IMPACT REPORT: OUTPUT 1

Security and Governance

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Background and Context

With an estimated 3,000 conflict-related deaths per year between 2006 and 2011, Nigeria has long been regarded as the most violent country in Africa, amongst those which are not at war. Approximately half of these deaths have occurred in states and Local Government Authority areas (LGAs) which have been selected by NSRP as target areas for the delivery of its peacebuilding and conflict reduction initiative.

Nigeria’s national conflict management architecture and security governance relies on a complex and overlapping set of agencies that are poorly coordinated, lack strategic direction, are not inclusive or accountable and do not enable cooperation between state and non-state actors. This has prevented early warning and response and often led to heavy-handed, selective action while failing to identify and tackle underlying causes of violence across the country. Nigeria’s security forces are often accused of human rights abuses including unlawful killings, arbitrary arrest and detention, extortion, sexual harassment, and disappearances. This leads to mistrust and negatively affects relations between security forces and the civilian population. Furthermore, civilian oversight of security institutions is ineffective and they remain largely unaccountable to civilian line ministries and the general public.

The programme delivered peacebuilding interventions at the federal level, and focused its conflict prevention and response activities in four zones encompassing 8 states. These are: the North East (Borno and Yobe States); the Niger Delta region (Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States); the Middle Belt (Kaduna and Plateau States) and the North West (Kano State).

In the North East, the insurgency of Jama’atul ahl al-sunnah li da’awati wal jihad (JAS) commonly known as Boko Haram continues to challenge the stability and development of Nigeria. From the 1990s JAS’ attempts to spread Islamic law throughout Northern Nigeria1 rapidly evolved into a movement against the central state and small, isolated attacks against Nigerian police and military begun to take place in Borno state. A more radical splinter group relocated to Yobe state and emerged under Abubakar Shekau, under whose leadership the group transformed its tactical and ideological targeting leading to more frequent attacks with greater reach and lethality. Since 2011, the group has engaged in mass suicide bombings at bus stations and central markets throughout the country, mass kidnappings of the population including but certainly not limited to the abduction of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok, and suicide attacks on the United Nations building in Abuja in 2011. These were all designed to inflict terror on the entire population.2 It is feared that the pledge of allegiance by JAS to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) / Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) might generate movement of expertise, finances and technical support between the groups.

Despite its recognised competence across the region through ECOWAS, the Nigerian military struggled to defeat JAS and interagency coordination remains a challenge. A number of ‘civilian vigilante’ groups joined the ranks informally to help curb the insurgency including the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) or ‘Yan Gora’. However, whilst these groups have contributed they have also on occasions been catalysts or perpetrators of violence against communities. As a result, JAS was able to continuing recruiting or abducting young boys and girls while historical allegiances between northern government officials and JAS leadership left a rift between citizens and state officials, leading to a breakdown in trust.

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1 Journal of the Center for Complex Operations. PRISM Challenges and Opportunities. Vol5, No 2. 2015. Lessons from Colombia for Curtailing the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria, pg. 97-100

between formal and informal political authorities in north-eastern states which are difficult to address.

In the Niger Delta, perceptions of inequalities and injustices primarily around failed economic opportunities and loss of livelihoods due to severe environmental degradation caused by oil exploitation, have fuelled grievances and driven violent conflict in Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States. Government and oil companies’ responses have focussed on transferring resources to groups that threatened or perpetrated violence – thus somehow rewarding the use of violence rather than reproving it and addressing its causes. A policy of ‘divide and rule’ displayed by government to respond to grievances, has fuelled inter-community violence which erupts regularly across the region, for often mundane reasons. Excluded from access to decent jobs and economic opportunities, young people operate primarily in the shadow economy, and act as the violent arm of unscrupulous political leaders. Gang crime and the struggle for power among cults remains the main cause of violence-related death in the region, as well as one of the main economic opportunities as criminal gangs control arms and drug smuggling, and are engaged in kidnappings and armed robberies.

In the Middle Belt, political and economic factors have driven communal conflicts in Plateau and Kaduna states. Historic tensions between indigenes and non-ingenies in Jos, Plateau State and in Zaria Emirate in Kaduna State shaped peoples’ perception of ethnicity and religion as main causes of conflict. Political manipulation of religion and ethnic divides fuelled resource-based conflicts (primarily over pasture and farmland) and are now the main causes of conflict. Marginalisation and loss of livelihoods have pushed young people towards criminality and substance abuse, further alienating them from society and hampering their social and economic development.

In the North West, the deepening economic crisis since the 1980s has made Kano in particular more vulnerable to violent conflict. Kano is the most populous state in the country and Kano city, second only to Lagos in population, has attracted people from across the country and the West African sub-region. Rising poverty and pressure from climate change have triggered waves of rural migration especially of youth to Kano. Poor, unskilled men and women have become prey to criminals and drugs consumption and addiction are perceived to have rocketed in Kano. Unemployed young people have been mobilised regularly for political and sectarian violence, which sees northern Muslims and southern Christians opposed. The economic crisis has also provided the context for resource based conflict among youth along the religious/ethno-political divide. JAS infiltrated Kano in 2010-2011 seeking to take advantage of the entrenched longstanding suspicions and rivalry between Islam and Christianity to portray its militancy as a struggle between Muslims and Christians. in January 2012, JAS repeatedly attacked security forces offices in Kano claiming over 200 lives.

The NSRP Intervention

The overall NSRP purpose (or outcome) was the ‘Application of improved policies and practices that help to manage conflict non-violently more often in NSRP target states’ which feeds into the impact the programme aimed to deliver: ‘The negative impacts of violent conflict on the most vulnerable are reduced in NSRP target states’

NSRP supported conflict management initiatives through four inter-related areas of work – each taking place at Federal, State and Local Government Area (LGA) levels. The four work

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3 However, the NDLEA has not reported any significant increase in drug use in recent years in Kano.
areas (outputs) were: (1) **Security and Governance**; (2) Economic and Natural Resources; (3) Women and Girls; and (4) Research and Advocacy, Media and Conflict Sensitivity.

The overall goal of Output 1 was to facilitate broader societal participation in and oversight of conflict management mechanisms at federal, state and local level. This document describes the intervention logic for the delivery of this output. The Theory of Change for the output states ‘**If NSRP can support strengthening of actors and institutions that manage conflicts, by making them better coordinated at local, state and federal levels, more accountable and also more inclusive (of youths, women and other marginalised groups), then it will enable these actors and institutions to manage more conflicts through non-violent means**’.

Output 1 was delivered in parallel to output 4.2 which focused on developing strategic partnerships with key Nigerian institutions to enable them to address stability and reconciliation more effectively in their policies and practices. The impact of Output 4.2 is assessed in the Output 4 report.

This paper looks at the impact achieved through Output 1 (security and governance) which worked with federal, state and local peace and security agencies and non-state actors to improve the inclusivity, coordination and accountability of security service providers. The programme encouraged state and non-state agencies to be sensitive to changing conflict dynamics, more accountable to citizens and their representatives and inclusive of young men, all women and other groups usually marginalised from decision making. NSRP supported all actors to adopt conflict sensitive approaches to planning and delivering their work.

NSRP sought to create space for civil society, security forces and civil servants to participate in local and state security management. At local level, NSRP supported the above actors to respond to reports of conflicts and violence, by encouraging them to address the causes as well as the effects and by improving reporting to state and federal agencies. This enabled civilian oversight of security frameworks and the development of state security plans, increasing awareness of the threats to, and opportunities for, peace that existed; leading to actions that were responsive to these realities and that addressed the root causes of grievances.

NSRP measured the inclusivity of platforms it supported through indicators that monitored the presence of each target group, interventions in debates by groups, and participation of marginalised groups in decision making at forum level.

The NSRP security and governance output delivered strategic partnerships and conflict sensitive policy at federal and state level by improving coordination between government (including Ministry of Women and Social Development, National Security Adviser, etc.); the security sector (Nigerian armed forces, Nigeria police, etc.); and civil society actors (religious groups, traditional leaders, associations and NGOs). This was done at federal level through support for a National Peace and Security Forum (NPSF) including providing technical assistance to draw up policies and implement plans. In the absence of space for civil society to contribute to the debate around security and governance in Nigeria, NSRP established the CSO Consultative Forum bringing together organisations and groups working on peace and security at grassroots level and enabling their coordination with the NPSF to influence peacebuilding practice and policy.

At State level, NSRP helped to set up and supported State Conflict Management Alliances (SCMAs) which focused on inclusive conflict analysis and provided responses to issues around peace and security at state level. Participants included representatives from government, security agencies, civil society organisations, traditional and religious leaders.
and communities. Other platforms supported by NSRP, including local Community Peace Partnerships (CPPs), Women, Peace and Security Networks (WPSN), State Observatories on violence against women and girls, Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships (in the Niger Delta) and Dialogue Committees (in the Middle Belt) were also members of the SCMA or attended meetings enhancing NSRP’s coordination mandate for issues that presented challenges to peace and security including land and water conflicts and violence against women and girls. Analysis and decisions led to actions, which NSRP supported financially, through technical advice, or by creating connections between these platforms and others operating at local or federal levels.

At LGA level, NSRP supported 27 Community Peace Partnerships (CPPs) across some of the country’s most conflict affected LGAs, bringing together religious and traditional leaders, civil society organisations, formal and informal security service providers and local authorities. CPPs have focussed their work on mapping and analysing conflicts and patterns of violence at local level, and have either responded directly to these threats, or reported actual or potential threats of violence to security service providers or SCMA, whenever necessary.

NSRP strived to enable vertical coordination between the NPSF, SCMAs, and CPPs to ensure that appropriate issues were considered and acted on at appropriate levels within the architecture.

Achievements, Outcomes and Impact

**TOC Outcome level 1.1** NSRP will have contributed to the development of a conflict sensitive and inclusive national approach to human security, achieved through sustained engagement between state and non-state actors, including the media.

The NSRP security and governance component (Output 1) has directly contributed to delivering the programme purpose level outcome: ‘conflict is managed non-violently more often in target states’ by supporting conflict reduction at grass-roots level; by stimulating institutional change with regard to security governance, and by influencing bottom-up policy development at state and central government levels.

By the end of June 2017, across the 8 states, a total of 623 conflict issues or potential conflict issues have been discussed at the 36 NSRP supported platforms. As a result of the actions taken by the platforms, a total of 84 emerging or actual violent conflicts had been prevented, managed or resolved (see table). CPPs, operating at the local level were particularly successful, discussing 361 issues and achieving 53 positive results, thus directly contributing to achieving the programme impact of reducing the
effects of violent conflict on the most vulnerable. The programme has also supported the process of raising up or cascading down conflict issues when appropriate. By the end of June 2017, there had been a total of 37 conflict issues considered by different platforms following referral from other levels in the peace architecture. These include early warning emerging from CPPs and presented to SCMA as well as early warning emerging at SCMA level and presented to the NPSF.

NSRP has successfully created space for conflict affected individuals and groups; local, state and federal governments and security agencies to discuss conflict openly, and undertake joint initiatives to directly address threats to or breaches of peace. The broad reach of the platforms has increased year on year as illustrated in the table above which shows the average number of different institutions involved in each platform at each level over the past three programme years\(^4\). There has been a steady increase in the number of institutions represented, suggesting increasing confidence in their capacity to engage effectively in the conflict space. NSRP has achieved this by supporting inclusivity, coordination and accountability of the sector and by breaching communication and coordination barriers between citizens, government and security agencies.

At policy level NSRP has increasingly been regarded as a crucial partner of the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA), which the programme supported in design and development of national level peace and security policies, including the national security strategy and the counterterrorism and countering violent extremism strategies - the national security adviser and the whole team at ONSA have been particularly appreciative of the support provided by NSRP in policy development. NSRP has also contributed to shaping policy at state level, by enabling closer societal oversight and consultation over proposed legislation. NSRP has served as a platform for sharing early warning information among key government and civil society organizations, thereby influencing their responses. For instance, as a result of discussions of rising threats to security in the Federal Capital Territory at the platform, the National Orientation Agency and National Security and Civil Defence Corps collaborated to undertake security awareness and sensitization activities in 60 communities.

TOC Outcome level 1.2
NSRP will have contributed to a measurable improvement in the functioning of SCMA, which will reflect an all inclusive, coordinated and accountable forum on peace and security established in each state. SCMA will engage with state-level peace and security structures, improving coordination in the management of conflict in the NSRP target states.

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\(^4\) 2014 data shows only NPSF and SCMA, data for CPPs not available

Hadiza Bala, Kano SCMA Member

“In the mosque, men and women do not sit together. We have our own place. The sermons are in Arabic, but these days they also preach in Hausa and Kanuri so that more people, especially the youth with little knowledge of Arabic can understand. They preach about the security situation in the state. Everybody is talking about it. Even in our women’s meeting, we discuss. We cannot keep quiet anymore. Some of us were invited to go to church for some of the activities and we readily participated although we are Muslims. This is because of the mutual respect and understanding that was fostered in the SCMA... During the celebration of the International Widow’s Day, we got speakers from Islam and Christianity to make presentations. This did not use to happen.”
Similarly, participating government, security and civil society stakeholders have leveraged on knowledge and skills gained at the State Conflict Management Alliances (SCMA) to take action to address risks of violence. For instance, the SCMA in Kano influenced security agencies’ response to a spike in terrorist attacks in the state in 2013-2014. In September 2013, the platform shared concerns of Kano residents on the conduct of security personnel stationed in various checkpoints in Kano metropolis and the negative implications for civil-military relations. This prompted security officials to take decisions to rationalise locations of the checkpoints and monitor behaviour of officers on duty. In March 2014, security officials were alerted on planned terrorist attacks on specific communities during an SCMA meeting. This prompted the Department of State Security, whose director chaired the platform, to organise a state-wide media briefing aimed at alerting residents on measures needed to protect their communities from infiltration by insurgents. In other states, advocacy and information shared by the SCMAs have led to efforts to develop policies to tackle specific challenges. Notable examples are the bill on the Peace Commission in Kaduna State and bill on Grazing Reserves in Bayelsa State.

**ToC Outcome level 1.3** NSRP will have contributed to establishing and building the capacity of CPPs, which will reflect an all-inclusive, coordinated and accountable forum on peace and security established in each target LGA. CPPs will engage with local-level peace and security actors, improving coordination in the management of conflict.

CPPs have played a pivotal role in anticipating, documenting and addressing both root causes and outbreaks of violence locally, and have been at the centre of NSRP’s efforts to re-establish communication lines between citizens and security agencies. The work undertaken by CPPs has successfully restored a degree of trust in security forces and strengthened their accountability at local level, contributing significantly to early warning and early response to conflict. In respect of EWER it is clear that CPPs have been at the forefront of NSRP’s delivery in terms of conflict prevention and reduction of violence.

NSRP delivered improved security outcomes at federal, state and local level by supporting joint conflict and threat analyses by civilian and security forces and enabling locally-led conflict response through rebuilding trust between civilians and security forces and facilitating intelligence sharing. The resulting vertical and horizontal collaborations enhanced conflict responses and increased citizens’ satisfaction rates of security services and conflict mitigation institutions.
NSRP has empowered citizens and institutions to act to prevent and respond to violent conflict by supporting inclusive and sustainable mechanisms.

NSRP sponsored platforms have played a crucial conflict reduction and conflict response role locally, achieving substantial change in the way Nigerians understand conflict affecting their lives and livelihoods, and how they are prepared to act to address it.

Platforms operating at LGA level have been especially successful as traditional and religious rulers and community leaders, who had been responsible for conflict management in their communities before violence escalated in recent years, were integrated as active members, thus harnessing their convening powers and reaffirming their relevance in local dispute resolution. Local disputes, crime and resources-based conflict remain the primary source of violence which, if not addressed, can escalate and develop into violence between interest-groups. NSRP strived to build on conflict resolution mechanisms and institutions to promote local ownership and ensure sustainability. However, striking a balance between supporting locally-driven processes and driving measurable change in the way in which conflict is understood and dealt with, has been a challenge for the programme.

NSRP has achieved a major shift in local perceptions over number, intensity and impact of violent conflict across its target states. NSRP-supported platforms have intervened and successfully brought 124 conflicts to an end. According to the NSRP Independent Evaluation Provider (NIEP) platform survey conducted in March 2017, direct intervention, reaching out to (external) actors parties to the conflict and engagement in mediation, has been the main role platforms have played. This was followed by awareness-raising and provision of information to communities more broadly.

The majority of the direct actions by platforms took place in the programme’s last two years of implementation. The initial years focussed on identifying and training individuals and ‘building’ institutions, through enabling communication, facilitating joint responses, and re-establishing trust between informal/civil society actors, government services and security agencies.
In addition to the major violent conflicts addressed, CPPs have achieved immediate resolution of issues that had the potential to lead to violence, by enabling communication between citizens and state-actors, and empowering the latter to commit to and then undertake actions addressing incidents of violence but also undesirable practices and behaviours among civil servants and security forces.

According to the March 2017 NIEP survey, 79% of platform participants have witnessed a major shift in the type of agencies they work with most successfully as a result of the programme, with 44% declaring they now work very successfully with security forces as a result of their participation in the platform.

As a direct effect of NSRP-sponsored forums, the nature of issues and conflict reported and discussed by the key actors, and actions undertaken has evolved, with human rights abuses being the most reported issue across platforms by the end of the programme.

As part of this process, NSRP has learned that, in highly polarised societies, people tend to rally behind an individual, a leader or a group and seek recognition for the role they play as part of that movement, as opposed to feeling part of a process based on agreed values. The choice of actors involved in the programme, and the support provided to leaders, for them to drive change has therefore been a crucial element for success or failure in a given context and has boosted or undermined transformative dynamics, and in turn, impact, within platforms at local and state level.

This is supported by the March 2017 NIEP platform survey which suggests that discussions at platform meetings have led to a cumulative 61% of participants declaring that their opinion over a conflict or an issue has changed as a result of debates held. Cumulatively platforms scored 8 out of 10 points in terms of successful conflict resolution in the last 2 years, and 7.5 out of 10 in terms of conflict prevention.

**NSRP has improved the effectiveness, accountability and responsiveness of Nigerian decision makers in the area of security.**

Platforms participants surveyed by NIEP in March 2017 were extremely satisfied (54%) or satisfied (40%) by actions undertaken by platform members/actors responsible for addressing the issue presented. This points to a considerable increase in satisfaction with and trust among institutions participating in NSRP-sponsored platforms, suggesting that the effectiveness of security, state and civil society institutions has increased as a result of the programme. This also links to the degree to which participants have felt a sense of common purpose, illustrated by the NIEP platform survey finding that 58% respondents feel that all members of the platform participate in meetings with the intention of finding solutions to the issues raised all of the time, and 33% of respondents declaring they feel so most of the time (i.e. 91% combined).

The NIEP platform survey also shows a significant improvement in the extent to which individuals attending feel they take part in decision making with respect to conflict management and peacebuilding compared to two/three years ago. The degree to which platform participants feel ‘very included’ in decision making related to security and peace has increased from 44% to 77% in two years. The survey showed a combined total of 96% of platform members at local, state and federal level feel very or somewhat included in decision making when it comes to conflict management and peacebuilding.

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5 16% of issues reported, discussed and acted upon across all NSRP platforms relate to human rights abuses, primarily by security forces – Source NIEP Survey report, April, 2017.
6 NIEP end of programme survey, March/April 2017
7 NIEP end of programme survey, March/April 2017
The NSRP Annual Perception Surveys (APS) show that the effectiveness of institutions engaged in peacebuilding and conflict mitigation has increased over the past two years, with civil society and traditional (customary and religious) institutions considered very or fairly effective by 89% of respondents in 2017. Government and security forces are also thought to be very or fairly effective by an average of 85% of respondents (up from 78% in 2014). NSRP itself is believed to be very or fairly effective by 91% of those respondents that had heard of the programme\(^8\). This is a significant outcome, considering that NSRP has only been operating for five years, and at scale for just over two years, with some areas such as Borno state inaccessible until just over a year ago.

Respondents to the 2017 APS declared that the army and vigilante groups among security actors, traditional leaders and customary rulers among traditional authorities, community development councils and youth groups among civil society actors and Hisbah boards are among the most effective institutions in terms of maintaining peace and addressing conflict – all these institutions scoring 3.5 points or more out of 4 in the 2017 APS.

**Borno SCMA**

With the insurgency that ravaged the North East in the past six years, millions of Nigerians became homeless and several thousands fled to the state capital, Maiduguri, settling in IDP camps. Most of these camps were managed by emergency response agencies while security was provided by both formal and informal (Civilian JTF) security agencies. At the peak of the emergency response riots broke out among displaced people, fighting to gain access to food, water and non-food items. Sexual abuse and harassment were also reported in some camps. These issues were reported to the Borno SCMA, and it became apparent that riots in Dalori IDP camp were primarily caused by security forces’ violent repression of legitimate grievances. Further, the SCMA learned that security personnel were responsible for sexual harassment and abuses perpetrated during security screening at the entrance of the camps. The SCMA resolved that the authorities in charge of the IDP camps should immediately deploy female officers to carry out necessary screening of displaced women and girls. Thanks to the collegiality of the platform, security officials attending the meeting enacted the decision immediately and female security personnel were deployed to carry out necessary security screening on female IDPs. This move immediately reduced tensions in the camp, and reports of sexual harassment ceased.

Looking specifically at NSRP-supported platforms, Borno, Plateau and Kano SCMAs are considered the most effective in maintaining peace and managing conflict (all scored above 3 out of 4 points in the survey). Reasons for these positive results can be assessed as follows: In Kano and Plateau, NSRP was extremely successful in setting up and supporting platforms, which in turn operated effectively, especially in the last two years of the programme. There has also been a de-escalation of conflict in these two states over the last two years which has contributed to improving collaboration between civilian and armed actors responsible for security. In terms of conflict issues increasingly being reported to the authorities, fear among civil society is decreasing, and trust among all actors increasing as a result. Our analysis suggests that it is likely that the Borno SCMA was deemed successful by respondents as it was the first platform created for coordination and discussion between civilians and security forces in the context of an extremely violent conflict and humanitarian crisis. As such, the Borno SCMA acted as the only platform in the state enabling citizens and displaced people to express legitimate grievances peacefully, and provide government and security agencies with an opportunity to respond to these grievances. Responses had the dual immediate effect of strengthening security agencies accountability, and restoring trust.

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\(^8\) 6% on the more than 3,000 respondents had heard of NSRP
between citizens and security forces. Positive perceptions related to the effectiveness of the Borno SCMA in the areas of peacebuilding and conflict response therefore need to be contextualised, however these positive perceptions point to the high value of NSRP’s peacebuilding outcomes in terms of perception change, which is a first step towards practice change.

**NSRP has shifted the understanding and the narratives around violence and its causes, provoking practice and policy changes amongst Nigerian actors engaged in peacebuilding and stabilisation.**

In the NIEP March 2017 survey of platform participants, over 61% of respondents stated that their opinion over causes and nature of violence affecting their communities changed as a result of their participation in debates organised by NSRP. This indicates that the programme has been successful in challenging partisan views and unsubstantiated positions among target groups. This may be attributed to the combined effect of conflict and gender sensitivity training, dialogue and debates among state and non-state actors often informed by research findings, and support to direct beneficiaries to develop more nuanced opinions over violent conflict, which added together enabled conclusions to be increasingly based on analytical evidence. The March 2017 NIEP survey of platform participants showed that 18% of respondents believe that sensitisation and awareness raising has been one of the main actions taken by NSRP supported platforms. This points to a potentially wider impact attributable to opinion change provoked at platforms level. The next two most identified ‘main actions’ were dialogue among communities affected by instances of violence (16%) and mediation between conflicting parties (13%). This data points to a gradual shift in understanding and narratives around violent conflict across target groups, maximised by individual and group undertakings to disseminate information and influence opinions across their constituencies.

Advocacy to state and non-state actors was the fourth most identified ‘main action’ (11%) which supports the view that in many cases, bottom-up advocacy resulted in practice change at local or state level.

In terms of output-level monitoring, a positive trend in terms of conflict issues discussed at platform level, platform intervention on issues discussed, and positive outcome in terms of conflict prevention or mitigation, has been registered throughout the programme implementation period. This trend has registered notable differences at each platform level, with CPPs overachieving targets, and SCMAs and NPSF underachieving. This is likely to be because it is easier to identify a positive link between input/output and outcome for institutions operating close to where a conflict is taking place, which is increasingly diluted the further the institution is from the actual conflict.
Kaduna CPPs Coordinate with Government on Policies to Prevent Future Conflict

Following increased interactions between the Zaria CPP and the state commission of enquiry formed to review the security incident between the military and the IMN, the Zaria and Jema’a CPPs provided a memorandum to the commission of enquiry, and were later requested to provide additional information and analysis. The collaboration between the CPP and the commission of enquiry was deemed extremely productive by all parties, and led to further collaboration, between the Kaduna state governor and the CPP. The Kaduna state governor requested the CPPs to organise consultation meetings for the upcoming legislation seeking to regulate religious preaching – a bill considered necessary to mitigate the risk of extremist religious opinion fuelling more violence in the state. The CPP accepted the role offered by the Kaduna state governor and successfully amended some of the aspects of the draft legislation and engaged in its dissemination across communities, introducing the nature of the legislation, explaining its objectives and seeking to mitigate the risk of violence erupting following its promulgation.

In terms of top-down policy change, NSRP has been particularly successful where it has established positive working relationships, leading to increased trust and in turn requests for support, particularly at federal level (NPSF). The programme initiated debates around and supported the definition of a National Peace Policy in 2014, although the document was not eventually approved and promulgated into law, following the political changes at the 2015 national elections.

The NPSF had more success with policy advice on Emerging and Existing Security Challenges in FCT, confirming the finding that greater practice and policy change have occurred where the issues at stake are considered more relevant by platforms participants. The discussions led to the production of a policy brief resulting in direct interventions by the National Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and National Orientation Agency (NOA) leading to resolution of conflicts between herders and farmers over land. Warring parties were invited to discuss grievances and positions and peace deals have been agreed.

Emerging and Existing Security Challenges

NSRP produced a policy brief on ‘Emerging and Existing Security Challenges in FCT’ in August 2016. The policy brief included specific recommendations for NOA and NSCDC which were discussed at the NPSF where these two agencies are represented. NOA and NSCDC both acted on the recommendations with support from NSRP. A capacity building workshop on Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) through the use of the ‘Know your Neighbour’ mechanism (first piloted in LGAs in Borno State by Herwa Community Development Initiative) was organised in six Area Councils in FCT after the establishment of EWER committees in 60 communities in FCT through NSRP support. As a result, emerging threats of violence were identified and one community (Waru community) was reported to have tense conflict dynamics that were at risk of escalating into violence. Farmers in Waru had been fined for poisoning the cattle of the herders that had damaged their crops, however, the herders were not compensated for the loss of their cattle. NOA, NSCDC and partners mediated the dispute through dialogue and the conflict between farmers and herders in Waru district was resolved. The parties signed a peace agreement in June 2017 which also sets out how they will manage any future conflict without violence and agrees to identify a place for cattle grazing.

NPSF, through IPCR, also collaborated with UNDP to conduct a National Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) which will be launched together with the National Action Plan (NAP)
which outlines a roadmap to address conflicts analysed. Given the high-level participation among NPSF members, NSRP expects that the roadmap will be followed through without additional support, after the end of programme funding.

Finally, with support from NSRP, the NPSF and the Kaduna SCMA provided technical support to the Kaduna State House of Assembly on a bill to establish the Kaduna State Peace Commission. The bill has been passed by the House of Assembly and the Kaduna State Governor has signed it into law and announced the appointment of the first set of chairperson and commissioners to the Commission.

While NSRP established the NPSF as a joint civil society, federal level line ministry and security agencies forum to act on inputs provided (or received from SCMAs) and lead member agencies’ engagement in peacebuilding and conflict response policy, the NPSF has instead acted as a joint platform for discussion and analysis, rather than action. Given the highly political environment the NPSF has been operating within, this does not come as a surprise. Therefore NSRP has adapted its approach to the contextual challenges presented and has utilised the NPSF to access specific line ministries or security agencies, and provide direct technical support to these agencies through its component output 4.2: strategic engagement.

Sustainability

NSRP was designed to provoke practice and policy changes in managing conflict and building peace. The programme was to achieve this not by creating new structures but by supporting what was already there at local, state and federal levels and improve it. In this regard, during the course of the programme, NSRP has faced two major dilemmas:

1) Mapping and supporting existing (good) practices is not necessarily enough to provoke a (positive) change, in a context dominated by patronage-based politics, exclusion of marginalised groups and high-intensity conflict. In many cases change had to be driven by NSRP, through all available means. With this in mind, achieving sustainable change would require a longer period of time.

2) During the course of the programme, NSRP learned that people – target individuals or groups – tend to rally around institutions, structures, organisations rather than approaches or ideas. NSRP was not designed to create platforms, but to foster greater trust in the (informal) platforms that already exist. National security and defence council, state security council and local security committee have set membership which statutorily do not include civil society. The platforms were intended to be a space that offer statutorily members of the governmental structures opportunities to engage with and be accountable to the public.

3) However, as these informal platforms started receiving support from NSRP, they became increasingly functional and effective and in many cases they started seeking recognition in their own right rather than - or in parallel to - continue working informally to improve the federal, state or local formal security institutions. As such, individuals or groups participating in the most effective platforms supported by NSRP (the CPPs in particular) have repeatedly requested the programme to help them create an identifiable image by providing badges, t-shirts, symbols which would allow them to be recognised as peace actors and give them access and leverage to address conflicts as they emerge. These symbols would also give them a sense of purpose and belonging, as this is often what drives people to act. While it may be desirable to have professional peace actors, NSRP has so far resisted the demands for formalization as they deviate from purpose of the platforms and contradict the programme’s strategic principle of not establishing new institutions.
NSRP has struggled at times to find answers to these two dilemmas, and this struggle, which is real and has impacted on the programme’s overall success, has certainly played a part in the programme’s ability to achieve sustainable change across its operations.

Looking in detail at Output 1 platforms at federal level, the CSO Consultative Forum is convened by Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) and works in coordination with the NPSF. CISLAC is a national CSO with track record in implementing several donor supported programmes and engaging national stakeholders at the strategic level. The platform has served as a forum for coordinating civil society response to peace and security challenges which are shared through the NPSF. As a result of NSRP support, CISLAC has successfully engaged with a number of national and international agencies, bilateral and multilateral donors during the course of the programme. These include ECOWAS, which has recognized the platform as a key civil society contact in its Conflict Prevention Framework and it is keen to support the platform as part of its regional peace and security work. CISLAC itself is seeking to secure alternative funding streams for the platform and it is clear that platform sustainability will depend on CISLAC’s success in this regard.

At state level, NSRP’s goal was to promote coordination between state officials, security agencies and civil society in addressing threats to peace and security. In all the 8 states where SCMA’s have been established and are functional, this coordination has commenced. The underlying strategy for the sustainability of SCMA’s was based on the expectation that state governments would recognize the value of the platforms and gradually take over responsibility for hosting or supporting them, although concerns have been raised by some CSO stakeholders about the potential impact of state funding on the neutrality and independence of the platforms. As evident in the summary below, there is uneven progress across states of the extent to which SCMA’s are becoming recognized as relevant platforms for addressing threats to peace and security and have thus been able to secure support for their continuation.

The Delta State government provide the venue for meetings of the SCMA and relied on the platform for strategic interventions on matters of peace and security in the state. SCMA meetings hold in the Conference Hall of the Secretary to the State Government who is also represented at the meetings. No cost is charged for using the hall and the government appreciates the relevance of the SCMA. However, apart from the venue, the government has not provided any funding for SCMA initiatives which has so far been exclusively funded by NSRP. There have been overtures to the Office of the Secretary to the State Government (SSG) and the Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) agency in the state to support the platform; However, no firm commitment has been secured at this time.

In Bayelsa State, the SCMA was invited by the state government to serve on two committees charged with management of conflicts. The Centre for Conflict Studies, Niger Delta University, which convenes the platform, has committed to continue to host the platform, proving the relevance of the platform and the good reputation it has established in the state. Long term funding for the platform however has not yet been confirmed at this time.

In Rivers State, the Centre for Gender and Conflict Studies, University of Port Harcourt, which convenes the platform has secured approval of university authorities to continue hosting the platform. However, no funding has been provided for hosting in the shortterm pending approval of the Centre’s budget for the following financial year. Efforts to foster sustainability through the leveraging on partnership with the office of the Special Adviser to the Governor on Conflict Resolution to develop a peace policy has been slowed down by planned change of political appointees in the state.
NSRP organized a lessons sharing workshop between the SCMAst in the Niger Delta and the new UK Government CSSF funded Niger Delta conflict programme which is managed by Stakeholder Democracy Network, one of its CSO partners in region. In the short term, continuation of the SCMAst in the region would largely depend on the outcome of its application for support from the new CSSF supported conflict programme for the Niger Delta.

In **Plateau State** the Peace Building Agency has taken over management, hosting and funding of the platform and has secured long term government funding. NSRP has handed over Plateau SCMA and ensured a smooth transition to the agency.

In **Kano State**, Mambayya House, the current, extremely well respected convenor of the Kano SCMA has committed to continue to convening and funding the platform through its own budget.

In **Kaduna State**, a major step towards sustaining the platform has been achieved by obtaining government buy-in and support for the platform, which is now being hosted in the conference hall of the SSG at no cost to the platform. Additional costs to run the platforms are being discussed with the state government, however no firm commitment has been secured at this time.

In **Borno and Yobe States** the SCMAst have made substantial progress to re-establish a degree of communication, trust and accountability between the conflict affected population and state security agencies. The work done by the Borno SCMA in reaching out to government, security forces and civil society actors and debate and address peace and conflict issues is remarkable, considering the level of violent conflict in the region until very recently. Despite the considerable progress made, the Borno SCMA will require further assistance, and the British Council-managed ‘Managing Conflict in North Eastern Nigeria’ (MCN) programme funded by the EU Trust Fund will continue supporting the platform.

At LGA level, NSRP has supported 27 CPPs across 8 states achieving a varied degrees of progress in terms of early warning and early action. In **Kaduna and Plateau**, commitments have been made by local government authorities to host and support the platforms once NSRP concludes. In **Yobe and Borno**, CPPs are expected to continue functioning with support from the British Council MCN programme, which will also see replication of CPPs across the north east thereby increasing their number and the potential for impact.

In the remaining states, efforts to ensure that CPPs are sustained are continuing, but as yet with no definite results. It is worth adding that as a result of the support provided by NSRP, there are a considerable number of local CSOs whose capacity has been developed in a way that has enabled them to mature into more professional and organised institutions, which are now in a better position to access direct funding from international donors.

**Conclusion**

In the course of the last five years, NSRP has become the leading peacebuilding and stabilisation programme in Nigeria, recognised at national and international levels for the quality of the conflict analysis produced, the relevance of its research outputs on peace and security, and the change it has provoked in terms of language, attitudes and responses to violent conflict among its Nigerian stakeholders.

NSRP has delivered sound conflict analysis at macro level, contributing to reframing narratives around violent conflict in Nigeria, and also at micro level, by providing detailed conflict assessments occurring at local level, but with an impact at regional or national levels. As such NSRP has led to a language and perception shift with respect to certain conflicts,
such as the conflicts in Kano and Plateau states – both perceived to be religious in nature but which are actually resource-based in reality.

Based on the evidence produced, NSRP has empowered target individuals and groups to take action, and positively engage in peace rather than tolerating or perpetuating violence, and while it has achieved its most remarkable results at local level – empowering state and citizens representatives to analyse, discuss and address over fifty potentially lethal conflicts in Nigeria – its outreach has been much greater. NSRP’s policy work in the area of security and governance has resulted in the design of a series of conflict and gender sensitive reforms; NSRP’s engagement with state security officials has re-established trust, and in turn increased communications between citizens and security forces, and has boosted state security forces efficiency and effectiveness as a result.

This paper has provided a selection of examples of perceptions and attitude change with respect to the governance of security that NSRP has provoked, highlighting areas of strength but also pointing to weaknesses in programme design or delivery. The document has highlighted change which is directly attributable to the programme in terms of immediate results and outcomes as the limited scope of the paper makes it impossible to provide an account of the full breadth of NSRP’s overall impact in terms of contribution to peace and stabilisation in Nigeria. A closer analysis of data from broader perception surveys commissioned by NSRP suggest the programme has had a much wider and deeper than expected impact in terms of how conflict is framed and how conflict management mechanisms and security responses have improved in NSRP target states across Nigeria. This will be NSRP’s long term legacy in the country – empowering people to imagine a different, more peaceful Nigeria, and harnessing the potential of each Nigerian to make this vision a reality.