PATTERNS AND TREND ANALYSIS OF VIOLENCE IN OIL PRODUCTION AND OIL DISTRIBUTION IN NIGERIA FROM 2006 TO 2014

BY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Most studies on oil related violence in Nigeria have unwittingly concentrated research efforts on oil production in the Niger Delta region. An attempt is made in this paper to demonstrate that oil distribution contributes more to fatality than oil production in Nigeria. Using the Nigeria Watch database as the primary source of data, the paper asserts that although the aggregate death figures attributed to the oil sector is insignificant compared to cases like road accidents, crime and political cum religious motivated killing, the number of violent deaths recorded between June 2006 and May 2014 from oil distribution is as triple as deaths adduced to oil production. While oil distribution accounted for 4,575 deaths, oil production events led to about 1,550 deaths. In addition, oil distribution makes more lethal impact on the country than oil distribution. Apart from Kebbi and Zamfara, all the states of the federation have witnessed at least a fatal incidence from oil distribution, whereas oil production cases only occurred in Anambra, Rivers, Delta, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa and Imo, with scanty cases in Kogi state. The reasons are not far fetched. Oil production are restricted to few states in the Niger-Delta area (and maybe Kogi and Kaduna states), while oil distribution activities cover the whole nation. More so, oil production deals essentially with crude oil, which is known to be nonflammable, whereas oil distribution involves refined products that are highly ignitable. In the final analysis, to understand the pattern and dynamics of fatalities in the oil sector, more research efforts need to be devoted to oil distribution.
1.0 INTRODUCTION

On the 26th December 2006, a pipeline explosion at Abule-Egba in Agege Local Government Area of Lagos claimed the lives of more than 600 persons. In a related development, series of deadly clashes between the Joint Task Force (JTF) and militants in Warri South and Warri South West Local Governments of Delta state on 13th May 2009 culminated in the deaths of some 593 victims. Such volatile outcomes and dangerous consequences are usually associated with oil related violence in Nigeria. Although oil violence may not be the major causes of fatal incidents in the country, its occurrences, especially those that have to do oil distribution have continued to trigger violence of frightening proportion at various spatial levels. Perhaps, one important question to ask is why such an important sector associates with fatal incidents of such magnitude? For one, Nigeria’s economy rests heavily on crude oil, hence it is only expected that commercial activities around it become intense and highly competitive. In fact, most international businesses in the country are driven by the oil factor to the extent that Nigeria is often considered the commercial heartbeat of Africa. In any case, the nation’s oil depicts a contested platform of intense power plays by forces within and without the state frontiers. According to Obi (2005:187);

Oil as a source of power and wealth is central to Nigeria’s federalism. It exerts a lot of influence by defining the object of power and by its dialectically being a source of wealth, poverty, unity, intensified competition, and conflict. This manifests at the levels of oil production and distribution

For another, the oil curse thesis, which has been sufficiently appraised in the literature still subsists in a primitive economy like Nigeria’s. The argument simply advances that the rise in oil production and the inevitable circle of oil boom have the tendency to precipitate socio-economic instability, and ultimately violence (Ikelegbe, 2005). However, it amounts to over-simplification of the problem without probing beyond the oil curse theory. To be precise, it is important to investigate the stakes of oil production and oil distribution in the complex matrix that make violent incidents more frequent. It is even more imperative considering the policy samalsults that the sector has witnessed in recent times. For instance, the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) that seeks to achieve a robust and comprehensive reform in the dwindling oil sector has reached its advance stage. It therefore calls for
a deeper analysis of issues for policy options at scientific level to be potent enough to remedy the degenerating situation.

In retrospect, the oil industry is a spotlight for major stakeholders with varying political and economic interests across the country. Although issues of politics, ethnicity and religion are known to be volatile in Nigeria, oil-related fatalities, especially those induced by oil distribution appear to have impacted more on the social environment in terms of geographical spread and intensity. Previous analyses on oil violence in Nigeria have unduly concentrated research efforts on oil production within the locale of the Niger Delta (Ikporukpo, 2002; Ogbogbo, 2005; Obi, 2005, Guichaoua, 2009; E.M. Akpabio & N.S. Akpan, 2010). But as the main findings from this research will later suggest, the frequent movements of oil products to different parts of the country on the dilapidated roads evidently makes frequently heavy fatalities probable. At the same time, the inflammable status of the refined oil and the rickety tankers that often convey these products predispose oil distribution to a large-scale violence. Fatalities that are associated with oil production are largely limited, not only in terms of their concentration to the core oil producing states (with few cases in Kaduna) in the Niger Delta but also in the context of its dealings with crude oil, which is non-flammable.

The intention of this paper, therefore, is to dissect the gamut of activities that account for the contours of violent incidents within this sector from 2006 to 2014, with a focus on oil production and oil distribution in Nigeria. The data for the paper is extrated from the Nigeria Watch database, which is an open source of public violence in Nigeria. It is a collection of print media reports of violent deaths in the country since July 2006. The patterns of violent events as they related to oil distribution and production nationwide are illustrated with the aid of charts and maps to show important trends. In order to advance the central themes of this paper, two probing questions are instructive: why is oil distribution more fatal than oil production in Nigeria? Why do stakeholders—authorities, NGOs, scholars and security professionals—concentrate more on issues that involve oil production?

This paper has been carefully structured to provide adequate responses to these pertinent questions. The first section introduces the paper by presenting the general outline of the discussion. The second segment takes a critical look at the political, economic and social context of oil distribution and production, exploring the historical evolution since 1956 and their transformation after 2009.
Section three discusses the methodology approach of the research and further addresses some specific issues that concerns oil production and distribution. Section four presents the key findings, while session five concludes the paper.

2.0 POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT OF OIL DISTRIBUTION AND PRODUCTION IN NIGERIA

It is important to situate the subject of this paper within the political, social and economic milieu of oil production and distribution in Nigeria. To achieve this, this segment of the paper is divided into two sub-units. The first attempts to explore the historical background of the oil regime in Nigeria. Here, the evolutionary trends of the subject since the colonial period, especially 1956 when oil was first discovered in Olobiri through the military era were briefly discussed. As a matter of fact, the various military regimes established the major infrastructure of oil in the country, it is expected that the paper devotes a considerable attention to this important aspect of the work. The second part covers issues on issues that emerged in the post 2009 oil governance in Nigeria.

2.1 Historical Background Since 1956

Before Nigeria assumed its current ‘petrol dollar’ status, it has always operated as a purely agrarian economy. The abolition of the slave trade in 1807 made the British colonial policy in West Africa to switch from trade in humans to appropriating territories for mass production of cash crops like cocoa, coffee, cotton and peanuts. In the Niger Delta region, which was then home of the Bonny, Brass, Kalabari, Itsekiri and Aboh people, it was the booming oil palm business that attracted the colonialists to the area. It’s lucrative oil palm empires in no time won it the title of Oil Rivers Protectorate (Falola, 2009). By 1886, the Royal Niger Company has successfully secured a charter from the British government to formally administer the area as a protectorate of the British Crown. This charter empowered the company to govern and administer justice to the region in the manner it deemed fit and it did not hesitate to use this machinery to consolidate its stronghold for maximum economic gains. All these activities ushered in a full-scale colonial government that effectively imposed British foreign rule on the conquered territories in 1901. As the clamour for political increased, a unique dimension to the political economy of the colonial state emerged when crude oil was discovered in Olobiri by Shell-BP in the year 1956.
As oil drilling began in Oloibiri in the 1950s, international business interests of which Shell Development Corporation played a lead role, were drafted to the area. The first oil export was achieved in 1958, spurring the nations’ economy to grow at a tremendous rate. By the time Nigeria was basking in the euphoria of political independence in the 1960s, revenue accruing from oil had become the main source of state income. The implication is that the previous feats recorded in the agrarian sector suffered a serious setback, as attention was principally shifted to oil exploitation. According to Obi (2005) the discovery of crude oil in commercial scale in Oloibiri in 1956 played an important role in the country’s leap from a cash crop-based to an oil based economy. By 1970, the nation has invested heavily in oil infrastructures through the construction of refineries, storage depots and pipelines. Subsequently, refineries were built in places like Port Harcourt, Warri and Kaduna, while Storage depots were situated in the major cities across the country including Aba, Enugu, Orec, Yola, Sitellite town in Lagos, Makurdi, Ilorin, Suleja, Kano, Gombe, Gusau, Minna, Jos and Mosimi to facilitate the processes of oil productions and distribution (Eke and Enibe, 2007).

The tasks of oil production and distribution lie with both public and private business efforts. While the public agencies are represented by the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and its subsidiaries, the Department Petroleum Resources (DRP) and Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Authority (PPPRA), the private investors included those referred to as Independent Marketers (IM) and Major Oil Marketers (MOM). The MOM include Mobil Oil Nigeria Plc, Total Plc, MRS Nigeria Plc, Con Oil Plc, African Peteroleum Plc and Oando Nigeria Plc have heavy foreign multinational enterprises, which enables them to dominate the market. In actual fact, the concept of independent marketing appeared first in the lexicon of the oil industry in 1978 when there was the need to bring indigenous investors into the framework of the oil business. According to A. Edoreh (cited in Ehinimen and Adeleke, 2012), there were over 1000 registered independent marketers in 1979 and by 2010, there were about 7948 independent marketers operating in various locations across the country. The MOM have also successfully established more than 2218 outlets in various places around the country. Despite this marked difference, however, MOM still manage to control well over 60% of the market.

The distribution of petroleum products, which is the movement of refined petroleum from refineries to the final users across the country is crucial and at the same time, a complex component of the production process. According to Nothingham (2004) the distribution component of the petroleum value chain holds the most promise for domestic initiatives. The Pipeline and Product
Marketing Company (PPMP) is saddled with wholesale supply, distribution and marketing of petroleum products in Nigeria. There is a complex network of over 4000km pipelines connected to more than 21 oil depots across the country. There are also more than 20 marine tankers that are used to ferry heavy products from coastal refineries in Warri and Portharcourt to places like Lagos where there is high demand. The situation is now worse considering the fact that most of the pipelines are being ruptured due to lack of maintenance, and of course the activities of vandals. This has left marketers with no other option than to resort to the use of tankers and trailers to convey the products. These practices have spelled a doom for the booming sector.

**FIGURE 1:** Physical Flow of Products: Retail Route Used By Major and Independent Marketers in Nigeria

- NNPC Refineries
- Imported Products
- Major Oil Marketers Deports & PPMC Depots
- Major and Independent Marketing Companies’ Retail Outlets
- Final Consumers of Petroleum Products in Nigeria

Courtesy of NNPC/PPMC Bulletin (cited in Ehinomen & Adeleke, 2012)
Although the arrival of oil economy significantly increased the revenue base of the state, it did not translate into a good life for the majority of the population. Citing Sala-i-Martin and Subranain’s analysis of the inherent paradox of the oil wealth, Guichaoua (2009:18) submits that;

In Nigeria, the GDP per capital in 2000 was roughly the same as in 1970. But the proportion of the population living on less than a dollar a day went from 36% to 70% over the same period. However, between 1965 and 2000, per capital oil revenue increased from $33 to $325. At the same time, income inequalities exploded. In 1970, the top 2% of income earners made as much as the bottom 17%, in 2000, the income of this top 2% was equivalent to the income of the bottom of 55% combined.

According to Obi (2005), two reasons can advanced for this unfortunate development. First, the partnership between the Nigerian state (through the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation) and oil multinationals is such that oil production in Nigeria since 1970s is marred by distrust and high level technical irregularities on the part of the oil companies. Since the multinationals are solely responsible for the oil production processes, the actual volume of production has always been shredded in secrecy. The Federal government is basically a collector oil rents but lacking in the technical know-how and the requisite technology that can monitor or supervise the quantity of oil production being produced daily. Hence, the government merely relied on the multinational corporations to fix the quantity of oil production and the revenue accruing from it. This arrangement gives room for the government to be short-changed in this closed system of operation. Secondly, the distribution of oil wealth under the control of the ruling elites has further inflamed the problem. Violent crises have erupted in many parts of the Niger Delta as a result of the sheer mismanagement and misallocation of oil proceeds. This argument is often situated within the oil curse discourse, which considers the discovery of petroleum to have generated so much boom, yet so much violence, corruption, abject poverty and under-development or what Ikpurukpo (2002) simply describes as the phenomenon ‘money-miss-road’.

The oil factor further played a central role is the political economy of the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970). In fact, there are evidences that support the view that the war was partly fought due to the contest between the Federal Government and the Biafra side for the access and control to oil receipts (Ajumobi & Aderemi, 2002). Due to the high value placed on crude oil in the international market, the Biafran troops, led by Col. Chuckwuemeka Ojukwu mobilized to seize oil wells in the
region while the Federal Government launched ferocious attacks to retain its control over the oil rich area. It was not long that the Yom Kippur war that offset the world’s economy broke out in 1973. While the economies of many nations across the globe suffered the excruciating effects of the war (that led to the astronomical rise in oil prices at international market), oil producing countries like Nigeria were basking in the euphoria of oil boom.

The period of the oil boom coincided with the incursion of the military into politics. By virtue of their centralized command system, the various military regimes appropriated the resources of regions/states, including the oil in the Niger Delta to foster their grip to political power and to perpetuate their anti-populist agendas. Consequently, the derivation principles suffered a severe setback as parochial creed assumed the centre stage in government affairs. Emphases were placed on even development, special need and population for the sharing of national resources (Oputa Panel Report cited in Ojakorutu and Olawale, 2009). Hence, the Niger Delta region became an arena of dangerous protests against the perceived marginalization, arising from the imperfections of the nation’s federal arrangement. This phenomenon has been described as the minority question in Nigeria (Osaghae, 1995). The excruciating effects of the military imposed economic policies of which the Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP) held sway in the 1980s further ignited civil unrest among the minorities and an array of civil society groups. It is in the character of the military to bypass constitutional solution favour of political solutions as a strategic of means of subverting the supremacy of the general will. According to Osaghae (1998), this use of political solutions has often encouraged the recourse to extra-judicial and violent means to press home legitimate demands by minority groups across the country. The problem of oil exploration in the Niger Delta can also be understood in this context. Again, in Osaghae’s (1998:13) submission;

The militant character of the Ogoni uprising, the high proportion of officers from minority, especially middle-belt, groups in military coups, the resort to rioting rather than the court of law by many minorities in the north, and the increasing use of sabotage of strategic oil installations by aggrieved minorities of the oil areas, are to be explained in this light.

For Perouse de Monclos (2012:536),

...the struggle for regional control of oil resources is certainly political, as the militants advocate the so-called derivation principle and opposes the ‘federal character of the Nigerian Republic, whereby richer States (in the South) are supposed to fund the poorer (in the Muslim north).
These protests, which usually played out on different platforms, including counter military coups have led the military government to adopt two strategies to deal with the problem. First, some adjustments in government policies to soothen the aggrieved. For instance, the repelled Major Gideon Orkar’s coup of 1990 did not just led to the jacking up of the derivation allocation to the oil producing states from 1.5% to 3.0% but also to the establishment of the defunct Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992 to ensure that the resources allocated to the area are properly managed (Osaghae, 1998). Secondly, the military government usually responded through state repression, which is germane to most dictatorial regimes in any part of the world. This was the case in 1995, when Mr Ken Saro Wiwa (a renown environmental crusader) and eight other Ogoni activists (Ogoni 9) were extra-judicially murdered by hanging, masterminded by the late Head of State, General Sani Abacha. Agbu (2004:37) aptly described this unfortunate development as an act of ‘state terrorism’.

**FIGURE 2: 9 States of the Niger Delta Region**

2.2 Pre and Post 2009 Scenario
The attainment of democracy in May 29, 1999 after a protracted military rule did not appease violent protests that had enveloped the Niger Delta region. Perhaps, the freedom of expression that democracy offers was taken to the extreme when armed groups began to mobilize and challenged the very foundation of the Nigerian state. The Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) founded by Alhaji Mujahid Asari-Dokubo and the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) created by Ateke Tom led more than 100 other smaller armed groups to violently engaged the Federal Government of Nigeria and multinational oil companies operating in the region, in a ‘war of attrition’. Asari’s led NDPVF and his lieftanants launched series of attacks on oil wells and installations, disrupting oil production and engaging in indescrimate killings of people. The militant groups also attempted to control oil resources through oil bunkering, an exercise that involves the tapping the oil piplines and sold to various market outlets in West Africa.

By Spetember 2004, the Federal Government of Nigeria under President Olusegun Obasanjo declared a full scale war on the militants. The crisis worsen and Shell had to withdraw its personnel from two oil fields, causing oil production to cut by 30,000 barrel per day. The crackdown on militants contiuned till 2008. The Joint Military Task Force combed and raided hideouts of militants in the creeks. The involvement of the most sophisticated armed group, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in whole struggle for oil (by attacking oil infrastructure and kidnapping of oil workers) considerably reduced oil output by 33%. MEND’s activities in the region extended to kidnapping for a ransom and sea piracy. In some other instances, it became political machinery for dealing with opposition parties towards the 2011 elections (Perouse de Moncelos, 2012). These unwholesome activities have made thousands of residents to flee their homes and hundreds of people lost their lives. In June 2009, the Federal Government declared its intention to grant amnesty and an unconditional pardon to militants as a way of restoring peace to the volatile region. The late Head of State, President Musa Yar’Adua signed the amnesty programme, which officially kicked off in October 2009. Before then, militants were given a 60 day period to surrender their weapons in exchange for training and rehabilitation programme of the government. Despite the elaborate amnesty programme currently going on in the Niger Delta, there are palpable fears that the armed youths soon find their way back to the creeks. Already, there have been a steady rise in the activities of piracy since October 2012. Nigeria is rated the most pirated country after Somalia. There have been cases of 12 hijacked ships, 33 kidnapped sailors and 4 oil workers killed. MEND,
whose members have benefitted most in the amnesty programme of the Federal Government was fingered in the current pirate attacks.

### 3.0 SPECIFICITIES OF OIL PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION

In coming to terms with statistical analysis of fatal deaths within the province of oil production and distribution requires that I clarify two important methodological issues. This is because the study of violence remains one of the most complex and contested area of research. The domain of violence was, for instance extended by Galtung (1969) to include ‘structural violence’, that is, physical or psychological injuries that may arise from unjust social and political relations. Hence, one of the methodological questions that this research may likely raise is how to measure the intensity of violence without having to overstate the problem. The second pertinent question bothers on how the data sources can representative enough without violating the credibility of the research findings.

First, it is almost impossible to exhaustively measure the weight of violence that attends to cases of oil production and distribution in Nigeria, especially as it involves generating consistent numerical data that will stand the test of time. What seems achievable under such condition is to streamline the focus of the research to head counts of deaths. Focusing on head counts helps to concentrate on only violent incidents that record at least one death. On the second issue, the research will only be concerned with open sources, which the Nigeria Watch database has so far provided generously with regards to its online resources on fatalities in Nigeria. Accessing reliable data on violent events in Nigeria as those provided by the Nigeria Watch project could be problematic. Official quarters like the police (although FRSC has the most comprehensive data on road accidents in Nigeria) are grossly ineffective in the collation of reliable data for the purpose of accuracy and record keeping. The Nigeria Watch database is primarily based on print media based reports on violent incidents in a consistent manner. It also crosschecks from other sources like FRSC, human rights watch and other credible sources to give a clear picture of events. The preferred media reports have been carefully selected to give the process a national spread. Although the database is limited in terms of coverage, it remains a potent tool for trend analysis of events. More so, the print media is only credible open sources that is consistent and accessible to the public. For all its shortcomings, the Nigeria Watch database is able to highlight and underscore valid assumptions about the complexity of oil production and oil distribution in Nigeria.

### 4. KEY FINDINGS

Figure 3, summarises the global picture of fatalities within the period of this research (June 2006 and May 2014). It indicates that Crime, Car accidents, religious clashes, political violence, fire explosions and oil distribution are the main drivers of fatalities in Nigeria. Presently, the spotlight of major violence in the country is on the boko haram insurgency that is largely interpreted as political and religious violence in the database. In other words, oil distribution and production are not the major violent cases in the country per se. However, it is important to compare the stakes of oil production to oil distribution to the violence deaths in the industry. With 4575 death figures, oil distribution accounted for the sixth highest violent cases in Nigeria. Oil production, which recorded 1550 death figures is the tenth. The combination of the two figures account for some 6, 125 deaths.

4.2 Fatalities Caused by Oil Distribution (2006 – 2014)

In figure 4, there has been a downward slope in annual violent cases in oil distribution except in the years 2009 and 2012. In fact, 2009 is exceptionally high with a stagerring casualty figure of 1089. The major event here was a case in Warri South and Warri South West LGAs, where a fatal clash
between soldiers and some militants led to the loss of lives of about 593 people. The fatality record of 957 in 2006 was also extraordinarily high, bearing in mind that the figure covers just 7 months (June – December, 2006). Road accident and pipeline vandalism formed the main drivers of violent deaths in 2006. But it is important to note that the general trend since 2006 has been decreasing save the aforementioned years (2009 and 2012). As a matter of fact, 2014 has given the lowest impression of 23 violent deaths, even though the figure only represented the first five months of the years. One could not readily offer a cogent explanation for marked variations in the fatality profile of the 8-year study, but what seems convincing is the fact that violent events are products of increasingly intense activities (both legal and illegal) around the oil. A further study of the database documented 2008 to have witnessed 122 incidences, which mostly revolved the activities of JTF. 2006 witnessed 40 deadly events despite its 7 months coverage. 2013 and 2014 witnessed 25 and 5 events respectively. The case of 2014 with just 5 incidents is explainable. Its covers just 5 months, that is, January to May 2014.

**FIGURE 4: Absolute Annual Deaths Caused by Oil Distribution, 2006-2014.**

Figure 5 shows that 34 states including FCT (Abuja) in Nigeria have witnessed fatalities in oil distribution. With the exception of Kebbi and Zamfara states, every state across the country has
recorded at least an event of violence due to oil distribution. Again, out of the total number of 4,575 deaths adduced to oil distribution, over 1,200 cases were recorded in Lagos state alone, followed by Delta state with about 850 casualties. Other high risk states for oil distribution include Rivers, Edo, Oyo, Ogun and Bayelsa. There are two fundamental issues that could explain this trend. First, states that have high demand for Primum Motor Spirit (PMS) are most prone to fatalities. The level of demand for petroleum products can at times be determined by the population density and the level of industrial activities in the states. Lagos and Delta for instance perfectly fit into this context. Lagos sea-terminals provide the routes through which oil products and other heavy goods are imported into the country to service the South west and some northern states. Hence, heavy traffic of trailers and light vehicular movements are common features on Lagos roads. The second point to make is the obvious fact that oil distribution activities are more fatal outside the states of oil production. For instance, the total death figure observable within the oil production areas is less than 2000, whereas about 4575 fatal deaths occurred in other parts of the country as a result of oil distribution. The frequency of fatal events in oil distribution between June 2006 and May 2014 also showed the high risk states as Bayelsa (99), Lagos (79), Delta (56) and Rivers (51). The cases of oil spillage and the activities of Joint Task Forces largely responsible for the frequency of violence in Bayelsa state. In Delta, road accidents that involved petro tankers, kerosine explosion, pipeline vandalism and piracy are major causes violent events. In Lagos, tanker explosion/road accidents, robbery incidents at fuel stations, oil thieves and oil pipeline vandalism loomed large.

The following map, that is, Figure 6 shows that the incidents of oil distribution cover virtually all parts of country, where Lagos and Delta represented the highest casualties. The graph indicates that only Kebbi and Zamfara states did not have records of fatality arising from oil distribution.

**FIGURE 6: ABSOLUTE DEATH FIGURES OF OIL DISTRIBUTION, 2006-2014**
When the above cases are mapped as relative violent figures (that is, per 100,000 inhabitants), the result tilted towards Delta as the most violent state, followed by Lagos and Rivers states. Normally, the absolute figures concentrate on Lagos state as the most fatal in terms of frequency and intensity of the problem. However, the risk assessment analysis shows Delta as the most dangerous state for oil distribution because it has the highest relative violent death figures.
### 4.3 Fatalities Caused By Oil Production (June 2006 – May 2014)

Between 2006 and 2014, oil production activities precipitated some marked incidence of violence deaths, particular in the zones of oil production. From the below chart, that is, figure 8, there was a steady increase in the number of violent deaths recorded between 2006 and 2009, after which there was a sharp drop from 722 to 70 (90% drop). The trend picked up again from 2012 to 2013 but only witnessed another sharp drop of 1(one) death in 2014. Generally, oil production has been less fatal compared to oil distribution.

*FIGURE 8: VIOLENT DEATH CAUSED BY OIL PRODUCTION (2006-2014)*
Since oil production activities take place mainly within the Niger Delta states, it is only logical that most of the violence are concentrated in the region. The oil rich states of the Niger Delta region including Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Abia, Anambra and Imo states presented varying degrees of fatalities arising from oil production activities. Some cases (14) cases were also observed in Kogi state due to the recent frequent clashes over oil deposit at the border between Aguleri and Achewno communities in Anambra and Kogi states. However, there is the likelihood that some of the violence that were documented in Anambra are also recorded in the cases that involved Kogi state. The aggregate death figures for oil production stands at 1,550. This is far cry when compared to oil distribution that accounted for a stunning figure of 4,575 deaths. This is a clear indication that oil distribution activities are more deadly than oil production. In fact, oil distribution deadly mishaps are more probable or likely to occur than oil production. In terms of state of frequency, violent events are most likely to occur in Bayelsa with over 117 incidents recorded between
June 2006 and May 2014. This is followed by Rivers and Delta states with about 65 and 35 events respectively during the period under study.

**FIGURE 9: Absolute Deaths of Oil Production By States, 2006-2014.**

The above data can further be mapped to show the geographical concentration of oil production violence as depicted in figure 9. The map is an absolute violent profile indicates that Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Abia, Akwa Ibom, Imo, Anambra and Cross River states are the concerned states, where that deadly violence erupted. Again Delta state has the highest fatality profile in oil production, while Rivers, Bayelsa, Imo, Anambra, Kogi, Cross River and Abia states followed in that order. The issues that led to violence in those states also vary considerably. In Bayelsa, the issues revolve mainly around oil spillage and the clashes between JTF and militants. JTF attacks and pipeline vandalism were also prevalent in Delta. Of a particular reference was a deadly encounter between JTF and some militants between 2009-05-13 and 2009-05-21 that claimed the lives of more 500 people, which included women and children.
The relative violent deaths in oil production is shown in figure 11. By this analysis, Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers are the most risky or dangerous states for oil production. This is not really surprising considering the fact that the trio are the core oil producing states of the Niger Delta.
5.0 Oil Production Versus Oil Production

Perhaps, the first point to make in this section is to assert that oil violence constitutes insignificant fatalities (less than 10%) in comparison to road accidents, crime, religious and political violence in Nigeria. Figure 3 clearly buttress this point by rating oil violence, that is, oil distribution and production combined, as the 6th main causes of lethal violence in Nigeria. However, its occurrences have been rather brutal in terms of intensity and national spread. This point becomes even convincing considering the fact the oil distribution activities has a strong link with road accidents. The most fatal accidents on the highways have always been connected to the movement of petroleum products to different parts of the country. The point was earlier made in this paper that the demand for PMS is in a way directly proportional to the number of violent deaths that may likely to occur in a particular location. Hence, locations like Lagos, Delta and Rivers states have always had high fatality cases, not just because of their overwhelming population status but as a result of the concentration of large-scale industries in these states.
Secondly, from the analyses presented above, oil production and oil distribution differ with respects to their stakes to lethal violence that happen across the country. Oil distribution is particularly more violent than oil distribution. This can be explained in many ways. In the first instance, the activitives that involve oil distribution is nationwide while oil production operations are restricted to the Niger Delta region, with few cases in Kogi state for reason of its border problems with Anambra state. This implied that the impact of oil distribution is nationwide. In fact, the only states that did not have incidents of oil distribution violence since 2006 (according to figure 5) are Kebbi and Zamfara. Oil production violence only took place in states like Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Anambra, Imo and Kogi. Thus, in measuring the impact of these activities, oil distribution is more impactful in terms of its spatial coverage than oil production.

Thirdly, the absolute number of deaths attributed to oil distribution is far more than the absolute number of deaths recorded for oil production. Figure 3 above drives home this point. Oil production recorded 1,550 deaths while oil distribution accounted for a staggering death figure of 4,575 deaths (more than 300% increase). In the same vein, Lagos state recorded the highest absolute death figure, followed by Delta, Rivers, Oyo, Ogun, and Edo states. When this is juxtaposed with absolute deaths in oil production, Delta, followed by Rivers and Bayelsa in this order became the most violent states (Figure 10). With respect to relative death figures, which is defined as deaths per a thousand inhabitants, Delta state takes the lead, followed by Bayelsa, Lagos, Rivers, Ogun and Cross River States. This implies that Delta state is the most deadly location for oil distribution in the region. The relative deaths figures for oil production implicated Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers states as the most dangerous places for violent incidents.

In the final analysis, other factors that make oil distribution a more deadly operation to oil production is worth mentioning. The point was previously made that oil distribution is closely tied to road accidents, which is one of the main casues of fatalities in Nigeria. The dilapidated state of the roads has made the movement of petroleum products to the various parts of the country more dangerous. This point is germaned considering the comatose state of the rail system and of course, the fact that pinelines have become major target for destructions by oil bunkers and pipeline vandals. Hence, the mounting pressure on the poorly constructed roads make frequent road accidents possible. In addition, the rickety state of most of heavy vehicles, that is, trailers being used to convey these products makes oil distribution activities more prone to violence. Of course,
petroleum products are inflammable to the extent that they easily cause fire explosion whenever accidents involving petrol tankers occurred. Taiwo (2013) listed mechanical, environmental, institutional, natural and supernatural factors as responsible for road accidents on the highways. For Bun (2012) driver factors, vehicle factors and runaway factors combine to contribute to over 93% road accidents. All these variables outrightly played out whenever petroleum products are distributed to different parts of the country.

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is important to stress at this concluding stage that the multifarious violence that constantly beset the oil industry are not main sources of fatalities in Nigeria, yet their impacts are not simplistic with respect to scope and intensity. Hence, one of the issues raised in this paper is the fact that oil distribution has a far more impact on the country than oil production. This is not just in terms of the larger geographical coverage but also with respect to its rising casualty figures. The analyses in this paper show that oil distribution is concentrated in the Niger Delta region while oil distribution is a nationwide affair. There is also a marked discrepancy in both absolute and relative number of deaths for oil distribution and oil production. All these are pointers to the complex stake of oil distribution in the violent incidences that often beset the oil industry. This paper advocates further empirical studies in order to gain more insights into the dynamics of oil distribution in Nigeria.
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