kaduna and Plateau states validates the focus of NSRP activities on these themes in the two states. More detailed mapping of such conflicts will be required.
- The study uncovers the diverse experiences of people resident in different parts of Nigeria and

highlights the importance of context. Patterns given by national means often do not apply at the regional, state or local level. The North-eastern states stand as exceptions to many trends, while in the Niger Delta, Rivers State often differs from the two other states. The finding argues for a flexible and decentralized approach to programme design and implementation which will work with these important aspects of context.

- In both qualitative and quantitative surveys, the emphasis given by citizens to unemployment and poverty as drivers of conflict and violence, and the need to address these urgently, emerged strongly. This finding underscores the imperative of NSRP's proposed intervention to enhance the delivery of employment programmes.
- Four percent of respondents stated that a member of their family was a victim of sexual violence in the

past year. Given the taboo nature of the topic, the incidence of such violence is likely to be substantially under-reported. Programme interventions to encourage reporting and addressing of violence against women and girls (VAWG) will clearly be important.

- Finally, the study showed that local religious leaders not only play key roles in conflict management, but are also relied upon as important sources of information on violence. Alongside family, friends and radio, religious leaders were frequently cited sources of information on violence and conflict. This finding will be helpful in guiding NSRP's conflict-sensitive communication initiatives.

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ACRONYMS

AIT	Africa Independent Television
APS	Annual Perception Survey
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CDC	Community Development Councils
CLEEN	Centre for Law Enforcement and Education in Nigeria
DFID	Department for International Development
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
IDI	In-depth Interviews
JAS	Jamaatu Ahlis-Sunna Liddaawati Wal Jihad
JTF	Joint Task Force
KII	Key Informant Interview
LGA	Local Government Area
NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSRP	Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme
PCRC	Police Community Relations Committee
PSI	Practical Sampling International
SEMA	State Emergency Management Agency
SSS	State Security Service
STF	State Task Force
VAWG	Violence against Women and Girls

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria has been experiencing intermittent incidents of violence that have threatened national cohesion and undermined human security. This violence has assumed various forms, including feuds in which the main protagonists are members of competing ethnic and religious communities to armed insurrection against the Nigerian state by aggrieved groups (see, NSRP 2012; El-Bushra, Ladbury and Ukiwo 2013). Since 2009, violence has escalated following the emergence of the Jamaatu Ahlis-Sunna Liddaawati Wal Jihad (JAS). The Islamist group, which aims to overthrow the secular state system in Nigeria, has waged an insurrection against the Nigerian state with extreme violence (see Perouse de Montclos 2014).

The prospect of JAS and other budding militant groups linking up with global networks and using terrorist strategies have heightened wider concerns about security in West and Central Africa given Nigeria's strategic position as a regional power. Besides the destabilizing consequence of violence in Nigeria on the region, violence and state fragility in Nigeria reduces prospects for economic growth and human development.

The Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) is a five-year programme that aims to reduce the incidence of violence and the negative impacts of violent conflicts on the most vulnerable among the Nigerian population. NSRP is funded by DFID and implemented by the British Council (in cooperation with International Alert and Social Development Direct). The programme focuses on eight states in four regions – North West, North East, Middle Belt and the Niger Delta as well as on the national level.

NSRP aims to deliver the following outputs:

Security and governance:

Strengthening the performance of - and public trust in - the way Nigeria manages violent conflict by helping the responsible organisations become more coordinated, participatory, inclusive and accountable.

Economics and natural resources:

Addressing grievances around employment and resource competition, especially over land and water use.

Women and girls:

Reducing the impact of violence against women and girls and increasing their influence on peace-building.

Research, advocacy and media:

Supporting the design, commissioning and dissemination of impartial, independent, expert research and analysis to assist Nigerian decision-makers develop and deliver policies to reduce violent conflict as well as supporting government agencies, development agencies and media organisations to adopt conflict-sensitive responses to conflict situations.

As part of the programme's monitoring and evaluation system, annual perception surveys (APS) on perceptions of security and violence are conducted in target states and LGAs.

This survey will be undertaken every year during the life of the programme in order to obtain statistically valid information on trends in conflict and perceptions of conflicts in the NSRP programme states. This report presents the results to the first such annual perception survey.

NSRP designed the research instruments and commissioned Practical Sampling International (PSI), an experienced survey company, to coordinate data collection and tabulation. The field survey was conducted in February and April 2013.

METHODOLOGY

The research consisted of parallel quantitative and qualitative components. In the quantitative survey, 5,000 interviews were undertaken between February and April 2013. The sample universe was Nigerian citizens, male and female aged 18 or over, and non-Nigerians who have resided within the community of the survey for two years or more.

The survey was conducted in 24 NSRP target LGAs three LGAs in each of the eight NSRP programme states: Borno, Yobe, Kano, Kaduna, Plateau, Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers. The criteria for selection of NSRP LGAs include a history of violence, an equitable spread across senatorial districts, representation of both urban and rural settings and the relative absence of other donor interventions in the area of peace-building.

The response rate was 90 percent, with some refusals likely due to the tense security situation in some survey areas. Interviewers received special training in conflict and cultural sensitivity.

The qualitative survey was intended to provide the contextual information necessary to interpret patterns of responses in the quantitative survey as well as information less amenable to quantification. Ten Individual Interviews (IDIs) and four focus group discussions (FGDs) were undertaken in each state for the qualitative survey, making a total of 16 FGDs and 80 IDIs. More detail on methodology is provided in Appendix 1.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS

The sample was split equally between men and women, and between respondents from urban (49 percent) and rural (51 percent) areas. Further detail on the sample socio-economic class, income and education is given in Appendix 1.



The response rate was 90 percent, with some refusals likely due to the tense security situation in some survey areas. Interviewers received special training in conflict and cultural sensitivity.



FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

AWARENESS OF INCIDENCE OF VIOLENCE

Most of the respondents (81 percent) were aware of violence in their areas in previous five years (Table 1). The percentage of respondents aware of violence was highest in Yobe (98 percent), Kano (97 percent), Rivers (83 percent) and Borno (77 percent). Less than half of respondents in Bayelsa (48 percent) and Delta (47 percent) said that they were aware of violence in their areas in the past five years.

A somewhat lower percentage of respondents were aware of violence in their areas in the past 12 months: 69 percent across the sample. Again, this was highest in the North-eastern states of Yobe (96 percent) and Borno (88 percent), where violence by the JAS has been concentrated, and lowest in the Niger Delta states of Bayelsa (32 percent) and Delta (32 percent). (Table 2)

In Borno, the level of insecurity was self-evident, and no-one interviewed in the qualitative surveys felt safe:

This question can only be asked by someone who does not live here, because the answer is obvious, the curfew, bomb blast, the killings, the state of emergency; it is no longer news here.

-Male focus group, Borno State

In Yobe, informants noted a downturn in the violence since late 2012, which followed months of serious violence earlier that year. Some were even able to say, that in the absence of bombings in the previous few months, at least in the city of Damaturu, they felt relatively secure for the time being, despite the continuing curfew. However, even for these respondents, the feeling was tentative:

I feel only partially safe because I believe that the people that caused the problem last year are still in town, so the fact that there is silence does not mean they are gone: maybe they are preparing for the next attack. Even if there were a million security [personnel] in the state, I don't think they will be of help, for it would only take the grace of God for us to be safe. In Yobe now, you can walk freely on the streets but it's not

everybody you talk to. You mind the way you talk, you mind the kind of places you enter, you mind people you meet and you mind someone you sell things to. You have to know the person; it's not everyone you sell things to and walk away: that person might follow you later and at the end might assassinate you just like that.

-Female focus group, Borno State

The survey results confirmed a decline in the incidence of violence in the Niger Delta following the amnesty programme, which commenced in October 2009 (see, Kuku 2012, Nwajiaku-Dahou 2013). In the Middle Belt, perceptions of safety were very much dependent on location. In the context of segregation along ethnic and religious lines in cities like Jos and Kaduna, residents only felt safe in their own areas.

Attitudes to the security forces were marked by particular ambivalence in the North East. Many gave the Joint Task Force (JTF) credit for containing, to a degree, the security situation, and in particular for the improved situation in Yobe State and its capital, Damaturu:

We owe a lot of gratitude to the security agents. Four months ago, Damaturu was like a ghost town as a majority of residents had moved out for fear of their lives and those of their families.

-Yobe State, government worker

For others, though:

The security personnel are as much a threat to us as are the insurgents; we are between the devil and the deep blue sea.

-Yobe State, NGO worker

Right now people are even more afraid of a military man than members of the group because they know that the sect or insurgents would not harm me as I have no fight with them. The security agents do not know an insurgent from one who is not and treat everybody as insurgents.

-Female focus group, Yobe State,

What I am trying to say here is that [the JTF] don't need to so forceful and brutal after all they are meant to protect and serve, so my wish would be that the

government should realize that the security personnel are doing more harm than good so they should make life easier for an already over-stressed people.

-Anonymous

As it is now, rather than help the situation it's creating a fear of the JTF even worse than that of Boko Haram: turning the situation to one in which the solution appears worse than problem as they security forces meant to protect have begun to extort the ones they are meant to protect; there is brutality.

-Borno State, Male Focus Group

We the community see the problem as JTF, but believe me if JTF is withdrawn from Borno State many people will die. Nobody has seen these people call Boko Haram, whether they are ghost or invincible, I have never seen any military arrest a true Boko Haram, they just arrest innocent people and execute them at Giwa Barracks. Let's be realistic to ourselves.

-Political office-holder, Borno State

Corruption was widely seen to be endemic, especially among the police:

In Nigeria, the all-powerful and corrupt attitudes of the Nigeria Police are the root causes of the crisis. In Nigeria the police are not seen as a friend for the common man in the society, when the common man sees the police he runs away. The policeman and security agents like the SSS deliberately set people up to implicate themselves on things they know nothing about, just so they can accuse you of trying to subvert the government.

For a simple thing as writing a report or statement about a lost property you could be told to pay for it. A statement is free by law but they would charge you as much as one to three thousand naira just for a common thing as a report that you lost, for instance, your ID card or something like that.

-Borno Youth Leader

The other security services were said to be following suit:

The worst part is that now, the army personnel have also started collecting bribes. Say for instance, if you give him 50 naira he insists he is too big to collect that and punishes you instead except you're ready to part with 100 naira or more. A few weeks ago when I travelled, at a checkpoint a soldier bluntly refused to accept 50 naira offered by the drivers and demanded for 200 naira else he would delay us there.

-Yobe State, female focus group

Even more seriously, the JTF were said to have trampled on the human rights of innocent civilians:

The security personnel, that is, the JTF, have contributed in no small way to the escalation of the conflict situation in the state. Prior to their coming, the insurgents would only come and carry out a few hits on the police and disappear. Now when they attack, the JTF in retaliation shoot back and kill at will such that innocent bystanders fall victim to the hail of bullets. Furthermore, the security personnel are very brutal when carrying out arrests and a lot of non-members of the sect have been wrongfully arrested and have suffered terribly as a result the inhuman treatment meted out to them by the JTF. So I would say that the security personnel have contributed to over 60% of the insecurity of the state because their rampant arrests and killings have heightened the crisis in the state and has contributed to people leaving the state in droves [...]

In Mali next door, it took France only two weeks to flush out insurgents who had covered over 70 percent of the country, but for how long will it take the Nigerian government to flush out Boko Haram from only North-eastern Nigeria? Imagine this, some time ago nine people were secretly recruited by the security agencies in Damaturu to be giving information to them but as we speak none of them is alive! They have all been killed. Only the security agents were aware of this, so who killed this men?

-Yobe State, male focus group

Paradoxically, the security forces depend upon the same civilians to provide information to identify suspected perpetrators.

One informant in Yobe State noted some improvement in the behaviour of the security forces in recent months which had contributed to better relations with the public and, in turn, improved security:

Of course a large number of people did run away, it is because there is relative calm now thanks, in no small measure to the efforts made by the government reduce the pains being felt by the general public that's why most have returned. Before now, the JTF went around in their armoured vehicles and parked at strategic points waiting for their informants to identify suspected members of the insurgent group. Such

persons would then be apprehended and taken away for interrogation and probably never to be seen again irrespective of whether they were guilty or not. Also, the level of intimidation and house break-ins by the JTF has reduced to a large extent. The state government had been carrying out enlightenment campaigns to stop people from panicking and running away, but none of that was effective until the JTF were able to curb their unnecessary high-handedness.

The people have been praying for God's intervention and in addition begun to give useful information to the JTF, they have also kept the law as required by the JTF. This effort by the people can be said to be the major reason why the security forces have been able to subdue the insurgents paving way for the peace we are enjoying now.

-Yobe State, legal practitioner

In Rivers and Bayelsa States in the Niger Delta, residents interviewed on the current security situation were somewhat positive, though it should be recalled that their assessments were made against a background of a long-running security crisis stretching back over decades. Most of those interviewed in the qualitative surveys said they said quite safe, especially compared to the situation a few years ago. Two factors were considered to be responsible: changes in administration in both states (new governors were elected in 2007 in Rivers and in 2012 in Bayelsa); and the Niger Delta Amnesty, signed by former President Yar'Adua in 2009, which continues to be in force. This amnesty was granted to around 30,000 former militants, each of whom is supposed to receive 65,000 naira per month, and has brought relative stability to the region, though not necessarily a halt to illegal activity.

Amnesty granted to militants to shun violence has urged them to embrace peace. And most of them were given scholarship to schools, given scholarship for trades, and again they embrace God so as a result of that we have been living in peace for like two to three years now.

-Rivers State, legal practitioner

For like two to three years ago in Rivers State a lot of youngsters engaged in petty theft, they cut people's neck chains, snatched people's phones, cut handbags and all sort of they do all sorts hostile activities, but we come to see that since Amaechi's government came on board they took time to call the youths together [to]

begin to see how to empower the youths with some programmes and in the cause of this granted them amnesty. This has gone a long way to bring down the unrest nature of youths in this society.

-Rivers State, market leader

The administrations in both states also introduced new laws against cults, kidnapping, and related offences.² There has been no recent crisis in either state comparable to those of earlier years, though criminality in the form of violent crime (including kidnapping), and oil bunkering (the illegal extraction of oil), remain all too common. Some residents said they continued to feel unsafe. Others considered that the amnesty was not sustainable for political or financial reasons. Indeed, according to some residents, the amnesty itself has led to unrest.

We are not safe, but the shootings have reduced. We do not sleep deeply. We can't move late at night due to cultists and militants. The police run away from robbery scenes.

-Bayelsa State, female focus group

We don't feel very safe because just few days ago, some youths just get up concerning amnesty issue, before you know it they started destroying cars on the way and some people were injured

-Bayelsa State, NGO worker

There was also evidence that outside the state capitals, security had not improved as much:

The other people say it is safe. Those of us in the rural community are suffering. Perhaps it is safe for them because they stay in Port Harcourt [capital of Rivers State]. In the rural community, we agitate for oil. We have communal problems amongst ourselves. All of these are caused by oil exploration and activities in the village. The urban area is safe due to the heavy police presence. The state is not as safe as they say it is due to the peculiarity of my community. Oil spillage issue and oil companies, and sometimes the government come in and defend the company. In the neighbourhood where I stay in the urban region, it is safe because of the presence of the military

-Rivers, Community worker

In the survey, there was a slight difference between genders in levels of awareness of violence. Male respondents were somewhat more aware of violence than female respondents both five years ago (83 vs.

² Bayelsa State Secret Cults, Kidnapping and Similar Offences Prohibition Law, 2012. Similar legislation was passed by Rivers State's administration in 2004 and 2009.

79 percent) and in the past 12 months (71 vs. 67 percent).


Given the high level of awareness of violence, it is not surprising that a majority of respondents were either very concerned (67 percent) or somewhat concerned (15 percent) that a member of their family would become a victim of violence (Table 3).

The high levels of concern about violence in Borno State (89 percent were very concerned) reflect the

rising incidents of attacks by JAS on civilians in the state during the period of the survey and the severe reactions of the security forces.

As many as 77 percent of respondents said that they, or a member of their household, had experienced some form of violence in the previous 12 months (96 percent in Bayelsa, 94 percent in Borno, with Delta having the lowest at 52 percent). The most common perpetrators were said to be: militant groups (27


Figure 1: Perception of perpetrators of violence



Borno and Yobe States respectively had the highest percentages of respondents whose household members had experienced or seen violence by militants and security forces in the past 12 months. In Borno, 81 percent of respondents had experienced violence at the hands of militant groups and 62 percent by the security forces. The most common type of violence experienced in Kaduna State in the past 12 months was violence between ethnic or religious groups. Experience of violence by robbers was pronounced in all eight states.

The most common impact of violence on families of respondents mentioned were physical injury (28 percent), loss of income/livelihood (19 percent), loss of life (14 percent), loss of access to services (17 percent), displacement (17 percent) and loss of a sense of security in the neighbourhood (17 percent) (See Figure 2). Most respondents had been affected by violence; only 47 percent said their families had not been directly impacted.

Figure 2: Impact of violence on family members



Rivers had the highest percentage of respondents who said their family was affected by loss of life (29 percent). Most of the respondents in Borno said they had suffered losses of income/livelihood (53 percent) and access to social services (58 percent) (see, Table 5).³

Twenty-four percent of respondents said violence arose from conflict over land, water or oil while a further 9 percent said violence was partially for these reasons. Not surprisingly, it was in the Niger Delta that the highest percentage of respondents said that violence was due to conflict over natural resources: 68 percent in Rivers, 51 percent in Delta State and 42 percent in Bayelsa.


Forty-nine percent of respondents in Kaduna State said that violent conflicts in their area were wholly or partly due to disputes over land and water. The equivalent figure in Plateau State was 44 percent. These two Middle Belt states have seen a history of violence over land and water, notably between farmers and pastoralists.

MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICTS

Only one out of four respondents felt conflicts they experienced were 'effectively dealt with and resolved': most respondents (43 percent) said conflicts were not resolved while 18 percent said conflicts were only partially resolved. Dissatisfaction with the management and resolution of conflicts was most pronounced in Borno and Yobe where 87 percent and 60 percent of respondents respectively said that conflicts were not dealt with effectively. Only 3 percent in Borno and 15 percent in Yobe considered that conflicts were effectively resolved. In other states (excluding the North-east) about a third of respondents said that they were.

The survey explored the roles and effectiveness of the various actors and institutions involved in managing conflict and violence. When asked which individuals, groups or organizations played a role in keeping peace and managing conflict, those most frequently mentioned spontaneously by respondents were: the army (51 percent); the police (45 percent); local religious leaders (25 percent); vigilante groups (21 percent); the federal government including NEMA, the Civil Defence and the SSS (20 percent); traditional rulers (19 percent); STF/JTF (19 percent); the state government including SEMA (17 percent); and youth groups (16 percent). (Figure 3)

Figure 3: Actors/Institutions that manage conflicts and keep peace(spontaneous responses)



³ The low percentage of respondents in Borno and Yobe who claim loss of life is probably explained by the fact that the survey did not sample areas most affected by the violence due to concerns for safety of researchers and respondents.

While there was variation between states in the institutions cited, in almost all states the federal government and its agencies emerged more prominently than the state. Slightly fewer respondents mentioned local governments. This suggested that the proximity to sites of conflicts and violence did not lead to local and state governments being seen as being more relevant than the federal government in conflict management. The finding may also be related to the control which the federal level has over security agencies.

The survey sought to gauge the degree of trust in which various actors and institutions were held and how accessible they were. Respondents were asked the extent to which they trusted each institution to be impartial and fair to all parties in their conflict management role. In order to compare the levels of trust in institutions, a score was used, allocating: 4 for 'trust completely', 3 for 'fairly', 2 for 'not very', 1 for not at all'. The strongest level of trust was expressed for faith-based and community-based actors and institutions. In the north, Sharia courts and the Hizbah Board also scored highly. As Table 7 shows, other trusted institutions included: leaders of religious 'umbrella' organizations (3.4), traditional rulers, CDCs, women's groups, vigilante groups⁴ and youth groups (all 3.3); the army (3.2); the federal government and unions (all 3.1). At the low end were (in the Delta) oil companies with 2.3, which scored even less than secret societies (2.5).

Responses on the accessibility of institutions showed a similar pattern. When asked the extent to which they could easily meet each institution when they needed them, respondents also said that they found faith-based and community-based actors and institutions to be accessible. (See Table 7)

While most institutions registered similar scores for fairness and accessibility, some, including community-based actors and institutions such as community leaders, local religious leaders and community development committees, scored slightly higher for access than fairness. Meanwhile, the army scored higher than the police in terms of fairness but lower for accessibility.

The survey aimed to establish the degree of public participation in conflict management institutions by asking interviewees whether or not they participated in any of the institutions. Only 7 percent of informants said they did, while 91 percent did not. Thus, the great

majority are not involved in conflict management institutions.

The finding is significant since the groups which emerged as most trusted and accessible were community-based groups which are local and open to all citizens, notably youth groups, unions, women's groups, community development groups and vigilantes. None of the respondents said they were involved in conflict management initiatives involving the state and local government.

Of those who did participate in conflict management institutions, most (81 percent) said they were involved as members. Other respondents were leaders (6 percent), executive council members (8 percent) and committee members (4 percent).

Underlying the propensity of disputes of all kinds to escalate to violence, there was an apparent lack of trust in institutions and a long history of disempowerment, as the following two extracts from interviews in the Niger Delta illustrate:

People are not just being greedy and taking laws into their own hands, this is because of the failing in our social institutions. The security has broken down, the police system is not working well, the judiciary is not working, and even the civil service has also collapsed.
-Media practitioner, Bayelsa State

People have been oppressed; you don't have a voice, but you have allowed things to go on because you can't really fight back and so life is going on because there is nothing you can do at the moment. For instance, an oil company has destroyed your land, and each time you want to talk to the oil company there is a very strong armed forces or police present at the place there is nothing much you can do.
-NGO worker, Bayelsa State

However, one informant in the Niger Delta expressed explicitly, and others implied, an increasing trust in institutions [6.3 politician]. Further, (in contrast to the North-east), opinions about the security agencies (the most visible being the JTF and the police) were by and large positive. 'Operation Doo-Akpo' (the security outfit set up by the Bayelsa State Government to tackle crime) was considered to have been effective in improving security in the state.

⁴ Vigilantes refer to groups recognised by communal groups and the state to provide security. They are often called in to fill gaps felt by poor security provisioning by conventional security forces. In most states where they operate, there is some of legislative backing for their existence and the legal instruments often specify the remit of their powers, especially in the areas of bearing arms.

In Rivers State, a legal practitioner commented as follows:

The police and the legal professionals are the ones that have been actively participating in conflict management and resolution. The police and the community have even set up a committee a group called Police Community Relations Committee (PCRC) which comprises of the community leaders and the police where they encourage every member of the community to give report on what is happening in their immediate environment. What they do in such situations [is] come in and settle matters. To make sure that the rightful things are being done.

-Legal practitioner

More generally, it was said of Bayelsa:

This present administration always set up peace reconciliation committee, including the traditional rulers, the political leaders and the youths.

-Government official, Bayelsa State

This approach was consistent with a more traditional style of conflict resolution:

We have a way or curtailing this thing which is conflict resolution, a situation whereby people must come together, sit down and talk things out because there is always a way out of everything; [it] is a matter of talking through and come to a solid conclusion about one particular thing.

-Government official, Bayelsa State

The work of NGOs was not always highly regarded, though:

Coming to NGOs, there have been some NGOs in the state but we don't see them. The NGOs themselves get richer through the masses, they gather information then analyse it, present it to the government, pocket their money and disappear. They have not made any effort to empower the youth or sponsor any programmes. I can't mention any of them because even when they come, after a period of time they move into thin air. Once you can't see them again, they are irrelevant.

-Market woman, Rivers State

Respondents were asked what they considered to be the real cause of violent conflicts and violence. The most widespread responses were: 'not enough jobs' (88 percent); poverty (89 percent); electoral malpractice (67 percent); politicians who arm gangs

for their own ends (65 percent), the non-resolution of previous conflicts (64 percent); and the availability of small arms (63 percent).

Among the list of drivers of violence given, respondents were asked to rank the top three factors. The results show that 'not enough jobs' (44 percent), poverty (11 percent); exclusion from decision-making (11 percent) topped the factors listed as first choice. The factors listed as second choice were 'poverty (39 percent); 'government decisions' (13 percent) and 'not enough jobs' (10 percent). The factors most commonly listed as third choice were 'availability of small arms (16 percent); 'electoral malpractice' (15 percent); and the non-prosecution of perpetrators of previous violence (14 percent). The results show that socio-economic and political/electoral factors predominate as drivers of violence according to people in the target areas.

The survey was also intended to find out perceptions of feelings of public safety (Table 8). Consequently, respondents were asked 'to what extent are the security concerns of you and your family being met at this time?'

The majority respondents felt their security concerns were being met, with 65 percent answering 'fairly well' and 'completely well'. There was no significant gender difference in the perception of public safety. Average scores indicated that urban residents felt less secure than rural (5.5 vs. 6.1). The outlier state was Borno, where most respondents (70 percent) answered 'not at all well' and 'not very well'. This is not surprising given the rising spate of killings in the state at the time of the survey. Delta (42 percent) and Rivers (38 percent) were the other states where a considerable proportion of respondents felt unsafe. The results are probably traceable to the upsurge in kidnapping rates in these states during the period of the survey.

When asked 'what would most improve the security situation in this state?' the opinions most commonly expressed by respondents were: 'create more employment opportunities' (28 percent), and 'improve the level of security' (24 percent) (Table 9). Just behind these responses were: 'government should improve the welfare of citizens/standard of living' (10 percent), 'they should have effective communication on security and how to keep peace' (10 percent), and 'provide more patrol vans and equipment' (9 percent). When these responses are disaggregated by states, there was a difference between those experiencing

insurgency and other states: Borno and Yobe respondents placed greater emphasis on security-related intervention while those in other states prioritised the provision of employment.

Respondents were asked what they considered to be the most important contribution that they themselves could make to promoting peace and security in their communities. The most common response was simply 'praying for Nigeria (24 percent)'. 'Advocating peace and educating youth on peace' was the next most common (23 percent), and a distant third (11 percent) was to call the police. This proportion was less than the 13 percent of respondents who felt that there was nothing to be done.

When disaggregated across states, some patterns emerge. Notably, respondents in Yobe (35 percent) and Bayelsa (29 percent) were more likely than those in other states (8 percent on average) to see their role in terms of reporting suspicions to the security agencies.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE

The survey showed that the main sources of information on peace and security were personal networks on the one hand and the media on the other. Personal networks such as friends (77 percent), family (64 percent) people in the neighbourhood (39 percent), other local opinion leaders or local neighbourhood elders (19 percent), and colleagues at work (18 percent) were very important sources of information. Respondents also identified radio (83 percent) and television (60 percent) as also very significant. The results show that 25 percent got information from newspapers and magazines, and 16 percent from the internet. Only 8 percent mentioned government officials as a source of information on conflict. Amongst 'other' sources of information mentioned by respondents, the most common was 'students', especially in Borno and Plateau.

The sources of information about conflict and violence were correlated with respondents' social class. Dependence on primary sources such as family

members, friends and work contacts were most common among middle and lower-class respondents while⁵persons from middle and upper-class backgrounds depended on media and electronic sources such as radio, television, newspapers, mobile phones and the internet (see Figures 5 & 6).

There were also gender differences in sources of information. Female respondents depended less on media sources and more on social contacts, especially the family, while male respondents got their information mainly from the media, and the social networks cited were friends, neighbours and local leaders. Location was also relevant: rural respondents depended more on family, friends, neighbours and local leaders for information while urban respondents were greater users of television, radio, internet and newspapers.

These results underline the influence of access and affordability on the sources of information people depend on for information.

⁵Based on self-perception by respondents. See Annex

Figure 4: Sources of Information by Social Class





Figure 5: Source of Information on Conflict and Violence by Social Class



Respondents were asked how much they trusted these sources of information. The highest scores were for friends and family (average score 3.3); radio (3.3); television (3); religious leaders (2.7); local chiefs and elders (2.3); and newspapers and magazines (2.1). Government officials were least trusted (2).

Respondents' attitudes towards specific radio stations broadcasting in their states were assessed. Two

questions were posed against a list of such stations: 'How much do you trust these radio stations for information on conflict and violence?' and: 'how much do you think these radio stations contribute to solving political conflict and violence?' The answers to the questions were closely correlated. The results for Maiduguri and Kaduna are shown graphically below, while the remainder are tabulated in Annex 2.

Figure 6: Perceptions of Trust and Relevance of Radio Stations by Borno Respondents





Figure 7: Perceptions of Trust and Relevance of Radio Stations by Kaduna Respondents



It is notable that international news stations are particularly trusted in Maiduguri. However, greater trust was generally expressed in private stations than those run by government.

The views expressed in the quantitative studies on media were largely confirmed by findings of the qualitative data.

In the North-east, TV was trusted because it presented images with news. Radio was also widely listened to, and had the advantages of being accessible to the common people with low incomes, limited literacy, or where the power supply was unreliable or non-existent. International stations, such as Al Jazeera and the BBC Hausa service, were mentioned by a number of informants as giving a more balanced view of news than others. Newspapers were not widely trusted, as they were considered liable to sensationalism and regional bias. Government sources were held in the lowest credibility. The internet and social media were considered convenient, though not very widely used. While friends and family were sources of information, most informants would want to check what they heard through television and radio, as rumours were rife. Being informed was vital to staying safe, and many would check with their networks of associates before moving around the town.

Residents of the Niger Delta are great consumers of media through radio, television and newspaper. Many were also connected through the internet. The most trusted source of news was television because images were considered to lend credibility to the report. Explaining why he rated African Independent Television's (AIT) news as the most credible source, one informant stated:

The importance cannot be over-emphasised. You see what they are reporting as against the newspaper while you are not seeing what they are reporting. When AIT gives you report, you see it. We have seeing them going into interior.

-Lecturer, Bayelsa State

Radio was valued for its wide geographical coverage and independence from a reliable electricity supply. Least trusted were the government-owned media houses:

Because whatever they are reporting will always be in support of government even when government is wrong. You can't see them exposing the mistake of government officials to public.

-Lecturer Bayelsa State

People in the Niger Delta were sophisticated in their use of media usage, and generally liked to corroborate information from one source with another (e.g. confirming a radio story by phoning their friends, or asking colleagues), before deciding on the veracity of a news item.

Newspapers ranked quite low in credibility. One informant, when asked which media source he trusts least, had the following perspective on the press:

The newspaper, because we have a lot of pocket journalists hanging out here and there, we have many of them. Once they can get any information from you, they go back twist it differently, so that they can sell more papers. You find out that you see a caption on the front page that is saying something and after you might have bought it and read it, you find out that the story is different, so the caption was put there to make people to rush and buy it.

Virtually all of them do that. When you invite them to do a story, or to gather information after they might have gotten what they want, they will start asking you to give them some money so that they can use it to pay for their transport to execute it.

Once you refuse to give them the money, you will find out that the information will not be published until when you pay for it or for a slot. There is one of the slots I paid about thirty-something thousand naira for I have the receipt just sometime last month. Something I wanted published, just because I refused to give the reporter transport fare, it was not published. They only answer to those people who bribe them after paying for the slot. You began to see that if you don't have money they will begin to dump your publications. That is why I prefer radio stations; they will never do that.

-Market association leader, Rivers State

ATTITUDES TOWARD POLICIES ON INDIGENEITY AND RESIDENCE

The subject of the relative rights enjoyed by Nigerians resident outside their state of origin generally referred to as 'non-indigenes' has been a strongly contested one. The concept of indigeneity (sometimes termed 'indigeneship', as used legally and administratively in Nigeria to govern access to jobs, land, rights of residence, political representation, etc., is sometimes seen as a driver of conflict in the

country. This has been especially true of Plateau State. The issue is one of those being addressed by the on-going review of the 1999 constitution. Several questions in the survey addressed issues of indigeneity and residence assessing views on current policies and practices and proposals for change. Questioned on current policies and practice as regards laws and regulations that favour indigenes, almost two-thirds of respondents (with some variance depending on the phrasing of the question), were content with the status quo, and most (58 percent) did not see them as a cause of conflict (Table 10). In fact, the only state where a majority of informants (59 percent) agreed that policies favouring indigenes caused disunity and conflict was Yobe, which is arguably has the lowest population of non-indigenes and faces least challenges on that score.

When asked about reform, there was little support for replacing or dropping policies that favour indigenes (Table 20). However, two-thirds of respondents would like policies to be amended so that non-indigenous residents and married women from other areas could also benefit (Table 11).

Yobe was also the only state where a majority (59 percent) advocated dropping policies that favour indigenes. Respondents in states with higher populations of indigenes were less likely to express the need for reform (Plateau, 23 percent; Kaduna, 30 percent; Delta, 10 percent; Kano, 33 percent).

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PROGRAMME

The survey provides a number of findings upon which some preliminary conclusions can be reached.

The study confirms the high frequency of violence in target states and the high perceived impact of violence on populations in target states. It also confirms programme assumptions that a majority of the people are not involved in conflict management processes and lack confidence that the conflicts in their states are being managed non-violently by conflict management institutions. The prominence of both state and non-state armed groups in conflict management is an indicator that conflict is not being managed non-violently. The study also shows that many conflicts remain unresolved and become source of future cycles of violence.

The fact that security agents are often deployed to intervene in conflict management probably explains the ironical finding that a majority of respondents hold a fairly high level of trust of security agents being fair to all parties while also seeing them as perpetrators of violence. The study showed that local and faith-based institutions enjoy the trust of respondents and that the vast majority of respondents, especially those from the lower and middle class, rely on primary sources of information.

The survey has generated baseline data for Indicator Outcome 1, Indicator 1 and Indicator 2.2. The baselines are presented in Annex 1.

Some implications for programme activities include the following:

Results show an encouraging degree of trust for security agencies as well as the willingness of citizens to cooperate with them. This offers opportunities for proposed programme interventions around security and governance and cooperative security provisioning. The findings on a lack of participation among the public in conflict management institutions also provides justification to this work-stream.

The study showed that most respondents from target states in northern Nigeria did not consider conflicts in their states to be over land and water use. Only in Kaduna and Plateau states do one third of respondents consider conflicts to be over land and water. Given that this is the assumption of programme intervention on resource governance, there is need for more detailed mapping studies of conflicts over land and water in the states.



The fact that security agents are often deployed to intervene in conflict management probably explains the ironical finding that a majority of respondents hold a fairly high level of trust of security agents being fair to all parties while also seeing them as perpetrators of violence.



The study showed the importance of contexts. Many of the general patterns revealed in the study were conflicted when disaggregated. The most startling revelations were the contrasting responses from the North-east states of Borno and Yobe and the differences between Rivers on the one hand and Bayelsa and Delta in the Niger Delta on the other. This finding raises the need for more nuanced approaches to interventions based on regional frames of reference.

The study confirmed the widespread perception that the underlying drivers of violence in Nigeria are unemployment and poverty. Most respondents felt poverty and unemployment were causes of violence and suggested job provision and an improvement in the living standards of people. This finding underscores the imperative of NSRP's proposed intervention to enhance the delivery of employment programmes.

The study revealed low reports of sexual violence. Only 4 percent of respondents admitted that a member of their family was a victim of sexual violence in the past year. This may indicate the extent to which discussion of sexual violence remains a taboo. It does lend credence to programme interventions to encourage the reporting and addressing of violence against women and girls (VAWG). There is a possibility of the APS becoming another source of data for reported VAWG in target areas.

Finally, the study showed that local religious leaders not only play important roles in conflict management, but are also important sources of information on violence that people rely on. Apart from family, friends and radio, religious leaders topped the list of sources of information on violence for most respondents. This suggests new opportunities for NSRP's conflict-sensitive communication initiatives.



Most respondents felt poverty and unemployment were causes of violence and suggested job provision and an improvement in the living standards of people.



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TABLES

Table 1: Awareness of violence in past five years

	Total	Male	Female	Borno	Yobe	Kano	Kaduna	Plateau	Bayelsa	Delta	Rivers
Yes	81	83	79	77	98	97	86	75	48	47	83
No	18	16	20	23	2	3	14	25	48	50	15
Don't know	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	3	3	2

Table 2: Awareness of violence in past 12 months

	Total	Male	Female	Borno	Yobe	Kano	Kaduna	Plateau	Bayelsa	Delta	Rivers
Yes	69	71	67	88	96	85	77	41	32	32	63
No	30	28	31	11	4	15	22	58	62	66	35
Don't know	1	1	2	0	0	0	1	1	5	2	3

Table 3: Concern that family members will be a victim of violence

	Total	Male	Female	Borno	Yobe	Kano	Kaduna	Plateau	Bayelsa	Delta	Rivers
Not at all concerned	9	10	8	3	7	14	4	5	6	10	14
Not very concerned	7	7	7	2	9	7	7	6	9	13	7
Somewhat concerned	15	14	17	5	29	14	24	14	18	8	14
Very concerned	67	67	66	89	54	64	61	74	60	67	63
Don't know	2	2	2	1	1	1	5	0	7	2	2

Table 4: Perpetrator of violence by gender and state

	Total	Male	Female	Borno	Yobe	Kano	Kaduna	Plateau	Bayelsa	Delta	Rivers
Violence by security forces	21	22	20	62	29	25	11	12	12	5	10
Violence by robbers	27	27	27	33	35	23	25	22	23	29	33
Violence by gangs	26	25	27	31	40	24	19	17	19	29	33
Violence Between Different ethnic or Religious groups	23	24	23	11	31	25	47	19	2	6	23
Violence by Militant groups	27	27	27	81	44	25	8	2	17	1	38
Domestic Violence Against women or girls	6	7	6	1	2	5	6	12	8	4	16
Domestic Violence against boys or men	8	8	7	2	1	13	4	8	14	2	12
Sexual Violence against women And girls	4	4	4	1	1	4	9	3	4	1	6
Violence by Cult group and secret societies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Violence by Kidnappers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Violence by Politicians/ political thugs	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	1
Violence by Community Chiefs/ Traditional Rulers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Violence by Community youths	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Violence Through land crisis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Others	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	1	0
None	23	22	24	6	19	20	30	29	4	52	14

Table 5: Impact of violence on family by gender and state

	Total	Male	Female	Borno	Yobe	Kano	Kaduna	Plateau	Bayelsa	Delta	Rivers
Loss of life	14	14	13	17	23	4	15	16	4	4	29
Physical injury	28	30	27	31	36	21	33	31	15	18	42
Mental health	5	5	5	2	7	1	11	4	7	0	11
Income/ livelihood	19	20	19	53	38	9	23	11	17	7	13
Displacement from home	17	17	16	22	33	7	24	9	11	5	29
Your access to services (schools, clinics, water)	17	17	16	58	16	10	26	7	1	4	5
Sense of security in your neighborhood	17	16	18	28	16	20	20	12	6	9	14
Loss of property	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Arrest/ detention	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	3
None	47	47	47	18	31	54	48	55	71	72	33

Table 6: Actors and institutions that manage conflicts and keep peace (Responses when prompted)

	Total	Male	Female	Borno	Yobe	Kano	Kaduna	Plateau	Bayelsa	Delta	Rivers
Traditional rulers	32	31	34	34	37	23	38	44	32	33	33
LGA	33	35	32	23	35	33	39	41	46	30	28
Local religious leaders	40	40	40	25	50	35	38	60	57	40	43
Leaders of religious umbrellas (eg. CAN/JNI)	33	35	32	48	61	14	40	62	55	19	21
Formal courts (incl. customary, excl. sharia)	27	29	26	20	25	14	36	41	48	42	22
Police	28	26	30	19	36	24	33	31	26	38	27
Army	32	30	34	21	33	26	35	32	36	42	39
STF/JTF	31	32	29	49	44	15	33	38	50	26	26
State government (including SEMA)	35	37	33	21	59	26	41	59	51	19	37
Federal government (including NEMA, Civil Defence and SSS)	39	42	37	24	61	39	47	56	56	23	31
Vigilante groups	34	36	33	14	32	34	41	50	44	40	27
Community Development Councils	33	34	31	28	41	17	43	48	41	43	30
Women's groups	21	20	22	13	27	8	21	46	36	22	26
Youth groups	26	28	25	18	33	13	31	49	36	31	28
Unions (okada, taxi drivers, traders, producers)	12	14	11	10	28	11	14	20	13	5	8
Secret societies	2	3	2	2	3	2	6	1	1	1	1
The mass media	33	35	31	53	38	33	28	47	34	27	14
Sharia courts	18	20	16	15	15	44	20	2	0	0	0
Hizbah board	14	15	13	0	1	44	16	0	0	0	0
Oil companies	5	5	4	0	0	0	0	0	26	4	23
Red cross/Red crescent	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Politicians	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
No Response	2	2	3	3	2	1	2	2	1	4	5

Table 7: Perceptions of fairness and accessibility of actors and institutions (mean scores)

Actors/institutions	<i>Fair to all parties</i>	<i>Can easily meet</i>
Local religious leaders	3.6	3.6
Youth groups	3.3	3.5
Traditional rulers	3.3	3.4
Vigilante groups	3.3	3.4
Community Development Councils	3.3	3.4
Women's groups	3.3	3.4
Leaders of religious		
'umbrellas' (e.g. CAN / JNI)	3.4	3.1
Unions (okada, taxi-drivers,		
traders, producers)	3.1	3.2
Army	3.2	3
Police	2.9	3.2
The mass Media	3.2	2.9
LGA	3	2.9
STF/JTF	3	2.9
Formal courts (incl. customary, excl. Sharia)	3	2.8
Federal Government (including NEMA, Civil Defence and SSS)	3.1	2.5
State Government (including SEMA)	3	2.4
Secret Societies	2.5	2.4
(North only) Sharia courts	3.5	3.3
Hizbah Board	3.5	3.4
(Niger Delta only) Oil companies	2.3	1.6

Table 8: Perceptions of public safety

	Total	Male	Female	Borno	Yobe	Kano	Kaduna	Plateau	Bayelsa	Delta	Rivers
Not at all well	11	11	11	43	5	2	10	4	1	8	14
Not very well	21	22	21	27	25	10	25	23	10	34	24
Fairly well	36	36	35	11	45	38	42	43	41	22	45
Completely	29	28	30	13	21	47	20	28	42	33	15
Don't know	3	4	2	6	3	2	2	2	6	3	3

Table 9: Suggestions on what would improve security

	Total	Borno	Yobe	Kano	Kaduna	Plateau	Bayelsa	Delta	Rivers
They should create more employment	28	11	21	26	27	16	20	55	43
They should improve the level of security	24	11	40	21	31	32	34	10	24
They should provide more patrol van/ well equipped	9	6	11	9	11	3	2	7	14
They should have an effective communication on security/how to keep peace	10	24	19	6	6	10	9	2	14
Government should improve the welfare of the citizen/ standard of living	10	4	6	8	5	9	7	10	28

Table 10: View about policies and practices that favour indigenes?

%	Yes	No	<i>Don't know</i>	<i>Refused</i>
I support them because they preserve the rights of indigenes	65	27	5	3
I support them because they are necessary for national unity	64	28	5	3
I support them because they help to protect interests of minorities	62	28	10	3
I do NOT support them because they lead to discrimination against women married outside their state of origin	36	51	10	3
I do NOT support them because they cause disunity and conflict	32	58	7	3

Table 11: View on proposals for constitutional amendment to change policies and practices that favour indigenes?

%	Yes	No	<i>Don't know</i>	<i>Refused</i>
AMEND policies and practices that favour indigenes so that residents can also benefit	68	22	7	3
AMEND policies and practices that favour indigenes so that women married outside their state of origin can also benefit	64	24	8	4
Retain policies and practices that favour indigenes	56	37	5	3
REPLACE policies that favour indigenes with those that favour residents	39	49	8	3
DROP policies that favour indigenes	31	60	7	3

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